Flynn v. FogartyFlynn v. Fogarty
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mulkey
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was an action brought by Mary Fogarty, the appellee, in the Knox circuit court, under the 9th section of the Dram-shop act, against the appellants, Daniel Flynn, Septimus Merrick, Gus Henderson, and others who are not parties to this appeal, to recover damages for the loss of her husband, John Fogarty, whose death, it is claimed, was caused by intoxicating liquors sold to him by the appellants. The cause was tried before the court and a jury, in the month of December, 1880, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1800, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Second District, and the appellants bring the case here for review.
The evidence shows that the deceased was between forty and fifty years of age, in good health, and by occupation a farmer; that he was the head of a family, consisting of himself, wife, and eleven children, the oldest, a son, being between eighteen and twenty years of age; that on the morning of the 20th of October, 1879, he went to Galesburg by rail, and shortly after his arrival there commenced drinking intoxicating liquors, and continued to do so, off and on, during the day; that at, or shortly after, a quarter past six in the evening he left Galesburg for home, by way of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy railway, in a state of intoxication; that he arrived at St. Augustine, his home station, not far from seven o’clock of the same evening; that in attempting to get off the train he fell from the platform between two cars, when the wheels of the rear one passed over both his legs, inflicting injuries from which he died the following morning. The evidence satisfactorily shows that the deceased drank intoxicating liquors at least three times during the day at Flynn & Merrick’s saloon,—once in the forenoon and twice in the evening,—the last time being between four and five o’clock. It was also shown that the deceased took three glasses of
Appellee bases her right of recovery upon the sole ground “she has been injured in her means of support. ” To make out a case, under the statute, it was necessary for her to satisfactorily establish, first, that the defendants sold or gave to the deceased intoxicating liquors; second, that the giving or selling of such liquors caused, in whole or in part, his intoxication ; third, that such intoxication caused his death; and fourth, that by reason of his death the plaintiff was injured in her means of support. Whether these facts were sufficiently established on the trial is a matter with which we have no concern, except so far as it may be necessary to present our views upon certain questions of law arising on the record.
So far as Flynn and Merrick are concerned we are unable to say the jury erred in reaching the conclusion they did, but with respect to Henderson, to say the least of it, we regard it as highly improbable that the three glasses of beer drank by the deceased in the forenoon at his saloon could have, in any degree, contributed to the intoxication of the deceased at seven o’clock, or thereabouts, in the evening. There is no fact or circumstance tending to show that the deceased either drank at or was about Henderson’s saloon in the afternoon of that day, nor is there any claim by counsel to that effect. Under these circumstances, therefore, it was but just, and highly important to the accused, that the law of the case should have been accurately stated to the jury, and strictly observed by the court in the admission or rejection of testimony.
On the trial of the cause, the court, at the instance of the plaintiff, gave to the jury, among others, the following instruction, to the giving of which the defendants, at the time, excepted:
“The court instructs the jury, for plaintiff, that if they believe, from the evidence, that John Fogarty, the husband of the plaintiff, came to his death on account of his intoxication, and that said intoxication was caused, wholly or in part, by intoxicating liquor sold or given to the said John Fogarty by the defendants, then the verdict of the jury should be for the plaintiff, with such damages as, in the judgment of the jury, from the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of $10,000.”
It is objected that this instruction wholly dispenses with all proof showing the plaintiff had been injured in her means of support by reason of the death of her husband, and that it, in effect, told the jury they might infer such injury from the mere fact of Fogarty’s death,—and such, it must be conceded, is the purport of the instruction. Nevertheless, we think there was no substantial error in giving it. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, we think the jury were warranted in inferring an injury to the plaintiff’s means of support by showing Fogarty’s death, and that it was occasioned by intoxication produced by liquors sold or given to him by the defendants. This was sufficient to shift the burden of proof, and entitled the plaintiff to at least nominal damages.
It is also objected that appellee, while testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was asked by her counsel, against the objections of the defendants, the following question: “State if, during the year, you have been put to extraordinary expenses you would not have been put to if it was not for Fogarty’s death. ” This question was clearly improper, both in form and substance. It was leading. It clearly suggested the answer desired, which is never permissible where the witness is favorable to the party examining him, as the plaintiff evidently was in this case.
But the matter elicited by the question was still more objectionable than the question itself. The witness, in response,
The plaintiff was also permitted to go on and detail to the jury the inconveniences she has labored under since her
As this case will have to be reversed for the error indicated, and the cause retried, we deem it proper to say that we are of opinion the trial court gave plaintiff’s counsel too much latitude in the examination of her witnesses. They seem to have been uniformly permitted to ask leading questions, without the slightest restriction, against the repeated objections of the defendants. While we concede the court may properly allow this where the witness is hostile to the party calling him, or is required to testify against his own interest, yet in the absence of any considerations of this character such a course of examination is in palpable violation of a well settled rule of law regulating the production of testimony, and is manifestly unjust to the opposite party. While we are of opinion that in some instances in the present case leading questions were properly allowed, yet we are equally clear that in other instances they were not, of which the above question to the plaintiff herself is an example. It is not necessary to go into further detail on this subject. What we have here said is with
For the errors indicated the judgment of the’ Appellate Court is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the cause for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.