400 S.E.2d 649 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1990
Appellant, a state employee with the Department of Community Affairs (the “Department”), was terminated from his position in 1985. Appellant had worked in the Department since 1982 and had been a state employee for over ten years. Upon his termination, appellant filed a complaint with the State Personnel Board. After a hearing before a hearing officer at which witnesses testified for both appellant and appellees, the hearing officer made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that there was sufficient cause for the dismissal of appellant under the rules of the State Personnel Board. The State Personnel Board upheld the decision of the hearing officer and adopted the officer’s findings and conclusions. Appellant
1. Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred in making findings of fact based on the record in the case when appellant disputed the factual findings of the hearing officer as to the manner in which he communicated with his supervisors. Appellant therefore asserts that there are material facts in dispute and the grant of summary judgment was in error. We agree with appellant’s contentions. “ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party shows he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.'’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Centennial Ins. Co. v. Sandner, Inc., 193 Ga. App. 253 (1c), 254 (387 SE2d 443)
We are aware that in a different context, involving a different combination of forums, a federal court will give preclusive effect to state administrative findings in a Section 1983 action brought in federal court, when those findings have been affirmed by the state courts under the “any evidence” standard. See Gorin v. Osborne, 756 F2d 834 (11th Cir. 1985). In the instant case, our state courts have not had the opportunity to review the hearing officer’s findings on direct appeal, and in the absence of such review, we do not find this federal precedent persuasive. Further, we do not feel that our conclusion is in conflict with the United States Supreme Court decision of University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U. S. 788 (106 SC 3220, 92 LE2d 635) (1986) in which the court held that federal courts must give an administrative agency’s factfinding the same preclusive effect that it would be given in the state’s courts when the agency is “ ‘acting in a judicial capacity [and] resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate. . . .’ [Cit.]” Id. at 799. First, the instant case does not involve the relationship between federal and state courts. Secondly, as we have previously stated, the factfinding process in a Section 1983 action is unique to the cause of action such that the appellant did not have the opportunity to litigate necessary facts and issues to that claim in an administrative hearing geared toward an entirely separate cause of action.
2. We find a genuine issue of material fact in this case and reverse the grant of summary judgment to appellees. Consequently, it is unnecessary for us to review the remaining legal arguments of appel
Judgment reversed.