Folsom v. WynnFolsom v. Wynn
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Almon, Shores, Houston, Steagall, Ingram, Cook, Maddox, Hornsby, Kennedy
These appeals deal with the constitutionality of Alabama Code 1975,
In a memorandum dated January 14, 1992, Governor Guy Hunt issued a proration order, pursuant to
William J. Wynn, a judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court, filed a complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Governor Hunt.2 The complaint, filed pursuant to
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that if
The case was heard by Judge Charles Price, who entered a final judgment holding
“At issue is the ‘proration’ statute, Ala. Code
§ 41-4-90 (1975). Via this statute, the Legislature has delegated to the Executive the authority to decide whether and when to declare proration; the amount or degree of proration; and exactly how to distribute proration in order to avoid ‘discrimination.’ The precise question is whether this delegation violates Section 43 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which provides that ‘the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them.’“The parties agree that the test is ‘whether [the] statute constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power or merely a power to administer and execute the declared policy of the legislative body within reasonably clear standards fixed by the statute.’ Nelson v. Donaldson, 255 Ala. 76, 81, 50 So.2d 244 (1951). See, for example, Jetton v. Sanders, 49 Ala. App. 669, 275 So.2d 349 (1973), holding that the Governor could not reduce the fee schedule for paying indigent defense lawyers. . . .
“Because
§ 41-4-90 attempts to delegate the primary function of the Legislature (the ‘power of the purse‘), this Court finds that§ 41-4-90 includes an insufficient limitation of powers. Under§ 41-4-90 , the Governor is not performing mere ministerial tasks, but exercises wide policy and discretionary judgments. ‘The authority to determine the amount of appropriations necessary for the performance of the essential function of government is vested fully and exclusively in the legislature.’ Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 306, 293 So.2d 830 (1974). Therefore,§ 41-4-90 violates Sections 42 and 43 of the Constitution, the separation of powers doctrine. To grant the Governor such sweeping power would circumvent the historical significance of the aforestated doctrine.”Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1991), is directly on point. . . .
“III
“In the alternative, this Court finds
§ 41-4-90 is unconstitutional to the extent it might apply to the co-equal branches ofgovernment, the Legislative and the Judiciary. In other words, even if the Governor is given clear enough standards in § 41-4-90 , the Governor may not ‘prorate’ the Legislature or the Judiciary. Section41-4-90 speaks of ‘the various departments, boards, [bureaus, commissions, agencies, offices and institutions of the state‘].“Again, the Chiles case is on point: ‘The inclusion of the judicial branch within the definition of “state agency,” and hence the placing of the judiciary‘s fiscal affairs under the management of the executive branch, disregards the constitutional mandate of coordinate power-sharing. . . .’
“IV
“Note that § 6.10 of the Judicial article also provides that, ‘Adequate and reasonable financing for the entire unified judicial system shall be provided. Adequate and reasonable appropriations shall be made by the legislature. . . .’ . . . This Court also notes that former Chief Justice Howell Heflin believed that the Judicial Article grants the Judiciary the responsibility to order ‘reasonable and adequate’ funding in the ‘unlikely event’ that ‘the Legislature should be remiss in complying with its constitutional mandate.’ Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 326, 293 So.2d 830 (1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting).”
Thus, Judge Price entered a judgment declaring
Alternatively, but also under the doctrine of separation of powers, Judge Price held
We begin our consideration of the constitutionality of
The essential history and purpose of
“The court accordingly is entitled to look, in its effort to arrive at the intention of the Legislature, to other provisions of the same act, to consider its relation to other statutory and constitutional requirements, to view its history and the purposes sought to be accomplished thereby, and critically to examine the results that will flow from giving the language in question the meaning it might have if none of these things were considered.”
Abramson, supra, 229 Ala. at 7, 155 So. at 594.
The Court in Abramson upheld the statute by refusing to give the language of the statute its literal meaning. Under the Abramson Court‘s analysis, the Legislature‘s intent in using the term “all appropriations” was to require proration of only those appropriations that were not constitutionally mandated or otherwise excepted or specified as fully payable in accompanying statutes. The
“Again, there are appropriations made pursuant to constitutional requirement which just as manifestly were not intended to be, and which in fact could not be, prorated, but the full amount of which, by express constitutional provision, must be appropriated by the Legislature to the purposes specified in the Constitution. . . .
“Other parts of the same act and other parts of our fundamental law, therefore, show that the language relied on cannot be given the broad meaning it might otherwise have, and cannot be held to mean all appropriations of every kind and character shall be subject to allotment and proration; nor are we confined in arriving at the true meaning of the Legislature to the literal meaning of the words used.”
