The opinion of the court was delivered hy
In 1890 the town of Hoquiam, assuming to act under authority of a general act of the legislature of the state (Bal. Code, § 1016), improved certain streets, and constituted an assessment district and assessed the cost of the improvement against lots fronting on the street, including the lots of the respondent. Before any proceedings were taken to enforce the payment of the assessment so levied, an action was commenced by the respondent in the superior court to enjoin the collection of the assessment. Judgment was entered by the superior court on the 6th day of January, 1893. The court found, generally, “that the equities of this case are with the plaintiff [respondent], and that he is entitled to the relief therein prayed for. The court further finds that the affirmative defense, counter-claim, or cross bill of the defendant [town] filed
“In this cause, after considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the court is of the opinion that the judgment in the former case of Rogg vs. the Town of Hoquiam*343 is decisive of the questions and rights of the parties in issue in this case.
The question of the validity of the contract on account of the town being beyond the constitutional limit of indebtedness was an issue in that action, and the court in its opinion says that the contention of the plaintiff was sustained, and supplements this by entering a decree enjoining the town from collecting the assessment, and that the contract was void.
In view of these facts, this court cannot go into the examination of the correctness of that opinion and decree; and, as no appeal was taken from that decree, it is binding upon the parties. As this opinion is decisive of the rights of the parties in this proceeding, it will be unnecessary to consider the other questions presented by argument of counsel.”
And as conclusions of law:
“That the judgment in the former case of Togg v. the Town of Hoquiam, cause Ho. 214, is decisive and res judicata of the question and rights of the parties in issue in this case, and that the question of the validity of its said contract on account of the town of Hoquiam being beyond the constitutional limit of indebtedness was an issue in that action. And the court further finds that plaintiff is entitled to a decree annulling the said reassessment proceedings and for costs.”
1. It is apparent that the judgment of the superior court was founded upon its view of the conclusiveness of the former adjudication of the validity of the original assessment. The appellant, town of Hoquiam, in the reassessment, proceeded under the act of 1893, supra. The act, in § 1, substantially declares that whenever an assessment which has heretofore been made has been or may be decreed void and its enforcement refused by the court, or for any cause has been set aside, annulled, or declared void, by any court, either directly or by virtue of any de
2. The town elected to proceed under the statute of 1893 in the reassessment. It has been heretofore determined that the statute of 1893 provides for an assessment in local improvements with reference to the benefits to the property improved, and the property must be equitably and proportionately assessed, and that the sum assessed against any particular lot or parcel of property cannot, in any event, exceed the special benefits received by such property from the public improvement made. These questions must be determined by the proper assessing officer, and examined and equalized by the council. Notice of hearing must be given to the owner of the real property affected by the assessment, and he may appear and must be heard upon the fairness, justice, and amount of the assessment. See Annie Wright Seminary v. Tacoma,
3. The statute of limitations is pleaded by respondent. It is claimed that more than two years had elapsed since the accrual of the cause of action for the amount due for making the improvement, but the statute only begins to run from the time a valid assessment is made. The original assessment was adjudicated invalid, on the 6th day of January, 1893, the reassessment statute was enacted on the 9th day of March, 1893, and the reassessment proceedings commenced on the 18th day of July, 1893. State ex rel. Hemen v. Ballard, 16 Wash. 418 (47 Pac. 970); Bowman v. Colfax, 17 Wash. 344 (49 Pac. 551).
The cause is reversed and remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the defendant confirming the reassessment.
Dunbar, C. J., and Fullerton and Anders, JJ., concur.