¶ 1 This is an appeal from a protection from abuse order entered against appellant Richard Eugene Fonner. On June 10, 1998, the trial court ordered appellant to refrain from аbusing, harassing, or stalking appellee Cindy Lou Fonner and their three minor children, prohibited appellant from entering the place of employment, business, or school/daycare оf appellee and the minor children, evicted appellant from the marital residence, and granted custody of the minor children to appellee. Appellant filed a mоtion for reconsideration. Following argument on appellant’s motion, the trial court amended the June 10, 1998 order and granted appellant supervised visitation with the minor children eaсh Sunday from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that abuse occurred as defined in the Protection frоm Abuse Act.
¶ 2 ‘When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence was not sufficient to support an order of protection from abuse, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inference, determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Miller on Behalf of Walker v. Walker,
113 The purpose of the Protection from Abuse Act (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101
et seq.,
is to protect the victims of domestic violence from the perpetrators of such abuse.
See Snyder v. Snyder,
¶ 5 Appellant testified that he did not threaten to hit appellee on the night in question. (Id. at 33.) Appellant was specifically asked: “Did you do anything on that night on June 2 nd to make her reasonably think that you would possibly hit her?” (Id.) Appellant responded: “No, I can’t think of anything I would have. No. No.” (Id.) Appellant denied threatening or grabbing appellee. (Id. at 36.) On cross-examination, appellant was asked: So “[a]ll those issues she brought up ..., they were all wrong?” He respondеd: “Yes. Yes, I would say they are wrong.” (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted appellee’s request for a protection from abuse order.
¶ 6 Appellant now argues tо this court that cases involving the finding of abuse based on a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury require more than screaming and wall punching. (Appellant’s brief at 7.) Basically, appellant contends that in order for a victim to meet her burden of proving a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury that physical contact with the victim should occur. In support thereof, appellant cites three cases:
Snyder, supra; Weir v. Weir,
¶7 We note that Snyder, supra, and Weir, supra, were decided prior to the Act’s amendment in 1994. Both cases involved a finding of abuse under § 6102(a)(2) which, at the time, read: “Placing by physical menace another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” (emphasis added) After the Act’s amendment in 1994, the words “by physical menace” were deleted. Since the instant case arose after the Act was amended, apрellant’s rebanee on Snyder or Weir is unavailing. 4
¶ 9 In DeHaas, appellee father, on behalf of his three children, petitioned the trial court for a protection from abuse order against his wife. The facts underlying the petition alleged that Mrs. DeHaas, while bathing one of the parties’ children, became angry and held the child down on her back in the bathtub and splashed water in the child’s faсe until the child began to choke. Mrs. DeHaas claimed that she did not attempt to inflict any physical injury on the child and, in fact, the child did not suffer any physical injury. The trial court found abuse had occurred under § 6102(a)(2). In affirming the trial court, we opined: “As the Act clearly states, [ ], the victim of abuse need not suffer actual injury, but rather be in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Id. at 102.
¶ 10 Instantly, the only physical contact to occur, according to appellee, was when appellant touched her arm. Appel-lee testified appellant was loud, angry and badgеring her on the night in question. Appellant briefly restricted appellee’s movement and touched her arm. When appellee pulled away, appellant followed her and punched a wall near appellee. Based on appellant’s actions, appellee was in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. This fear caused her to call the police. The trial court found appellee’s testimony credible, and granted her petition.
See Williamson v. Williamson,
¶ 11 While physical cоntact may occur, it is not a pre-requisite for a finding of abuse under § 6102(a)(2) of the Act. Moreover, if the goal of the Act is to prevent physical and sexual abuse, see Snyder, supra, then clearly a victim nеed not wait for physical or sexual abuse to occur in order for the Act to apply. Here, the issuance of the PFA order was appropriate.
¶ 12 Order affirmed.
Notes
. While the trial court did not specifically state that it found abuse based on
. Appellee had filed a complaint in divorce sometime in May 1998. (Notes of testimony, 6/10/98 at 20.)
. Appellee was asked how close the punch came to hitting her. (Notеs of testimony, 6/10/98 at 7.) She described the physical distance as "The distance between this podium and the bench." (Id.)
. Appellant states that
Weir, supra
and
Snyder, supra
involved physical contact with the victim which, in turn, enabled the victim to meet her burden of proving "reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” (Appellant’s brief at 7.) We point out that at the time
Weir
and
Snyder
were decided, the definition of § 6102(a)(2) did not include the word "reasonable” but rather included the phrase "by physical menace.” Both cases involved the victim being placed by the defendant’s
physical menace
in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. In
Weir
there was no physical contact between appellant and appellee. This court
Snyder
involved an escalating pattern of abusive conduct which culminated in an incident where the husband physically restrained his wife, threw hеr to the floor, and threatened to have sex with her.
Snyder,