112 Ky. 646 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1902
Opinion of the court
Reversing.
This action was instituted by appellants against appellee to recover a tract of 129.3 acres of land situated in McLean county, and rents thereon from 1885, which they alleged that the defendant wrongfully detained from them. The defendant denied the alleged wrongful' possession, and said that he had purchased the land sued for from the plaintiff, through her duly-authorized agent, L. W. Gates on the 25th day of April, 1885, for the sum of $1,200, and was put in. possession by him; that, whilst the negotiations for the purchase were made with L. W. Gates as- agent of plaintiff, he authorized his son G. W. Gates to conclude the transaction, and that G. W. Gates wrote the notes and executed the bond, binding plaintiff to convey the land, and that the cash was. paid to G. W. Gates for his father, L. AY. Gates, and that the notes were delivered to G. W. Gates, who paid the money collected by him, and delivered the notes to L. W. Gates, plaintiff’s agent, who, in turn, paid the $200 and delivered the notes to plaintiffs, which they accepted; that subsequently plaintiffs redelivered the notes for collection to L. W. Gates, who placed them in the hands'of G. W. Gates, with authority to collect them, and that G. W.
It appears from the record that Plaintiff Lucy B. Floyd inherited from her father a large tract of unimproved land in McLean county about the year 1859, which she never saw, ■and which .she managed through agents residing in McLean county. The greater part of this land had been sold or disposed of -prior to 1885. For several years preceding the transaction 'with the defendant, Lloyd W. Gates, who resided in McLean county, acted as her agent in looking after her unsold lands, and as such paid the taxes thereon, rented them out, and sold a part Of the land to a man named Ray, executing therefor a bond for a title, signed by him as' agent. In 1883 or' 1884 L. W. Gates moved from McLean county to Jefferson county, about 12 miles from Louisville, where he resided until his death, in 1890. After his removal to Jefferson county it appears that he made several trips back to McLean county, looking after unfinished business. In April, 1884, the appellee, J. H. Mackey, wrote to the appellant Mrs. L. W. Floyd, proposing to buy about twenty-nine acres of land in the tract of land in controversy. Mrs. Floyd inclosed this letter to L. W. Gates, and addressed to him the following communication: “Louisville, Ky., April 9. Mr. Gates: Inclosed find letter from Mr. Mackey, which we can not answer only through your judgment. Please
The first question to be determined is, did Mrs. Floyd ever in fact authorize L. W. Gates to sell the land, as her agent, to the defendant? And, second, did he in fact do so? The appellee, Mackey, in his letter to Mrs. Floyd in 1885, only proposed to purchase twenty-nine acres of her tract of land. This letter she referred to L. W. Gates, with instructions to do what he considered bdst, or to write his advice in the matter. The only question was the advisability of selling twenty-nine acres of the remainder of appellant’s land. There is no contention that L. W. Gates sold the twenty-nine acres, but it is claimed that he sold the entire tract, of 129 acres, through his son, G. W. Gates. Agency is a personal trust for ministerial purposes, and can not be delegated; for the principal employs the agent upon the opinion he has of his personal skill and integrity, and the latter has no right to turn his principal over to another without hifj knowledge or consent. See 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.), p. 368; Jones v,. Brand, 106 Ky., 410 (20 R., 1997) (50 S.W., 679). It is clear that even if L. W. Gates had authority, either general or special,to sell the land to the defendant,he did not do so in person; and he had no right to delegate such authority, if in fact he did delegate it, to his son. The decided weight of the testimony is that L. W. Gates was not present at the transaction between his son G. W. Gates and the defendant, and that he never received any of the purchase money, which was undoubtedly paid by the appellee to G. W. Gates. It is unreasonable to believe that the account books of L. W. Gates should have contained an exact record of every transaction between himself and his son from the time he left western Kentucky and moved to Jefferson county, except that growing out of the
But it is contended for appellee that as Mrs. Floyd authorized and permitted L. W. Gates, in numerous transactions which preceded the one in question, to represent her in the sale of parts of her tract of land in McLean county under precisely similar circumstances to those under which appellee bought the land claimed by him, and subsequently ratified his acts by making conveyances, and referred appellee’s letter, seeking to buy the twenty-nine acres of land, to him, she is estopped to deny his authority in the premises, or to assert title to the land in controversy. Even if L. W. Gates had, as a matter of fact, sold the land to appellee (which the record fails to show), the facts relied on would not be sufficient to estop Mrs. Floyd from claiming the land in controversy. Undoubtedly the active participation of a married woman in the perpetration of a fraud may operate, by way of estoppel, to divest her of interest in real estate. See Connolly v. Branstler, 66 Ky., 702, 96 Am. Dec., 278; Heck v. Fisher, 78 Ky., 644; Newman v. Moore, 94 Ky., 147, (15 R., 1, 21 S. W., 759, 42 Am. St. Rep., 343). And if appellant had in fact received the purchase money of this tract of land, or had knowingly ratified and approved its sale, by accepting the notes and sending them to G. W. Gates for collection, the doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais might be invoked, unless she refunded the money.
For the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.