2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 3782 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 2002
As to the plaintiff, the YMCA seeks summary judgment, first, on the ground that there was no causal connection between its actions and the plaintiff's injuries. It claims that its actions were neither the cause in fact nor the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and that the actions of Mr. Knibbs were a superseding cause, relieving it of legal responsibility for any injuries the plaintiff may have suffered. All of these are issues to be resolved at trial. There are genuine issues of material fact, and the YMCA, on this record, is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
An issue which can be resolved on its summary judgment is the legal effect of a waiver signed by the plaintiff before he entered upon the skating park. The waiver provides in relevant part: "I have read the above information and understand that is it my responsibility to skate safely while at the program. I also understand that the Southington Community YMCA and YMCA staff are not liable for any injuries or accidents that may occur. I understand that NO legal action against any of the parties listed above will take place." (Emphasis original.)
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether waivers of negligence claims by adult participants in sporting events are enforceable. In general, "[t]he law does not favor contract. provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence. . . Such provisions, however, have been upheld under proper circumstances." (Citations omitted.) Griffin v.Nationwide Moving Storage Co.,
Courts have seemed to take two views regarding the language. that must be included in a waiver agreement for the purpose of barring negligence claims against an owner of a facility or its employees. "Some courts require that specific language be included alerting the patron that he or she waives any claim for injury caused by the actual negligence of the facility operator. Other courts disagree with this view. They take the position that exculpatory agreements must be strictly construed but hold that the word "negligence' need not be used; the operator of a sports facility can be protected by an agreement in which the patron releases the operator from "any claim.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Slauson v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 432460 (May 30, 2001, Jones, J.).
The majority of trial courts that have recently addressed this issue, as well as the trial court decisions cited by the parties to this action, take the position that specific language, i.e., the word "negligence," must be used to waive effectively claims for negligence against facility operators. In Slauson the court followed the reasoning of Bashura v. Strategy Plus, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 50871 (November 20, 1997,Corradino, J.) (
. . . [Furthermore,] such a rule does not impose a great burden on the operator; small changes in liability waivers can now be made with a computer and a printer." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court in Malin v. White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut,Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 432774 (March 16, 2001, Blue, J.) (
Where the waiver does explicitly absolve the defendant from liability for its own negligence, Superior Courts have held the language contained in the waiver form is sufficient to release the facility owner from liability. For example, in Connors v. Reel Ice, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. 579993 (July 24, 2000, Wagner, J.) (
In Salvatore v. 5 D's, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 153131 (February 20, 2001, Doherty, J.) (
While it is important to note the different outcomes among the Superior Courts in cases of this kind, it is more important to note that these cases apply the same line of reasoning, and there does not seem to be any real split. The cases that have upheld the validity of a waiver form made reference to the specificity of the language in the waiver form as a basis for their holding. For example, the waiver forms in the cases that have held for the defendant use specific language such as the word "negligence." Where the parties did not raise the specificity or scope of the waiver or include the word "negligence" in the waiver, the courts have denied defendants' motions for summary judgment.1
The YMCA's waiver form does not contain specific language alerting patrons like the plaintiff that the waiver releases the YMCA from claims for injuries caused by its own negligence. For this reason the waiver does not impair the plaintiff's right to sue the YMCA for damages. CT Page 3786
For the reasons stated, the YMCA'S motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff is denied.
The YMCA's summary judgment motion directed at the cross complaint of its codefendant, Mr. Knibbs, also raises the issue of the effect of his signing the same waiver as the plaintiff signed. I need not reach that issue, however, because I agree with the YMCA that Mr. Knibbs cannot prove the elements of common law indemnity upon which his cross complaint is based.
In his response to the YMCA's request to admit, attached to the motion for summary judgment on the cross complaint as Exhibit B, Mr. Knibbs has admitted to striking the plaintiff, as the plaintiff has alleged. Given that admission, he cannot prove two essential elements of a common law indemnity claim; viz., that the negligence of the YMCA was the direct, immediate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and that the YMCA was in control of the situation, i.e., "the dangerous condition that gives rise to the [injury]", Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc.,
Accordingly, the YMCA's motion for summary judgment on the cross complaint is granted.
BY THE COURT
______________________ Joseph M. Shortall, J.