229 Ala. at 6, 155 So. at 593. (Emphasis in the original.)
Although the Court in Abramson discussed “essential government functions” and interpreted the proration statute (now at
The proration statute (now codified at
The trial court‘s initial recognition that the doctrine of separation of powers applies to this case was correct. It is settled law that the Legislature may not constitutionally delegate its powers, whether the general power to make law or the powers encompassed within that general power, including the “power of the purse” — the power to make appropriations. Cagle v. Qualified Electors of Winston County, 470 So.2d 1208 (Ala. 1985); Nelson v. Donaldson, 255 Ala. 76, 50 So.2d 244 (1951); Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110, 26 So.2d 849 (1946); and Opinion of the Justices No. 64, 244 Ala. 386, 13 So.2d 674 (1943). However, the doctrine of separation of powers does not prohibit the Legislature‘s delegating the power to execute and administer the laws, so long as the delegation carries reasonably clear standards governing the execution and administration. Nelson v. Donaldson, 248 Ala. at 122, 26 So.2d at 849; Heck v. Hall, 238 Ala. 274, 190 So. 280 (1939).
The trial court held that the language of
Section
In accord with the Abramson construction of
In light of general State and Federal constitutional requirements and the specific provisions of Ala. Const., Amend. 328, our interpretation means that
The general language of
While we read
“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘agency/department’ shall include state agencies, departments, boards, bureaus, the legislature and institutions of the state.”
Ala. Code 1975,
As recognized by the Court in Abramson, the Governor‘s application of
The Federal and State Constitutions, which dictate the duty and function of each branch of government, including the judiciary, are the ultimate authority concerning the resources available to perform those functions.
” ‘The Constitution of Alabama, like that of the nation and of the other states, is the supreme law within the realm and sphere of its authority. Subject only to the restraints resulting from the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Alabama is the highest form and expression of law that exists in the state.’ ”
Gafford v. Pemberton, 409 So.2d 1367, 1374 (Ala. 1982) (quoting Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 393, 87 So. 375, 380 (1921)). This principle, that constitutional directions, first from the United States Constitution and then from the Constitution of Alabama, take precedence over legislative proscriptions and affect how those proscriptions apply, is critical to the constitutional application of
In considering the application of proration under
The Judiciary is a separate, independent, and co-equal branch of government, and the United States Constitution and the Constitution of Alabama describe its duties at some length. Cases from the United States Supreme Court and cases from this Court have further defined those services that are constitutionally required of the Judiciary for the benefit of the people. Without attempting to list every specific duty that is constitutionally required of the Judiciary, we note that the courts are, in many respects, the means by which the people of this nation assure their most fundamental individual rights. The courts are the forum where the guarantees set out in the Bill of Rights, Amendments I-X, to the United States Constitution, and in the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Alabama, Art. I, §§ 1-36, gain meaning and limit governmental power.
For example, the right of the individual to be free of unreasonable search and seizure,
Many requirements imposed on the Judiciary for timely delivery of judicial services ultimately stem from Federal and State constitutional provisions. For example, juvenile court work reports must be presented, as required by the administrative director of courts, before the 10th day of each month,
The Alabama Constitution also requires the delivery of judicial services in civil proceedings. Each person in this State has, along with many other enumerated rights, a constitutionally guaranteed right to a forum for the enforcement of his or her contracts, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 22; a right to prosecute a civil cause, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 10; and a right to a jury trial, Ala. Const. Art. I, § 11. Federal constitutional requirements also directly require the delivery of similar services by the courts of this State.
The right to a timely civil jury trial, for example, is especially important to American jurisprudence, and that right is constitutionally guaranteed by both our Federal and State Constitutions. Under the appropriate circumstances, Federal courts have held that the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution means that in the Federal courts citizens may not be deprived of this essential right by financial considerations. In Armster v. United States District Court, 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986), the court reviewed the efficacy of a blanket three and one-half month moratorium on civil jury trials due to an alleged insufficiency of funds. The court began by noting the importance of civil jury trials:
” ‘The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen . . . should be jealously guarded by the courts.’ ”
792 F.2d at 1428 (quoting Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53, 62 S.Ct. 854, 54, 86 L.Ed. 1166 (1942). After considering “the relationship between constitutional rights and the public fisc,” 792 F.2d at 1429, the court concluded:
“The constitutional mandate that federal courts provide civil litigants with a system of civil jury trials is clear. There is no price tag on the continued existence of that system, or on any other constitutionally provided right.
“. . . .
