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Florig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
130 A.2d 445
Pa.
1957
Check Treatment

*1 theory logical Majority If the its be carried to Legion conclusion it would mean that the American headquarters Indianapolis, would be re- Indiana, sponsible (whom typist for the dismissal of a it did contact) not know and with whom it had had no at posts Albuquerque, one of its in distant New Mexico. large organizations, It would mean that all fraternal responsible such as the Moose and would be for Elks, every localized contact еntered into distant indi- lodges. vidual goes

I believe that the decision in this far ease be- yond required pleadings is what under the and the evi- Opinion Majority’s says I am satisfied that the dence, right wrong is much that in a I fear connection, laying precedent that the Court here is down a complicate may adjudication just and retard the complaints employees and contractees within local- ized and it is clear to mе territories, that this decision up procedure disposi- sets a novel and intricate for the adequate ap- tion of the claim when an propriate already one exists. all of these

For reasons dissent. Mr. Justice dissents. Cohbn Appellant. Florig & Roebuck Sears, *2 Argued 1957. Before January 9, C. J., Bell, Jones, Jones JJ. Chidsey, Musmanno, Arnold, Cohen, Strawbridge, Morris with him Wolf, Maxwell Ber- nard M. Schorr & Wolf, Borish, Block, Solis-Cohen, appellant. for Barry

Wm. J. N. with him Moran, Jr., Moran, Jr., appel- Billegas Wm. J. & for Moran, III, Moran, lee. 1957: March Opinion by Me. Justice Bell, brought personal trespass

Plaintiff an action for injuries resulting separated widely from two accidents. injuries The serious which he suffered on June 14,1952, alleged, resulted from on an accident March 17, 1951. on March entered one of the Plaintiff, 17, 1951, purchase defendant’s warehouses order to some sid- *3 ing. pass supervisor Plaintiff tried to around the inаdequacy defendant’s the because of warehouse, and, stepped light, into in a hole the floor of the ware- thereby injuring house and his hand and fell, wrist. left Although pain, he claims that he suffered constant he any lost no time from and work made no claim for in- juries resulting January from this accident until 23, over months later.

On June 1952—15 months after the first acci painting neighbor’s dent—while the roof house, plaintiffs gave suddenly way left and hand wrist and grоund breaking he fell to a concrete floor on the level, right suffering leg heel and contusions. His was for in a cast six weeks. The accident accord occurred, ing plaintiff, as “I to follows: started at nine o’clock morning, and in the three o’clock in the afternoon only square yards X had more about two to do. To do I that had ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍to the ladder roof, move about five or six square yards, And do times. those two I had to put position, g-ot I in make one more move. my the ladder up square and stain, and went finished the two roof, the I hand against tried to. left put my yards, I my before hand, know, right with worked to my I fell back collapsed. way* hand just gave left I from any it stop going and I could thought elbow, rolling on kept I didn’t succeed, further, the left. towards right hand,

“I for the ladder with grab my did lifted the ladder from the ladder, of the hold got all that ladder through commotion, roof. And gavе and out she and the went, ladder bottom, on way fell down.” and all ac- this second

It not until seven months after accident, first months after the twenty-two cident and for damages for sued the defendant plaintiff that acci- sustained both which injuries allegedly the first accident was Plaintiff contends dents. and that negligence the defendant’s attributable from the to his resulted wrist second accident first accident. he sustained for denied that it responsible Defendant further denied accident and first or second in- caused the second accident first accident the trial the course of therein. During received juries both presented by medical considerable the cru- is which raises and it this litigants in this appeal. point cial for in the returned a verdict

The jury *4 the in- upon based almost $11,000., entirely amount in the second accident. Defendant’s he suffered juries and for new for n.o.v. a trial were judgment motions the lower Court. by denied its is in this motion for appeal, pressing, Defendant Defendant contends com- (1) legally trial. a new to required establish a medical testimony petent * throughout, ours. Italics

423 (2) accidents causal connection the two between by plaintiff produced testimony that such not injuries (3) consequently suffered it is not liable for plaintiff a new therefore second aсcident and the granted. A the medical tes- review of trial should be timony pertinent de- substantiate authorities position. fendant’s injuries resulting

