Fogarty v. Michigan Central Railroad

180 Mich. 422 | Mich. | 1914

Brooke, J.

(after stating the facts). We have set out somewhat at large the testimony relating to the custom of defendant in giving notice when about to back in cars upon the side track for the reason that the sole negligence of defendant is predicated upon its failure to observe an alleged custom to send a man in over the track in advance of the train to warn plaintiff of its approach. In our view of the case it becomes unnecessary to consider the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence upon which much could be said even if plaintiff’s statement be taken ás absolutely true. Nor is it necessary to determine his status as a licensee or otherwise. He relies for recovery upon the establishment of a custom, the breach of that custom by defendant, and his injury in consequence thereof. A careful reading of all the testimony offered on behalf of plaintiff convinces us that no such custom as he testified to obtained in the yard where he was injured. His observation covered a period of but ten days, while that of his witness Kelley covered a period of five or six campaigns, of his witness Le Mere, from the time the sugar company started operations, and his other two witnesses an indefinite but apparently extended period.

It is unnecessary to consider defendant’s evidence upon the point which was to the effect that, after the original warning, a man was never sent in ahead of a train being backed in on an empty track. A brakeman was always placed upon the front end of the forward car to see that the track was clear. The most that can be said of plaintiff’s evidence, taken as a whole, is that sometimes the defendant sent a man in advance of a train being backed in and sometimes stationed a brakeman upon the front end of the forward car. This situation was not such a one as would warrant plaintiff in the belief that he would be personally notified of the approach of an oncoming train by a man sent in advance. It is undisputed that an effort was made by the brakeman to warn him. This warning proved abortive either because of plaintiff’s deafness or because of the noise caused by dumping stone into the lime kiln.

A custom must be certain, uniform, and invariable. It must also be notorious; that is, known to all persons of intelligence having to do with the subject to which it relates. Ledyard v. Hibbard, 48 Mich. 421 (12 N. W. 637, 42 Am. Rep. 474); Black v. Ashley, 80 Mich. 90 (44 N. W. 1120); Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lindeman, 143 Fed. 946, 75 C. C. A. 18.

As defendant’s negligence rested alone in a breach of an alleged custom which plaintiff failed to establish, we must hold that he failed to introduce any evidence tending to establish negligence on the part of defendant, and that therefore a verdict should have been directed in defendant’s favor.

Judgment is reversed, and there will be no new trial.

McAlvay, C. J., and Kuhn, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.