59 Ga. App. 680 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1939
Lead Opinion
On July 27, 1934, Interstate Life and Accident Insurance Company issued to George McLendon a policy of insurance which contained the following pertinent provisions: “This policy provides indemnity for loss of life, limb, sight, or time due to accidental injuries and for loss of time due to illness, all to the extent herein provided. [The company] hereby insures George Terry McLendon . . against loss resulting directly and independently of any and all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means (suicide, whether sane or insane, excepted), hereinafter called ‘such injury,’ and against loss resulting directly and independently of all other causes from disease or illness which is contracted and begins during the life of this policy and after it has been maintained in force for thirty days, hereinafter called ‘such illness,’ as follows: Part I. The principal sum five hundred & 00/100 ($500) dollars. Monthly accident benefit fifty & 00/100 ($50) dollars. Monthly illness benefit fifty & 00/100 ($50) dollars.” Following the above-quoted portions is a statement as to the amount to be paid for the loss of various members of the body. Attached to the policy was an ap
This policy comes clearly under the provisions defining industrial life insurance in Code, § 56-1301. An insurance company may fix the terms of its policies as it wishes, provided they are not contrary to law, and it may insure against certain risks and exclude others. “If the terms of the contract are clear and express, the courts can not extend or enlarge the contract by implication or construction so as to embrace an object or limitation distinct from that originally contemplated and not included in the express provisions.” 1 Couch’s Cyc. Ins. L. § 184. Courts do not contract for the parties, though they do construe contracts as written. “The contract of insurance should be construed so as to carry out the true intention of the parties” (Code, § 56-815), and “where the meaning is plain and obvious, the contract should be so construed as literally provided therein.” Daniel v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 620 (2) (184 S. E. 366); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 45 Ga. App. 638, 640 (165 S. E. 847); Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Padgett, 49 Ga. App. 666, 670 (176 S. E. 702). On the other hand, the following principles, applicable when construing insurance policies, are so well established as to need no citation of the innumerable authorities that support them: “Policies of insurance will be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished, and the provisions therein will be construed strictly against the insurer.” “If a policy of insurance is fairly susceptible of more than one construction, the interpretation most
This policy will be construed in its entirety. The caption provides : “This policy provides indemnity for loss of life, limb,.sight, or time due to accidental injuries and for loss of time due to .illness, all to the extent herein provided.” (Italics ours.) Then the provision follows which insures “against loss resulting . . solely through external, violent and accidental means (suicide, whether sane or insane, excepted), hereinafter called ‘such injury.’” The loss above referred to means loss because of death as well as injury. The loss by death would be payable to the named beneficiary. The loss by injury, death not ensuing, would be payable to the insured himself. The next clause is in the identical language of the foregoing clause: “against loss . . from disease or illness” beginning or contracted at least thirty days after the policy becomes of force. Such loss, whether resulting in death or not, was referred to in the first clause as “such injury,” and such loss in the second clause was referred to as “such illness,” and, under a like construction, there being no other proviso or exception, would mean death or disability resulting from such disease or illness. To interpret such clause otherwise it would become necessary to say that the loss referred to in the second clause, quoted above, referred to loss of time, only. No such restriction was placed in the clause relating to death by accident, and it clearly appears that this policy insures against accidental death. The caption does state “loss of time,” but it further states “all to the extent herein provided,” and refers to the entire clause preceding which covers loss of life as well as disability insurance. The caption and the second clause in the policy may be inconsistent. To make them accord we must read into the second clause, after the word “loss,” the additional phrase “loss of time.” Without these words being added there the
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. In my opinion the policy of insurance, properly construed, did not cover insurance for loss of life due to death caused by disease. I think the judgment should be affirmed.