If to for wished recover him— it incumbent on from the second accident was by competent prove the facts of this ease—to under testimony that there was a causal and definite medical relationship Courts have the two accidents. between precise lay to down a standard which found it difficult question every medical fit case on the of whether can prove testimony necessary be- is to a causal connection prior injury. injury and a The neces- latest tween depend sity in each case medical will particular including, upon inter facts of that case in each kind of which occurred accident, alia, between the accidents, time interval exact manner activities between accidents, accident occurred. last Superior Pa. In v. 180 Ct. Ruckno, Washko Inc., required 121 A. 2d medical evidence was 456, 608, produced by heavy prove attack heart work (page thirty The Court said minutes before. done prove 609) duty “It that her hus : was claimant’s alleged from over-exertion: death resulted band’s Valley Wyoming v. 332 Pa. Co., Colleries Adamehick * relationship no causal is obvious Where thеre 401. necessary unequivocal is to estab- medical * 32, 403; Saylor Wentz, Pa. 73 A. 2d v. v. 365 Green Gill Cf. Superior 633; McCoy Co., A. 43 2d Gar 157 Pa. Ct. Steel ville Mosko, 523; Superior Spriggs, A. Ct. Stracka v. 102 Pa. v. 483; Superior Rubber Utzman Penna. 98 Pa. Ct. Pa. Superior Ct. 483.

424 Philadelphia Ab- lish Rich v. the causal connection: Superior 200.” batoir 160 Pa. Ct. Co., Spring 270 Pa. 476, v. In Fink Sheldon Axle & Co., required testimony to connect 113 A. medical 666, swinging being paralytic a a struck stroke with necessary Similarly, testimony held door. medical plaintiff pneumonia resulted where contended previously: in his months Ander from a cut arm two son v. 285 Pa. 132 A. 358. Medical testi 443, Baxter, plain mony necessary likewise be held to where pneumonia tiff claimed that was the result an acci dent he had suffered seven weeks earlier: MeCrosson v. P. R. T. 283 Pa. 129 A. 492, 568. testimony other

On the medical was held to hand, unnecessary in be Tabuteau v. London &G. H. Co. 351 Pa. 40 A. Ltd., 183, 2d where suffered pain groin developed immediately a hernia misstepped after he on an uneven sidewalk. The Court 186) (page expert testimony necessary said : “. . . is not (or injury) immediately where death directly, ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍is so naturally or probably, the result of the accident depend that the connection between them does not sole ly professional expert on the witnesses: Superior Davis v. 80 McCoy Davis, Pa. 343; Ct. v. Superior Spriggs, Pa. 102 Ct. 500, 157 A. 523. produced competent “Plaintiff direct and evidence clearly if which, believed, established the causal rela- tionship injuries. between the accident and Plain- support tiff’s own is sufficient to the find- ing jury of the that he suffered an accidental policy, resulting the terms of the within disability. Sayers, “In & Superior Mohr Desimone 110 Pa. A. Ct. court said: frequently 44, 49, ‘It has disability complained been held where of is probable injuries, the natural and result the fact- permitted finding body may be to so find, even in the entire absence of In the instant case expert opinion.’ *6 the sequence of events indicates a causal con- strongly nection between the and the entirely unexpected injury continuous it. Plaintiff had disability following been in excellent and had health, done same work for before the accident. thirty years But immediately after the accident he was disabled a ob- by pеrfectly vious which a injury could layman and he diagnose, was unable to work as before. The accident and the were so and closely so connected, ap- quickly that parent, circumstances themselves justified submission to the jury: Stracka v. Pa. Su- Mosko, perior Ct. 463.”

In the instant the evidence case, the in- including terval of time between accidents and the manner in which the last accident occurred make it оbvious that only expert could connect the testimony two accidents. The second accident could have happened from any one of half a dozen different causes. There no ob- vious causal relationship between the accident of March 1951 and the accident of June 1952. The last accident could not be said reasonably layman— without be the natural guessing and probable re- —tо sult of the injuries suffered from the first accident. The second accident did not immediately directly result from the first accident nor was it the natural and probable result of the first accident which was so connected and so closely that a readily apparent lay- man could diagnose (except by guessing) causal connection. In other medical words, to establish —if it could—the causal necessary connec- tion between the two accidents. in order to

Plaintiff, prove causal connection between two called Dr. accidents, Herbert Kaplan, physician, Dr. London. Dr. family Kaplan after plaintiff treated both accidents, did not pre- present had that trial, before the

know, before) years viously (many His his left wrist. broken pertinent “I that it is feel was as follows: possible very highly probable of the because that pain burning which flew there, sensation to use his hand, I told the man and, understand, burning, possible type tin- had same it is pain opinion, boring my gling, the cause ... In —. collapse day to the due of the on that wrist pain persisting causalgia-like since the had been simplify day injury. If I can will it, of the [first] opinion my say him to this have caused could slide from the roof.” *7 produced on