“We conclude that the civil jury trial system may not be suspended for lack of funds. Specifically, we conclude that the seventh amendment right to a civil jury trial is violated when, because of such a suspension, an individual is not afforded, for any significant period of time, a jury trial he would otherwise receive.”
Id. at 1429-30. Although we recognize that the right to a jury trial in our State courts is guaranteed by our State Constitution, while Armster was based on the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and although we recognize that perhaps not every delay will amount to a denial of a constitutional right, the rationale in Armster does underscore the weight that must be accorded the timely delivery of constitutional rights in light of the scarcity of funding and resources.
The various rights vested in our citizens by the State and Federal Constitutions require that the Judiciary have adequate and reasonable resources available for it to serve as the forum for the enforcement of those rights. Moreover, the Alabama Constitution specifically requires the courts to be open and to be the avenue through which every person in this State may seek a remedy for an injury.
Most jurisdictions, on a similar review of the duties constitutionally required of the Judiciary, have held that the Judiciary, as a separate, independent, and co-equal branch of government, has the inherent power to assure itself sufficient funding to perform its duties. See, e.g., County of Barnstable v. Commonwealth, 410 Mass. 326, 572 N.E.2d 548 (1991); Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1991); In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991); Abbott v. Spencer, 790 S.W.2d 171, 302 Ark. 396 (1990); Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. 1988); Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982); In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1665, 29 L.Ed.2d 138 (1971); Millholen v. Riley, 211 Cal. 29, 293 P. 69 (1930); and Moynahan v. City of New York, 205 N.Y. 181, 98 N.E. 482 (1912).
The foregoing cases, and many others of similar rationale, hold that the inherent power of the Judiciary to assure adequate funding stems from two basic factors: (1) the position of the Judiciary as a separate and co-equal branch of government, and (2) the fact that essential services are required of the Judiciary on behalf of every person by the constitution of each jurisdiction. Chief Justice Heflin described the inherent power of the Judiciary to continue its constitutional function:
“The concept of inherent power is not some device created by a power-hungry judiciary, but is a doctrine that is concomitant to the very structure of our tripartite form of government. If the judicial system is to be a truly co-equal and independent branch answerable only to the sovereign — the people — than it must have the power to maintain itself under exigent circumstances. Certainly in the usual situation it is not necessary for courts to exercise any extraordinary power since the other great branches of government are also charged with the constitutional duty to provide for an effective judiciary. It is only when the other branches are remiss in their constitutional duties that the court must act to preserve the efficient administration of justice.”
Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 319, 293 So.2d 830, 847 (1974) (Heflin, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Helfin‘s rationale, coupled with the analysis of many other jurisdictions and case law from this State, see, e.g., Ex Parte Huguley Water System, 282 Ala. 633, 213 So.2d 799 (1968), and Ex Parte Wetzel, 243 Ala. 130, 8 So.2d 824 (1942), would be sufficient to warrant our holding in this case. As Chief Justice Heflin said, the doctrine of inherent power “is a fundamental element of the jurisprudence of this nation.” 292 Ala. at 321, 293 So.2d at 849.
Aside from the inherent power in the Judiciary to assure sufficient resources to continue its function, our Constitution expressly requires Legislative appropriation of such resources:
“Adequate and reasonable financing for the entire unified judicial system shall be provided. Adequate and reasonable appropriations shall be made by the legislature for the entire unified judicial system, exclusive of probate courts and municipal courts. The legislature shall receive recommendations for appropriations for the trial courts from the administrative director of courts and for the appellate courts from each such court.”
Ala. Const., Amend. 328, § 6.10. We note with approval Chief Justice Heflin‘s discussion of this provision in his dissent in Morgan County Commission, supra:
“The constitutional mandate ‘adequate and reasonable financing’ in [§ 6.10, quoted above] is more expansive than the clause ‘adequate and reasonable appropriations’ and there is no limitation of this responsibility to a specific branch following
the clause ‘shall be provided‘. . . . Further, it seems clear that adequate and reasonable financing of the court system of this state is a constitutional priority for nowhere else in the Constitution do the words ‘adequate and reasonable’ appear in relationship to financing and appropriations.”
