155 P. 197 | Or. | 1916
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
1, 2. As a general rule, an order setting aside a default is of an intermediate character, and is not appealable, although it may be reviewed if an appeal is taken from the final judgment or decree: Taylor v. Taylor, 61 Or. 257 (121 Pac. 431, 964); Hall v. McCan, 62 Or. 556 (126 Pac. 5). The appellant concedes the general rule, but relies upon what is said in First Christian Church v. Robb, 69 Or. 283 (138 Pac. 856), contends that the order was void and therefore an utter nullity, and argues that a void order is appeal-able The merits of the order can neither be examined nor determined on a motion to dismiss the appeal.
The motion to dismiss is denied, with the right to renew the motion when the cause is heard on the merits. Motion Denied.
Opinion on the Merits
Appeal dismissed May 23, 1916.
On the Merits.
(157 Pac. 788.)
delivered the opinion of the court.
4c. We find it necessary at this time to consider only the motion to dismiss the appeal. Section 3710, L. O. L., among other things, says:
“Any defendant against whom such judgment and decree has been rendered, and who has not been personally served with the notice or summons of the application for judgment or decree of foreclosure, and who has not appeared therein, may, upon good cause shown and upon such terms as may be proper, be allowed to defend and file his objections after such judgment or decree, and within one year after the entry thereof, upon such terms as may be just. ’ ’
The order of the court permitting the defendant to answer was clearly an intermediate order, and not appealable unless void: Section 548, L. O. L.
It follows that it is not an appealable order, and tbe appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.