Lоney P. FONTENOT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, LICENSE CONTROL DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 5712.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
December 21, 1976.
Rehearing Denied January 26, 1977.
341 So. 2d 80
Before HOOD, DOMENGEAUX and HUMPHRIES, JJ.
Foye L. Lowe, Jr., Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Baton Route, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff-appellant, Loney P. Fontenot, brought this action to enjoin the defendant-appellee, State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety, License Control Division, from suspending his driving privileges pursuant to
By virtue of
“. . . revoke the license of any person, for a period of twelve months, upon receiving satisfactory еvidence of the conviction or of the entry of a plea of guilty and sentence thereupon or of the forfeiture of bail of any such person chаrged with any of the following crimes:
. . . . . .
(2) Conviction or the entry of a plea of guilty and sentence thereupon, or of the forfeiture of bail of any such person оn the second subsequent offense for operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, . . . where any or all of the offenses were the result of violations of a state law, a municipal ordinance or a federal law or any combinаtion of them;”
In the instant case the Department alleged that plаintiff had plead guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated on two separate occasions and in two different states, to-wit: Municipal Court, Camden, Arkansas, on September 21, 1973; and City Court, Lafayette, Louisiana, on July 22, 1974. According to plaintiff‘s petition, he was not ordered to surrender his driver‘s license until November 14, 1975. This action was instituted оn December 4, 1975.
Plaintiff contends that the copy of the record of the proceedings of the Municipal Court of Camden, Arkansas, failed to comply with the provisions of
THE ARKANSAS GUILTY PLEA
Our Courts have held that driver‘s license revocation proceedings pursuant to the statute at issue are civil matters and that uncounseled guilty pleas for prior driving violations are admissible and relevant. See Berger v. Department of Public Safety, 327 So.2d 705 (La.App.1st Cir. 1976), writ refused La., 330 So.2d 310. See also State v. Page, 332 So.2d 427 (La.1976).
Conсerning the record of the proceeding in the Municipal Court of the city of Camden, Arkansas, the authenticity and admissibility thereof is governed by the provisions of
“Art. 1395. Same; out of state records
An offiсial record, or an entry therein, of the United States, of any state other than Louisiana, of any territory of the United States, of any foreign country, or of any political subdivision, corporation or agency of any of the above, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by a copy attested by the оfficer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which thе record is kept is within the United States or within a territory or insular possession subject to the dominion of the United States, the certificate may be made by a judge of а court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public offiсer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign state or country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.”
The document in question is a copy of the proceedings in the abovementioned court on September 21, 1973, indicating that plaintiff herein was charged with the offense of “D.W.I.” and that he plead guilty to same on that date. At the bottom of that document is the following cеrtificate:
Without engaging in a detailed analysis thereof, we note that, on its face, the above described document complies with the requirements of
PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES
Plaintiff argues that the State‘s action against him should be considered as either a criminal misdemeanor proсeeding or a prosecution for an offense or quasi offense against the state, the applicable prescriptive periods thereto being six months and one year, respectively.
Concerning the prescription argument, our brothers of the Fourth Circuit have construed
“The `forthwith’ mandate of the statute is direсted to the Department for the purpose of protecting the public at large from the habitually intoxicated motorist and not to create by implicаtion a prescriptive period to relieve the convicted driver from the penalties of his own misconduct.”
The defense of laches has no statutory basis but rather is an equitable doctrine. While no rigid rule exists concerning application of the doctrine we feel that the case of Molero v. Bass, 322 So.2d 452 (La.App.4th Cir. 1975), writ refused La., 325 So.2d 609, presents an adequate statement relative thereto:
“It is difficult to state the elеments of laches or to state a `test’ for the application of laches. In general, since the applicability of laches is within the discretion of the court, each case rests upon its own particular set of circumstances. It is possible to say that laches has no application where there has been no delay in asserting the right. However, delay of time alone will not suffice, there must be other circumstances. Prime among the other circumstances most often mentioned in the jurisprudence are a prejudicial change of conditions occurring during the delay and reliance by the defendant upon the inaсtion of the plaintiff. Munson v. Martin, 249 La. 925, 192 So.2d 126 (1966); Labarre v. Rateau, 210 La. 34, 26 So.2d 279, supra; Shirey v. Campbell, 151 So.2d 557 supra; 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 115-119.”
Admittedly, there was a delay in the instant case of approximately one year from the date of plaintiff‘s second conviction to the time the department instituted proceedings against him. However, as the above quoted language indicates, a delay of time alone will not suffice to invoke the doctrine of laches. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial change of condition during the delay or any reliance on his part
For the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendant-appellant.
AFFIRMED.