The appellant, James Edward “Bo” Flynn, and his mother, Mildred Ioane White, were convicted of armed robbery and murder, and they both received two consecutive life sentences.
1
Her conviction was
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affirmed in
White v. State,
The appellant and White denied any invоlvement in the crimes, but Gene Huddleston, a co-conspirator who was granted immunity for his testimony, testified that the three of them planned to rob the victim, Hiram Nathan Wilson. The evidence showed that the appellant shot Wilson while Wilson was sitting in his vehicle at White’s home. With the aid of the others, the appellant removed the victim’s watch, rings, and wallet, and then drove the victim’s vehiclе away from White’s home.
Wilson was still alive when his vehicle was doused with gasoline and set on fire. Approximately two hours after Wilson was last seen alive with White, his body, burned beyond recognition, wаs found in his vehicle.
1. The appellant asserts the general grounds in enumerations one, two, and nineteen.
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rationаl trier of fact to find that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the armed robbery and murder of Hiram Nathan Wilson. White
v. State,
supra;
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. The appellant asserts in enumerations three through eleven that certain portions of the jury charges had the effect of shifting the burden of proof to him.
a. The court’s charge and recharge on malice, OCGA § 16-5-1 (b), was not burden shifting.
White v. State,
supra at 215. The charge was not similar to the charge that was found to be defective in
Parks v. State,
b. The appellant complains about the following charge: “I instruct you that every person is prеsumed to be of sound mind and discretion, but that this presumption may be rebutted. I instruct you that you may infer that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are the product of that person’s will, and you may infer that a person of sound mind and discretion intends the natural and probable consequences of that person’s acts. Now, whether or not you make any such inference is a matter solely within the discretion of the jury.” Unlike the mandatory rebuttable presumption in
Francis v. Franklin,
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c. The appellant claims the following charge is erroneous: “malice may be inferred from circumstances which demonstrate a reckless disregard for human life. Now whether or not you make any such inference is a matter solely within the discretion of the jury.” This charge is a correct statement of the law,
Walden v. State,
d. The аppellant contends that the court erred in giving the following charge on conspiracy: “the conspiracy may sometime be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances.” This is a correct statement of the law,
Hewitt v. State,
3. The appellant cоntends in enumeration twelve that the court erred when it instructed the jury that if it found the appellant guilty of murder it could consider the armed robbery charge, but if it found the appellant guilty of felоny murder they could not consider the armed robbery charge.
We find no error.
Blankenship v. State,
4. The appellant asserts in his thirteenth enumeration that the charge on impeachment was defective in that it did not inform the jury that a witness could be impeached by a showing of bad character.
“Failure to give a specific charge that bad character is one method of impeaching a witness is not a substantial error which is harmful as a matter of law under OCGA § 5-5-24 (c) (Code Ann. § 70-207).
Tanner v. State,
5. The appellant claims in enumerations fourteen and fifteen that the trial court erred when it failed to direct а verdict of acquittal because the state failed to prove the corpus delicti. He specifically claims that it was error to allow the medical examiner to testify thаt he identified the body by comparing dental x-rays that were objected to as hearsay.
“We have held numerous times that the corpus delicti may be proved by both direct and circumstantial evidence. [Cits.]”
Johnson
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v. State,
Although we approved of the admission of x-rays under the business records statute, OCGA § 24-3-14, in
Redd v. State,
6. The appellant asserts in his sixteenth and sevеnteenth enumerations that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motions for a mistrial when his character was placed into issue and when a state’s witness testified that White had been interviewed when she was taken for a polygraph examination.
a. The appellant made a motion for mistrial when the state’s witness testified that White had been interviewed when she was taken for a polygraphic examination, that motion was vigorously restated thereafter, and again prior to the introduction of White’s statements to the police. However, there wаs no objection to the portion of the statement that became the subject of the motion for mistrial on the ground that it placed the appellant’s character into issuе at the time
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the statement was read into evidence. “[A] mistrial will not lie where evidence is admitted without objection
(McCormick v. State,
b. The fact that the state’s witness indicated that White had been interviewed when she was taken for a polygraph examination did not, in this case, raise an inference as to the results, thus it was not error. See White v. State, supra at 213.
7. The appеllant contends in enumeration eighteen that the trial court erred in allowing Huddleston to testify, after an initial showing that he had been committed, without a showing that he had been rehabilitated.
“Everyone is presumed competent to testify, and even where a person is shown to have been insane, or to have been adjudged insane previously and is presently in a state mеntal hospital, this does not necessarily render such person incompetent to testify.
Conoway v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed on April 1, 1977. The Cobb County jury returned its verdict of guilty on November 10, 1983. A motion for new trial was filed on December 7, 1983, and an amended motion for new trial was filed on April 15, 1985, and denied on August 14, 1985. The transcript of the evidence was filed on January 12, 1984. Notice of appeal was filed on September 9,1985. The record was docketed in this Court on March 7,1985. The case was argued before this Court on November 13, 1985.