89 N.J.L. 474 | N.J. | 1917
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The prosecutrix’s husband, Arthur E. Foley, deceased, was in his lifetime in the employ of the respondent as a special traveling salesman and manager of its European trade. In the course of his employment it was necessary to visit the respondent’s London office which was its European headquarters. The deceased engaged passage on the Lusitania, which steamship was listed to steam from the port of New York to Liverpool on May 1st, 1915', under tito British Hag. The steamer carried passengers and ordinary freight and some cartridges for war use. There was an American steamer scheduled to steam for a British port under the protection of. the American flag on the same day that the Lusitania was clue to leave, on Which American steamer the deceased might have procured passage, so far as his duties or requirements of his employment were concerned. The respondent did not instruct the deceased on what particular steamer to make the journey, hut knew of the fact that the deceased had engaged passage on the Lusitania and offered no objeefion. On the 7th day of May, 1915, while the Lusitania was within the zone or area which had theretofore been declared the war zone by the German government, she was attacked and torpedoed by a German submarine which caused the steamship to sink within a few minutes, and the death of the deceased was the result of the sinking of the steamship.
In the Court of Common Pleas of Merecr county, counsel tor the respective parties stipulated in writing as to the facts as above related and it was on this stipulation that the trial judge made his findings and rule, for judgment for the respondent.
The trial judge- found that the deceased came to his death as a result of an accident in the course of his employment.
■ The finding made by the trial judge, which gives rise to the vital question under discussion and which is the turning
Whether or not an accident arose out of an employment is invariably a mixed question of law and fact. It is well settled by the decisions of our courts that if there is any testimony to support the determination of fact it will not be reviewed.
Here, however, it is apparent that the determination of fact was founded upon a misconception by the trial judge of the legal principle applicable thereto, and therefore the legal propriety of such finding is reviewable.
The trial judge appears to have disposed of the facts involved in this case upon the mistaken notion that in order to hold a master responsible for an injury to his employe as the result of an accident, the accident must be one of which the actual or lawfully imputed negligence is the natural and proximate cause, whereas it is clear from a plain reading of the statute that the question of negligence does not enter into the consideration of the case at all, where compensation is sought, as in this case, under section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation act. Pamph. L. 1911, p. 136.
The legal principle which was applied by the trial judge to th'e facts of the present case is solely applicable to actions at law commenced under section 1 of the act above recited.
The question presented for our decision is whether the destruction of the Lusitania by a submarine and the death of the deceased in consequence was an accident arising out of the employment. The facts in this case are undisputed, and therefore the same situation in that respect is present as existed in Walther, Executrix, v. American, Paper Co., decided at the November term, 1916, of the Court of Errors and Appeals (post p. 732), where the court reviewed the finding of the Court of Common Pleas, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 98 Atl. Rep. 264, that the accident, established b3 the evidence, arose out of the employment, and reversed the judgment.
Following the rule laid down in that ease it was held by this court, in Schmoll v. Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (ante p. 150), where the agent and collector of the brewing company, while on his employer’s business in a district of bad repute, was shot by some person unknown, that in the absence of any proof that the motive of the assailant was robbery or that the employer had notice or knowledge of the dangerous character of the locality, it could not properly be said that the shooting of the agent was an accident arising out of the employment. In Walther v. American Paper Co., supra, the decedent was a night watchman in a mill and while engaged in such employment was struck down with a club and killed by his assailant who took from the vest pocket of the deceased $15. The assailant knew that the deceased had been paid his wages that day and went to the mill in the night time on purpose to rob the deceased. He made no attempt at any robbery from the office of the mill or any destruction of the mill property or any mischief or crime other than the robbery of Walther.
The Court of Errors and Appeals held that the death of the deceased was not the result of an accident arising out of his employment and that the case could not be distinguished from Hulley v. Moosbrugger, supra. From this it is plainly inferable that it was the view of the court 'that since the design of Walther’s assailant was directed against Walther
But if it can be fairly said that the respondent bad no notice of this declaration of the German government and was not therefore legally bound to take notice of it, nevertheless it was bound to take notice that a condition of war existed between Great Britain and Germany and that ships of the enemy were subject to be captured or destroyed by such warring nations. This was a danger reasonably to be apprehended. This danger attached itself to every traveler on an enemy ship, whether engaged in the pursuit of pleasure or in the course of his or her employment.
The extraordinary risk in the present case ai’ose from the fact that Eoley was on an enemy ship in the course of his employment. His employer knew, of this risk. If the Lusitania had been lost-through a collision, Are or storm at sea, resulting in the death of Eoley, it would, under the principle enunciated in all the eases bearing on this Subject, be held to have been an accident arising out of his employment.- -
In the present case if the Lusitania, had struck a mine instead of being torpedoed, resulting in Foley’s death, could it be reasonably contended that his death was not due to an accident arising out of his employment? We think not. It may be well said that those whose employments require them to travel by land or sea are known by their employers to be subject to the common perils that such traveling incurs. The
Let us test the soundness of the proposition just stated. Suppose the Lusitania had not been torpedoed but captured, and in transferring the passengers to lifeboats, Foley lost his life; or after the passengers had been transferred to lifeboats a storm had arisen, sinking the lifeboat in which Foley was; could there be any doubt whatever that Foley would have been considered to have lost his life by an accident arising out of his employment. This is the underlying doctrine of Zabriskie v. Erie Railroad Co., supra, and Terlecki v. Straus, 85 N. J. L. 454; 86 Id. 708.
It is a matter of common knowledge that thousands of traveling salesmen travel daily in the course of their employment in cars propelled by steam, electricity and other propelling power, and therefore are subject to the risk of being injured or killed by reason of a collision or derailment; or by the cars going through an open draw or falling from a defective trestle, &c. The fact that the collision or derailment was caused by some malicious person with the design to injure a railroad company or some person in its employ, would not operate to make an injury received by a salesman traveling on the'car collided with or derailed, any the less an injury, the result of an accident arising out of the employment of such salesmen, than if such injury had been received by him as a result' of the cars going through an open draw or falling from a defective trestle.
It must be borne in mind that the denial of a right of compensation in the Walther case was put upon the ground that the design of the assailant was to rob Walther and not Walther’s master, and hence the attack made on Walther was not connected with Walther’s employment, and that the denial of compensation in the Sehmoll ease was rested upon the
The present case is clearly distinguishable from the cases referred to in which compensation was denied, in that it cannot be properly said here that there was any malicious design on the pari of th"e German naval forces against Eoiey or any other passenger, and it may be safely assumed that the prime object of the German naval forces was to destroy the enemy’s ship and not the lives of its passengers.
It is said that the attack made on the Lusitania, from a humane and civilized standpoint, was barbarous and cruel and in violation of the law of nations, and that therefore the act of torpedoing the steamer was not within the contemplation of the employer, when the risk of going by such steamer was undertaken by its agent Eoiey.
We do not think that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the conduct of the German naval officers affects the matter at all. If the Lusitania had been attacked by a German cruiser and instead of surrendering, offered resistance or attempted to run away and thereupon the German cruiser, by a well-directed shot, struck the steamer inn a vital part, causing her to sink, and Eoiey to lose his life, it would hardly have been contended by respondent that the death of Eoiey was not due to an accident arising out of his employment. Foley’s employer knew that the former had taken passage on a British ship and that such ship was subject to the risk of capture by the German naval forces, in what manner that might he accomplished was unimportant, so long as the employer was aware of the risk. Whether the ship was destroyed by lawful or unlawful means is immaterial.
We think, therefore, that Foley’s death was due to an accident while in the course of his employment and that such accident arose out of his employment.