67 Tex. 173 | Tex. | 1886
This suit was brought upon an account partly due and partly to become due to John Focke, Henry Wilkens and Herman Lange, constituting the firm of Focke, Wilkens & Lange. An attachment was sued out in the case upon affidavit that the defendants were indebted to John Focke, John Wilkens and Herman Lange, composing the firm of Focke, Wilkens & Lange, upon an account having the same amount due and the same amount to become due as were stated in the petition. Considered without explanation, the debt sued on and the debt sworn to are different causes of action. An indebtedness to a partnership is an indebtedness to its individual members. Two partnerships may have the same firm name, and yet be composed of different members.
The writ of attachment in this case recites that it is issued upon a demand of Focke, Wilkens & Lange; but to which firm of that name does it refer, or tb which demand—the one sued on in the petition or the one sworn to in the affidavit? If the former, it is not supported by a proper oath; if the latter, it is not accompanied by the petition required in attachment cases. There must be no uncertainty in attachments which is not explained by the proceedings themselves; 'for no presumptions will be resorted to for the purpose of sustaining them. (Espey v. Heidenheimer, 58 Texas, 662.)
That an important variance between the petition and the affidavit for a writ will vitiate the latter, is well established, and a variance is important when the petition is based upon a demand due to a firm composed of certain members, and the affidavit on a demand due to a firm which is not composed of the same partners. (Drake on Attachment, sec. 36; Wright v. Snedion, 46 Ala., 92.)
But it is said by the appellants that the reference in the affidavit to the petition cures the erroneous statement as to the claims of the firm contained in the former, as these two papers must be construed together. As there is no proof offered upon the trial to show of what persons the firm of Focke, Wilkens & Lange were composed, we have no information as to whether the names of the partners were correctly stated in the petition •or in the affidavit. We can not, therefore, say that the statement in the affidavit is erroneous.
It is only in cases of imperfect affidavits that the petition can • be called in to their aid, and not when the affidavit is in all
The dissolution of the attachment did not necessarily dismiss the suit, as the amount alleged in the petition to be due was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the cause. It is only where the plaintiff’s whole right to sue depends upon his right to obtain an attachment, that the suit falls with the fall of the attachment. But here the plaintiffs claimed a recovery upon a debt of three hundred and forty-six dollars and, eighty-one cents, already overdue, and they had the right to pursue that claim to judgment independent of the attachment proceedings, the county court of Bosque county having no jurisdiction of civil suits. They could dismiss their suit if they wished, but this did not prevent the defendants from a trial of the cause upon their plea of reconvention, filed before the dismissal occurred.
It does not appear from the record that the proceeds of the attached goods ordered to be turned over to the defendants upon their giving bond, ever reached the defendants, or that they ever gave the bond required of them. They were therefore entitled to the full amount found by the court in their favor. This sum, however, should be' credited with the amount of said proceeds when paid over to them. The judgment below will be so reformed as to allow the appellees a recovery of nine hundred and two dollars and seventy-seven cents, with interest thereon at the- •
Reformed and affirmed.
Opinion delivered December 17, 1886.