143 S.E. 142 | N.C. | 1928
Action for judgment declaring void an assessment upon lot of land owned by plaintiffs for street improvements, made on 20 February, 1923, and enjoining sale of said lot for the collection of the amount assessed.
From judgment upon facts agreed defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs own a lot of land located at the northwest corner of Louise and Sunnyside avenues, in the city of Charlotte. The frontage of said lot on Louise Avenue is about 110 feet, and on Sunnyside Avenue is about 167 feet.
Louise Avenue was paved by the city of Charlotte, under the provisions of its charter, in 1913. An assessment for its pro rata part of the cost of said paving was made by the city of Charlotte on said lot, on 23 October, 1913. The said assessment was valid in all respects, and the amount so assessed is a lien on said lot. This amount was $423.36, and is now due, with interest at six per cent from 1 March, 1914, no part of same having been paid. The assessed taxable value of said lot in 1913 was $2,400. The charter of the city of Charlotte, under which the assessment was made for the paving on Louise Avenue, contains a provision as follows: "Providedfurther, that no assessment against any piece of property improved as in this act provided, shall in any case exceed the amount of special benefit to or enhancement in value of said property by reason of said improvements, or twenty per cent of the assessed taxable value thereof, and where permanent street improvements shall be made the property bearing such assessments shall not be so assessed again until after the expiration of ten years from the date of the last preceding assessment." Section 7, ch. 251, Private Laws 1911.
Sunnyside Avenue was paved by the city of Charlotte under the provisions of chapter 56, Public Laws 1915, and amendments thereto, now C. S., 2703-2728. An assessment for its pro rata part of the cost of said paving was made by the city of Charlotte on said lot on 20 February, 1923. The said assessment was valid in all respects, and the amount so assessed is a lien on said lot, provided the city of Charlotte had the power to make said assessment. The amount assessed upon plaintiff's lot, on account of the paving of Sunnyside Avenue was $868.40; five installments are now due and unpaid. At the date of the assessment for the paving of Sunnyside Avenue, plaintiff's lot was assessed for taxation at $8,635.00.
Upon the facts agreed, the court was of the opinion, and so adjudged, that the amount assessed upon plaintiff's lot for the permanent improvement *601 of Louise Avenue, to wit, $423.36, was a lien upon said lot; but that only the sum of $56.64 of the amount assessed for the permanent improvement of Sunnyside Avenue was a lien upon said lot, and that said lot was not subject to a lien in favor of the city of Charlotte, for the remainder of said assessment.
The judgment must be affirmed, upon the authority of Charlotte v. Brown,
We think it manifest from the language of the proviso in section 7 of chapter 251, Private Laws 1911, that under the charter the second assessment, having been made before the expiration of ten years from the date of the first assessment is void, and this without regard to the fact that the second assessment was made under the provisions of Article IX, ch. 56 of the Consolidated Statutes. The language is, "Where permanent street improvements shall be made, the property bearing such assessments shall not be so assessed again, until the expiration of ten years from the date of the last preceding assessment."
It is provided by C. S., 2704, that Article IX, ch. 56 of the Consolidated Statutes shall apply to all municipalities; "It shall not, however, repeal any special or local law or affect any proceedings under any special or local law for the making of street, sidewalk, or other improvements hereby authorized, or for the raising of funds therefor, but shall be deemed additional and independent legislation for such purposes and to provide an alternative method of procedure for such purposes, and to be a complete act, not subject to any limitation or restriction contained in any other public or private law or laws, except as herein otherwise provided."
The principle discussed and applied in Bramham v. Durham,
Affirmed.