292 Ala. at 326, 293 So.2d at 854-55. (Heflin, C.J., dissenting; emphasis in the original; footnote omitted.) Not only is the Legislature required to make adequate and reasonable appropriations for the entire judicial system under § 6.10; all three branches are charged with a constitutional duty to ensure adequate and reasonable financing for the Judiciary. Plainly, the constitutional requirement of reasonable and adequate financing encompasses the various administrative costs, including equipment and personnel, necessary to deliver constitutionally mandated judicial services. At a constitutional minimum, therefore, appropriations to the Judiciary may not be reduced by operation of
This Court has addressed the terms “adequate and reasonable” within the context of funding in Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528 (Ala. 1979). Sparks considered that language in the context of a challenge to the scheme for compensating attorneys for indigent defense work. However, the Court in Sparks, citing Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So.2d 830 (1974), discussed the doctrine of separation of powers and its relation to judicial funding. Like the Court in Abramson before it, the Sparks Court deferred to the Legislature‘s power to appropriate, while recognizing the Court‘s duty to construe constitutional and statutory language:
“It is therefore not within the sphere of the judicial branch to determine what appropriations are to be made although, of course, it would be within our purview to determine if the appropriations made are ‘adequate and reasonable’ for the unified judicial system. . . .”
At a constitutional minimum, the term “adequate and reasonable” means that the Judicial Branch of government must be funded sufficiently to fulfill the duties required of it by the Constitution. Thus, “adequate and reasonable” funding for services constitutionally required of the Judiciary is the level of funding beneath which
It follows that
Whenever proration under
The Chief Justice shall then submit the redetermined amounts from each separately funded entity within the judicial branch, showing the amount of appropriations required for adequate and reasonable funding of the Judiciary‘s constitutional duties, to the Governor, pursuant to
In this case, the Governor sought to apply a 5% proration without a consideration of the constitutional requirements of the Judicial Branch; historically such a consideration has been used, in light of Abramson. Even after deducting expenses that the Governor acknowledged were constitutionally exempt from proration, the financial impact was to reduce the initial judicial appropriation of $85.4 million to $81.3 million.
The reduction brought about by proration of the Judiciary‘s appropriations was proportionately much larger than that faced by the other branches of government because a high percentage of the judicial budget is derived from the General Fund, the fund most affected by proration. The following list gives examples of departments or agencies upon which the effect of the proration of the General Fund is relatively minimal:
Department or Agency General Fund Earmarked Funds A.B.C. Board 0 $ 40,000,000 Commission on Aging $ 4,550,329 $ 24,178,817 Conservation $ 978,096 $ 55,811,504 Economic Community Affairs $ 8,172,420 $154,260,846 Environmental Management $ 6,554,469 $ 53,077,665 Public Health $32,623,251 $210,397,593 Human Resources $40,000,000 $376,051,713 Revenue $ 368,451 $ 67,443,161
In contrast, the Judiciary and those departments that derive a majority of their appropriations from the General Fund have a greater adverse impact from proration. The total budget for the Judicial Branch for fiscal year 1991-92 contained $ 85,492,577 appropriated from the General Fund, but only $ 754,349 from earmarked funds. These examples from fiscal year 1991-92 further illustrate the problem:
Department or Agency General Fund Earmarked Funds Corrections $137,641,102 $25,966,844 Finance $ 9,058,941 $ 172,193 Pardons and Paroles $ 11,999,693 $ 3,447,108 Public Safety $ 49,100,605 $ 8,410,747 Soil and Water Conserv. $ 1,271,209 $ 183,050
Had the proration sought by the Governor been implemented against the Judiciary‘s budget, significant numbers of court personnel would have been laid off, trial court operations would have been suspended in some situations, and various other impediments to the delivery of justice would have resulted. Because salaries and fixed expenses required by the operation of the trial courts represent a large portion of the judicial budget, this reduction would have drastically affected the funds used by the courts for their operations.
In such circumstances, the Governor‘s position on the question of whether proration affected the delivery of constitutionally mandated judicial services would be extremely difficult to support, even if the Governor had attempted to follow the principles in Abramson. However, this Court takes judicial notice that, after the trial court entered its judgment in this case, the Legislature passed Act 92-227, Ala. Acts 1992, providing additional appropriations to the Judicial Branch. The additional appropriation in Act 92-227 restored some $3.2 million to the Judicial Branch appropriations, leaving a net loss in appropriations of some $1.6 million; that net loss caused the termination or postponement of many needed and desirable programs within the courts, but the Legislature‘s additional appropriation in Act 92-227 enabled the courts to avoid employee layoffs and to remain open to the public. This timely action by the Legislature permitted the people continued access to our courts and relieved this Court from having to make a more difficult determination.
This Court, taking notice of all the appropriations actually available to the Judicial Branch for the year in question, 1991-92, holds that those appropriations were adequate and reasonable for the completion of the Court‘s constitutionally mandated duties for that year.
The Governor‘s attempted application of
Accordingly, the trial court‘s order declaring Ala. Code 1975,
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, STEAGALL, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs in the result.
HORNSBY, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., recused.