Plaintiff Floyd Heno and two of his daughters appeal a district court order dismissing their claims for compensatory and injunctive relief against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).
1
We affirm the district court’s dismissal,
I
BACKGROUND
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
de novo,
crediting all allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff.
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
The complaint alleges that plaintiff Heno sold Baleol Corporation a 104-acre parcel of undeveloped real estate in 1986, for which Baled gave Heno a promissory note secured by a first mortgage. In-September 1987, Baled began to develop the property, known as the “Prospect Heights” residential subdivision, and obtained construction financing through Home National Bank of Milford (“Bank”). Heno agreed- to subordinate his first mortgage to the Bank’s construction loan mortgage. Baled and the Bank agreed to release $19,125 from the lot-sale proceeds *431 in return for the release of Heno’s second mortgage lien as each lot was sold.
By April 1990, Balcol and Prospect Heights were experiencing financial difficulties, and the three principal parties entered into a recapitalization agreement. Heno agreed to accept $5,000 (rather than $19,125) per lot for releasing his second mortgage on the next nine lots sold by Balcol. In return, Balcol and the Bank agreed: (1) to transfer two additional lots to Heno (Lots 82 and 111), free and clear of the Bank’s first mortgage liens, at the time Heno released his second mortgage on the ninth lot; and (2) to deposit the net proceeds from the nine lots in escrow with the Bank. The escrow monies were to be used exclusively for the immediate completion of roadwork at the project and to defray Balcol’s first mortgage interest payments to .the Bank.
Although Balcol conveyed Lots 82 and 111 to Heno on May 2, 1990, the Bank did not release its first mortgage liens on the lots. During April and May 1990, seven of the nine original lots were sold by the Bank after Heno released his second mortgage liens. By June 1, 1990, more than $232,000 had been deposited in escrow with the Bank pursuant to the recapitalization agreement among Heno, Balcol, and the Bank. Ultimately, the eighth and ninth lots were sold, and the net proceeds, approximating $90,000, were deposited with FDIC. 2 The complaint alleges, hence we must assume, that $125,000 was to have been devoted to roadwork at the project. 3
On June 1, 1990, the Bank was declared insolvent and FDIC was appointed receiver. At an unspecified later date, FDIC applied the escrow funds to the principal due on Balcol’s first mortgage loan account with the Bank, contrary to the express terms of the recapitalization agreement. Heno’s counsel thereafter held discussions with FDIC, and was informed by Balcol that FDIC would determine, after obtaining an appraisal of the Prospect Heights project, whether to release the Bank’s first mortgage liens on the two additional lots at issue on appeal (lots 82 and 111). On December 13, 1990, 4 and again on February 19, 1991, Heno submitted written requests for action by the FDIC, but to no avail. 5 Subsequently, FDIC foreclosed on the Prospect Heights subdivision, including Lots 82 and 111. The escrow funds were neither redeposited nor applied to the agreed purposes.
On October 18, 1991, Heno brought the present action to enjoin FDIC’s sale of Lots 82 and 111 and to compel it to redeposit the escrow monies previously misapplied to Bal-col’s first mortgage with the Bank. The complaint demanded an equitable accounting of the escrow monies, and compensatory relief for the loss occasioned by FDIC’s refusal to release the Bank’s first mortgage liens on Lots 82 and 111. FDIC moved to dismiss the claim for compensatory relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. 12(b)(1), and the claim for injune- *432 tive relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim for compensatory relief by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(i), and that injunctive relief was precluded by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j).
II
DISCUSSION
Heno advances two contentions on appeal. First, he contends that neither subsection 1821(j), nor subsection 1821(d) (mandating that holders of “claims” against the assets of failed financial institutions lodge a timely administrative claim with FDIC as a prerequisite to judicial review), applies to “non-creditors” — like Heno — who assert claims for relief against FDIC in its own right, as distinguished from claims to assets of the insolvent financial institution itself. 6 Second, even if he were to be considered a “creditor” attempting to recover “assets” of the failed Bank, Heno contends that his claim for compensatory relief should not have been dismissed for failure to comply with the administrative claim procedure established under subsection 1821(d). With respect to the claim for compensatory relief, we agree.
The Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Act (“FIRREA”) regulates the filing, determination, and payment of claims against the assets of failed financial institutions after FDIC has been appointed receiver. The “task of interpretation begins with the text of the statute itself, and statutory language must be accorded its ordinary meaning.”
Telematics Int’l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp.,
In contrast to subsection 1821(d), however, subsection 1821(e) expressly empowers the FDIC, as receiver, to repudiate contracts made by the failed financial institution prior to FDIC’s appointment, where FDIC determines — in
its
“discretion,” but within a “reasonable period” after its appointment — that repudiation of the failed financial institution’s contract would “promote the orderly administration” of the failed institution’s affairs. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1).
7
Although repudia
*433
tion frees FDIC from performing the failed institution’s contract, it constitutes a breach for which FIRREA affords the injured contracting party a direct claim for compensatory relief against FDIC.
Howell v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
FIRREA’s language, structure, and context indicate that subsections 1821(d) and (e) govern very different
types
of “claims”. The administrative claim allowance procedure established under subsection 1821(d) is inappo-site to direct claims for FDIC’s repudiation of a contract entered into by the failed financial institution
prior to the receivership,
9
Subsection 1821(d) governs only claims against assets of the failed financial institution. Subsection 1821(e) authorizes claims for compensatory relief for direct loss occasioned by FDIC’s repudiation of a pre-receiv-ership contract entered into by the failed financial institution.
Cf. Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
No. 91-1304-PFK,
Moreover, as further evidence of FIR-REA’s dichotomous treatment of “claims,” the discordance between the applicable “timing” elements in subsections 1821(d) and (e) is noteworthy. In contrast to the fixed bar dates applicable under subsection 1821(d), FIRREA expressly allows FDIC a “reasonable period following [its] appointment” within which to repudiate preexisting contracts of the failed institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2). Of course, subsection 1821(e)(2)’s more pliant “reasonable time” prescription will vary in accordance with the factual circumstances in the particular case,
see Monument Square Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate only “ ‘if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on
any viable theory. ’ ” Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B.,
Ill
CONCLUSION
On the basis of these allegations, we are unable to conclude that “the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.”
Garita Hotel Ltd.,
Finally, our interpretation not only accords due recognition to the clear language of subsection 1821(e), but comports with the established rule of statutory construction that enactments limiting federal court jurisdiction are to be construed narrowly,
see United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
The order dismissing appellant’s claims for an accounting and compensatory relief is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In all other respects, the district court order is affirmed.
Notes
. As the claims at issue'on appeal relate only to Heno, we make no further reference to the other plaintiffs.
. The complaint does not specify the date(s) of these sales, but the proceeds were deposited with FDIC on or about October 1, 1990.
. Although the record is silent, at oral argument Heno’s counsel represented that the roadwork was never performed.
. Heno's December 13 letter specifically sought release of the Bank’s first mortgage liens on Lots 82 and 111 and served "notice of [Heno's] contingent interest in [the escrow account].’’ The letter went on to say:
Heno should receive either the lot releases or that portion of the escrow account attributable to his participation in the agreement. Under well established fiduciary and equitable principles, if the FDIC is not going to honor the purposes of the escrow account, that portion of the escrow account attributable to Heno's participation should be returned to him, and not used by the Receiver to reduce Balcol’s obligation.
(Emphasis added.) Heno’s complaint demands an equitable accounting of the escrow funds, and, accordingly, does not specify the exact amount claimed. However, were Heno to establish a repudiation of the recapitalization agreement, he might be expected to assert a claim for recovery of an amount equal to the difference between the $19,125 originally agreed upon, and the $5,000 which he later agreed to accept under the recapitalization agreement, for releasing his second mortgage liens on the nine lots sold by Balcol (or approximately $127,000).
.The February 19, 1991 letter outlines, inter alia, the evidence relating to Heno’s interest in the escrow monies and certain subdivision lots, and makes reference to other letters not included in the appellate record.
. Subsection 1821(j) provides, in part:
Except as provided in this section, no court may take any action, except at the request of the Board of Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as a conservator or a receiver.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (emphasis added). Like the district court, we conclude that Heno's claim for injunctive relief is harred by subsection 1821(j).
Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp.,
. Subsection 1821(e)(1) provides as follows:
(e) Provisions relating to contracts entered into before appointment of conservator or receiver
(1) Authority to repudiate contracts
*433 In addition to any other rights a conservator or receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease—
(A) to which such institution is a party;
(B) the performance of which the conservator or receiver, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion, determines to be burdensome; and
(C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the conservator or receiver determines, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion, will promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (emphasis added).
. The term " 'actual direct compensatory damages’ does not include—
(i) punitive or exemplary damages;
(ii) damages for lost profits or opportunity; or
(iii) damages for pain and suffering.”
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3)(B).
. Not only docs the § 1821(e) claim repudiation provision stand in sharp contrast to the administrative claim procedure under § 1821(d), it closely resembles the analogous statutory provisions governing the assumption and rejection of execu-tory contracts and unexpired leases in chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.
Compare
Bankruptcy Code § 365(a), (b)(1), (d)(2), (i), (j) & (k), 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (b)(1), (d)(2), (i), (j) & (k),
with
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1), (2) & (3).
Cf. Howell,
Neither FIRREA nor its legislative history defines the term "claim,” nor has FDIC issued regulations defining or clarifying its meaning. At least one other court has consulted analogous bankruptcy practice as a “promising source" for discerning congressional intent as to the meaning of the term "claim” under FIRREA.
See Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
Of course, no repudiation "claim” can "arise" against FDIC until it disaffirms or repudiates a claimant's preexisting contract with the failed financial institution. Cf. Bankruptcy Code § 502(g); 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (governing post-bar date allowance of "claim[s] arising from the rejection ... of an executory contract”) (emphasis added). FIRREA expressly grants FDIC a "reasonable period following [its] appointment” to "determine whether or not to exercise [its] rights of repudiation....” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2). Thus, the Bankruptcy Code definition of "claim” is plainly inapposite to a claim for repudiation against FDIC, as distinguished from the insolvent institution, their chapter 11 counterparts being the chapter 11 trustee and the debtor, respectively. The prepetition-claim filing deadlines established under the Bankruptcy Rules are inapplicable to postpetition "claims” against the chapter 11 trustee's counterpart {i.e., FDIC), since, by definition, no claim against FDIC can have arisen until its appointment and its repudiation of the failed financial institution's preexisting contract with the claimant.
.In
Homeland Stores,
for example, the district court aptly noted that, where FDIC or RTC fails to repudiate a contract or lease in a timely fashion, or by analogy to the present cáse, where FDIC decides not to repudiate within a "reasonable time” to permit the injured party to file a claim before the § 1821(d) bar date, FDIC or RTC “step[s] into the shoes of the [contracting party or] lessor for purposes of that [contract or] lease and is subject to claims on the contract. A contract claim by plaintiff is not a creditor action and therefore is not subject to the claims process.”
Homeland Stores,
No. 91-1304-PFK,
. As the district court explained in Rechler:
[T]he language of the administrative claims procedure explicitly indicates that it was designed to address pre-Receiver claims against the failed depository institution and not post-Receiver complaints against RTC.
In this case, plaintiff’s [§ 1821(e)] claim did not exist at the time the Receiver was appointed. At that time the plaintiff did not know, and could not have known, what position the Receiver would take concerning the [continuation of the] lease.
Common sense suggests that at the date of appointment the plaintiff could, in good faith, expect the Receiver to act reasonably and fairly to either repudiate or affirm. Thus, at the date of die appointment, plaintiff had no claim. It only ripened when RTC allegedly failed to exercise its statutory responsibility under Section 1821(e), long after the expiration of the time period for filing administrative claims. Taken to its logical or illogical conclusion, defendants’ argument would mandate a finding that plaintiff’s claim was time barred before it existed.
Rechler Partnership,
No. 90-3091,
Case law involving the statutory powers of RTC is applicable to FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A).
. As the claim for compensatory relief was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the district court made no findings relating to whether, or what, Bank records may have been lost. On remand, therefore, appellants may confront a serious problem of proof.
See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,