In the Matter of FOOD PARADE, INC., Doing Business as GREENFIELD SHOPRITE, Respondent, v OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF COUNTY OF NASSAU et al., Appellants.
Court of Appeals of New York
October 24, 2006
8 NY3d 273 | 859 NE2d 473 | 825 NYS2d 667
Argued September 14, 2006
Lorna B. Goodman, County Attorney, Mineola (Peter J. Clines of counsel), for appellants. I. The Appellate Division decision ignores controlling principles of consumer protection law and leaves consumers vulnerable to the deceptive sale of expired goods. (Matter of Pathmark Stores v Office of Consumer Affairs of County of Nassau, 1 AD3d 520; Reusens v Gerard, 160 App Div 625, affd sub nom. de Ridder v Gerard, 221 NY 665; FTC v Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 US 374; FTC v Algoma Lumber Co., 291 US 67; Vallery v Bermuda Star Line, 141 Misc 2d 395; People v Volkswagen of Am., 47 AD2d 868; Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268; McDonald v North Shore Yacht Sales, 134 Misc 2d 910; 23 Realty Assoc. v Teigman, 213 AD2d 306; Maldonado v Collectibles Intl., Inc., 969 F Supp 7.) II. The decision upsets the traditional deference accorded to administrative determinations by this Court and other judicial departments. (Matter of 172 E. 122 St. Tenants Assn. v Schwarz, 73 NY2d 340; Seittelman v Sabol, 91 NY2d 618; Matter of Elcor Health Servs. v Novello, 100 NY2d 273; Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262; Matter of American Tel. & Tel. Co. v State Tax Commn., 61 NY2d 393; NLRB v Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 US 111; Matter of Nelson v Roberts, 304 AD2d 20; Matter of Dunn Appraisal Co. v Melton, 79 AD2d 707; Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434; Matter of Louis Harris & Assoc. v deLeon, 84 NY2d 698.)
Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale (Merril S. Biscone, Evan H. Krinick and Michael P. Versichelli of counsel), for respondent. I. The Supreme Court‘s order should be affirmed in light of the fact that the determination of the Office of Consumer Affairs was arbitrary, capricious, irrational and without jurisdiction. (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222; Matter of Borenstein v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 88 NY2d 756; Matter of Maryhaven Ctr. of Hope v Wing, 251 AD2d 413, 92 NY2d 889; Matter of Valle v Buscemi, 233 AD2d 334; Matter of 4M Holding Co. v Town Bd. of Town of Islip, 185 AD2d 317, 81 NY2d 1053; Matter of VR Equities v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 118 AD2d 459; Robin v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 30 NY2d 347; Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423; Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v Town of Guilderland, 74 NY2d 372; Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Town of Red Hook, 60 NY2d 99.) II. The instant proceeding was not premature. (Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52; Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 87 NY2d 136; Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 301 AD2d 845; Matter of Parkway Hosp. v Axelrod, 178 AD2d 644, 80 NY2d 921; Matter of Good Samaritan Hosp. v Axelrod, 150 AD2d 775, 75 NY2d 703; Bankers Trust Corp. v New York City Dept. of Fin., 301 AD2d 321, 99 NY2d 507.)
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, New York City (Daniel Smirlock, Laura Etlinger, Jane M. Azia and Thomas G. Conway of counsel), amicus curiae. I. Deceptive practices laws are properly construed to include the sale of expired products. (Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v Philip Morris USA Inc., 3 NY3d 200; Karlin v IVF Am., 93 NY2d 282; Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314; New York v Feldman, 210 F Supp 2d 294; Maldonado v Collectibles Intl., Inc., 969 F Supp 7; Matter of State of New York v Maiorano, 189 AD2d 766; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94 NY2d 330; Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43; Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20; People v Apple Health & Sports Clubs, 206 AD2d 266, 84 NY2d 1004.) II.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROSENBLATT, J.
Many consumer goods bear expiration dates, as required by law. In the case before us, a supermarket displayed a number of products bearing expired dates. We must decide whether this is a deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the Nassau County Administrative Code. We hold that offering such products for sale is not deceptive unless the retailer alters or disguises the expiration dates. Without doubt, the Legislature may prohibit and punish the sale of certain outdated or stale products. We cannot, however, fit such sales or displays into the code‘s “deceptive trade practice” proscription.
