Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Patricia Anne Williams, J.), entered October 20, 2003, which granted defendant VL.J. Construction Corp.’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied and the complaint reinstated as against said defendant.
A certified record of the fire maintained by the Bureau of Fire Prevention, consisting of a report, reveals that the fire originated in “vehicle parts” and that the substance ignited was “gasoline.” The Fire Marshal’s incident report states that the fire started “in the boiler room . . . adjacent to the water heater, in the vapors of a flammable liquid.” The interview sheet accompanying the Marshal’s report notes that the boiler room contained two gas-fired water heaters and that “[i]t may have been the pilot light that ignited the flammable liquid.” A firefighter reported that a motorcycle was found in front of the apartment “with no gas tank on it,” and that “the gas tank for the motorcycle was found in the boiler room.” The investigator was told by Mr. Salgado’s common-law wife that “her husband was working on the gas tank for the motorcycle at the front of the apt.” when gasoline, which had been transferred to a red container placed just outside the apartment, spilled into the foyer, “and the husband was trying to clean up the liquid as it was running into the boiler room.”
Firefighter Foiles sustained his injury after entering the apartment to search for victims. With extensive smoke, “zero visibility” and “fire everywhere,” he crawled forward on his hands and knees until he encountered what he believed to be a flight of stairs. The object, however, was a piece of furniture, which collapsed as he tried to climb it. Foiles fell over, twisting his left knee. The injury rendered him permanently disabled.
Plaintiffs brought this action against VLJ, Salgado and the
As we noted in McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co. (26 AD2d 186, 195 [1966], affd 20 NY2d 921 [1967]), General Municipal Law § 205-a “may be considered as having intended to impose liability in any case where there is any practical or reasonable connection between a violation and the injury or death of a fireman.” In addition to providing an injured firefighter with a means of recovery, the statute was intended to encourage “property owners and occupiers to comply with safety and prevention codes” (Mullen v Zoebe, Inc., 86 NY2d 135, 141 [1995]). As a remedial statute, the Firefighter’s Law is subject to liberal construction (see Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d 558, 566 [1987]), requiring only that a plaintiff “identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firefighter” in order to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 NY2d 423, 441 [1995]).
Since VLJ never obtained a certificate of occupancy authorizing the residential use of the basement unit, it is unknown to what extent the premises failed to “conform to all of the applicable provisions of this code and all other applicable laws and regulations for the proposed new occupancy” (Building Code § 27-217 [a]). It is known that prior to obtaining the certificate
Foiles has identified a code violation, described how he sustained injury and established a reasonable connection with the violation so as to permit a trier of fact to infer that VLJ’s negligence indirectly caused the injury. Therefore, he has satisfied the burden to defeat VLJ’s dismissal motion (Zanghi, 85 NY2d at 441). Concur—Tom, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Marlow and Nardelli, JJ.
Section § 27-217 (a) provides: “No change shall he made in the occupancy ... of an existing building which is inconsistent with the last issued certificate of occupancy for such building, or which would bring it under some special provision of this code or other applicable law or regulation, unless a new certificate of occupancy is issued by the commissioner certifying that such building or part thereof conform to all of the applicable provisions of this code and all other applicable laws and regulations for the proposed new occupancy or use.”