Local Law No. 2-1970 of the County of Nassau, adding Nassau County Administrative Code, chapter XXI, title D, § 21-10.2 (the Act), reads as follows, in pertinent part:
“1. Unfair Trade Practices Prohibited. . .
“(a) . . . No person shall engage in any deceptive or unconscionable trade practice in the sale . . . or in the offering for sale . . . of any consumer goods. . .
“2. Definitions. . .
“b. ‘Deceptive trade practice.’ Any false . . . or misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other representation of any kind, which has the capacity, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers and is made in connection with the sale . . . or . . . the offering for sale . . . of consumer goods. . . . [D]eceptive trade practices include but are not limited to:
“(1) representations that: . . .
“(d) goods or services are of [a] particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if they are of another.”
After an investigation, the Nassau County Office of Consumer Affairs cited petitioner (Shoprite) for displaying 144 products with expired manufacturers’ dates. The products included vitamins, baby formula, nasal decongestant and tanning oil. Following an administrative hearing, the agency fined Shoprite $3,600.
Shoprite brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the agency‘s determination. Supreme Court concluded that the agency acted without a sound basis in reason and that its determination lacked a reasonable basis in law. The court held that Shoprite made no misrepresentation and committed no deceptive act by merely displaying for sale items that were plainly marked as outdated. The court annulled the agency‘s determination. The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that Shoprite did not misrepresent the quality of the goods, and noting that each item was marked by the manufacturer with an unaltered and unconcealed expiration date.1 We now affirm.
The agency argues that in displaying expired products for sale, the supermarket misled consumers by making an “implied representation” that the items were unexpired. That could well
The state statute does two things. First,
Second,
Here, there is no claim that the dates were in any way obscured, nor does the Nassau County Act prohibit the sale of expired over-the-counter drugs or any other products. It does prohibit misleading or deceptive sales or displays, but we are unable to conclude that the sale or display of an item plainly (out)dated is deceptive or misleading.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
The Nassau County Unfair Trade Practices Act, like its federal and state counterparts, regulates a wide array of conduct affecting consumers. It prohibits “deceptive trade practice[s],” which are defined as
“[a]ny false, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other representation of any kind, which has the capacity, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers and is made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan of consumer goods or services” (Nassau County Administrative Code § 21-10.2 [2] [b]).
The local law further clarifies that a deceptive practice includes the “failure to state a material fact if such . . . failure deceives or tends to deceive” (Nassau County Administrative Code § 21-10.2 [2] [b] [3]).
The language used by the Nassau County Legislature is similar to that employed by Congress and the New York State Legislature in federal and state consumer protection laws. Since 1938, Congress has precluded “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in . . . commerce” (
This Court has broadly construed general consumer protection laws to effectuate their remedial purposes, applying the state deceptive practices law to a full spectrum of consumer-oriented conduct, from the sale of “vanishing premium” life insurance policies (see Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94 NY2d 330, 344 [1999]) to the provision of infertility services (see Karlin v IVF Am., 93 NY2d 282 [1999]). We have repeatedly emphasized that
“apply to virtually all economic activity, and their application has been correspondingly broad . . . . The reach of these statutes provide[s] needed authority to cope with the numerous, ever-changing types of false and deceptive business practices which plague consumers in our State” (Karlin, 93 NY2d at 290-291 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).
And it is not always necessary for legislatures to supply administrative agencies with
“rigid formulas in fields where flexibility in the adaptation of the legislative policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute[s] the very essence of the programs. Rather, the standards prescribed by the Legislature are to be read in light of the conditions in which they are to be applied” (Matter of Tommy & Tina, Inc. v Department of Consumer Affairs of City of N.Y., 95 AD2d 724, 724 [1st Dept 1983] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], affd for reasons stated 62 NY2d 671 [1984]).
This is particularly true in the arena of consumer protection where “the proscriptions . . . are flexible[ ] to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business
In determining what types of conduct may be deceptive practices under state law, this Court has applied an objective standard which asks whether the “representation or omission [was] likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances” (Gaidon, 94 NY2d at 344 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 26 [1995]), taking into account not only the impact on the “average customer” but also on “the vast multitude which the statutes were enacted to safeguard—including the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general impressions” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 273 [1977]).
In my view, the determination that Shoprite‘s practice of offering expired products for sale to the public was deceptive should have been sustained. First, there is nothing novel about the County‘s conclusion that the sale of expired products can be deceptive. Since at least 1985—prior to the enactment of
* In fact, although at that time no state statute specifically stated that the sale of expired drugs was a misleading practice, in 1985 Attorney General Abrams took regulatory action against five major retailers under the auspices of
Second, the interpretation given the local law by the Office of Consumer Affairs, the agency charged with administering it, is reasonable and consistent with the plain language of the provision. The Nassau County local law clarifies that a deceptive practice includes the “failure to state a material fact if such . . . failure deceives or tends to deceive” (Nassau County Administrative Code § 21-10.2 [2] [b] [3]). From an objective standard, the fact that baby formula, an over-the-counter drug, or a vitamin has expired is a material fact since it would bear on a reasonable consumer‘s decision to purchase the product. Put another way, faced with the choice of purchasing an unexpired product or an expired product for the same cost, a reasonable consumer would undoubtedly purchase the unexpired product.
The Federal Trade Commission requires that expiration dates be included on such products precisely because their efficacy diminishes over time and the products are less effective after the expiration date has passed. Even Shoprite conceded in its petition that expiration dates are included “[t]o assure that a drug product meets applicable standards of identity, strength, quality and purity at the time of sale.” This concern is especially acute in the case of baby formula because “[t]he nutritional quality of infant formulas . . . deteriorates with time” (48 Fed Reg 31880, 31883 [1983]) and the product is used by infants, arguably the most vulnerable members of society. If administered after its effective date, infant formula may not supply needed nutrients and, in this respect, poses a particular danger to unwary consumers who may believe their children are receiving adequate nutrition when, in fact, they are not. Here, for example, Shoprite was cited for offering Carnation baby formula for sale months after product expiration dates had passed.
higher penalty against violators ($500 per violation pursuant to
The Office of Consumer Affairs rationally determined that the fact that Shoprite did not conceal the expiration dates did not shield it from liability under the local law. Shoprite acknowledged in its papers that the manufacturers’ expiration dates at issue were tiny markings on the bottoms of packages that were sometimes made by a stamped impression, without contrasting ink, and were often difficult to read. In the words of Shoprite‘s president, “some of the dates [on the products at issue] were so illegible that no reasonable person could be expected to read these dates” and some “needed a magnifying glass in order to be read.”
The manufacturers’ expiration marks at issue were unobtrusive and unlikely to attract the attention of the average consumer. In this respect, they were akin to “small print” disclaimers on advertisements, which may be insufficient to overcome a misleading overall impression in the context of a deceptive practices claim (see e.g. Gaidon, 94 NY2d at 345). For this reason, I believe that the Office of Consumer Affairs rationally rejected Shoprite‘s argument that, because careful consumers could individually check product expiration dates, it was relieved of any obligation to cull expired products from its shelves. The consumer protection laws are designed to protect all consumers—not just discerning, unhurried and meticulous shoppers. Perhaps a reasonable consumer can be expected to check the expiration dates on perishable items such as milk or meat (which, in any event, are generally not as unobtrusive as the marks at issue in this case), but the Office of Consumer Affairs could rationally conclude that many do not consistently inspect expiration dates on more durable items like cold medicine, sunblock and baby formula.
To be sure, the County‘s interpretation of its deceptive practices law places a responsibility on retailers to inspect shelves
I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and reinstate the determination of the Nassau County Office of Consumer Affairs.
Chief Judge KAYE and Judges CIPARICK, READ and R.S. SMITH concur with Judge ROSENBLATT; Judge GRAFFEO dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion; Judge PIGOTT taking no part.
Order affirmed, with costs.