Dr. the second doctor Russell London, question plaintiff, to the behalf testified relative рreviously “A. In of causation: a wrist fractured but permitting, according history, over to full function all years, paining consistently those and then from the episode, degenerative time of the second with changes previously we have mentioned in that wrist, pain I can conceivethat there is at the extremes of cer- length tain and for an excessive motion, time, patient could have caused the to his save hаnd sudden- ly and lost his balance.” history

Plaintiff’s medical revealed that before the first accident he had his broken left wrist and sus- injury joint tained an to the radial of his left arm and developed degenerative changes both had arthritic hypertension, may severe which of itself well cause painting dizziness. he Furthermore, had been this heavy for six he had hours; roof moved the ladder about during day; just six times that five or and had moved immediately the ladder before the accident. These im- portant Kaplan facts not were mentioned Dr. by Dr. London. Myers,

Dr. Ellwood S. who examined at response request, ques- defendant’s testified, to the tion of whether the second accident suffered as a result say definitely of the first accident: “A. I would My explain no. may reason for that is if I three-fold, unfortunately, that. Most this man Ias have told has, you, previous injuries two to this wrist. exam- From X-rays, previous ination of the he could not have, perfectly normally functioning goes a this, wrist. That presence without doubt because of the of arthritic change prevented in the radial head. That would have says anyone says, just no matter what he him, or what by looking X-rays, prevented at the it have would him bringing perfectly normally from that hand inside give helped him full function. It could not have to. prevent putting way It also would it all the out, prevented and to a certain extent it would have him up. getting may argue it It not have hurt I him, won’t injury preceded, that. But here is an and here injury preceded, top is another on of that gets help injury, third tie couldn’t but have a help I weak how don’t see he could But arm, it. injure on blame that an that didn’t even injured giving you the soft if bone, tissues, him, neuralgia want to term a or a it, am afraid neuritis, *8 I it. can’t see falling as

“As far his off roof is the concerned, anything upon my physical don’t know about but this, hypertension. the man has a examination, terrific He pressure, systolic, eight-six. has 204 blood over He has very poor eyesight. eyes, ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍eyesight, His normal should twenty twenty-twenty. vision is be His over a hundred. certainly Those in factors, two must have themselves, bearing. hypertension Q. Does sometimes cause dizzi- definitely ness? it does.” Yes, A.

428 Wargo v. In settled. in this field is well

The law Railways Pittsburgh 638, 101 A. 2d 376 Pa. 168, Co., granted a new reversed the lower Court this Court analogous tо the one at bar. The Court in a case trial plaintiff’s physicians it of said: “From anything guess impossible as to but how much, to do is present is any, back condition due to if original present back of to in- accident instead jury and arthritis!” 497, Philadelphia Pa. Trans. 376 Co., Menarde v.

In (page 501) “Moreover : said A. 2d 103 Court 681, testify, expert condition not that has to probably from might come or even did,* have, claimant opinion professional that in his accident, alleged. A less question cause came from the in result required opinion expression below the direct falls legally proof com not constitute and does standard of petent Machine et al., v. Mesta Co. evidence: Vorbnoff 375 Pa. A. Powell v. 256; Risser, 133 206, 286 Pa. 199, Pittsburgh Railways Wargo A. 2d v. 454; 99 68, 69, 60, Company, 101 A. 2d 638.” See to the Pa. 172, 376 168, George, 469; Pa. 46 A. 2d Nestor 19, effect: same Pa. 132 A. 358; McCros 443, v. Baxter, Anderson Rapid Philadelphia Transit 283 Pa. Cо., 492, son v. Spring Axle & 270 Pa. Fink v. Sheldon 568; 129A. & v. Seeds 336 Pa. Monahan 666; Durham, 113 A. 2d 889. A.6 is both on its facts at bar ruled, case

The Dr. principle, mentioned authorities. the above unequivocally in- positively that the denied Myers resulted from accident juries in the second suffered injuries Dr. London, in the first accident. incurred injuries received testified that plaintiff’s witness, caused have” the second “could first accident * throughout, ours- Italics

429 by qualified opinion Ms Kaplan’s Dr. was accident. caused” have “could that tbe first accident probable” highly possible very “it is or that my “in also testified accident; it caused the second from the opinion him slide caused to this could have suf- medical roof.” None of required proof by the standard of ficient to meet the cited. cases hereinabove Benninger, A. 2d Pa. 105

In Nikisher 377 564, v. 2d v. 344 Pa. 25 A. 392, 182, and Bender 281 Welsh, upon by tes- medical are relied the lower Court, required timony the causal rela- not to establish tionship and the cases are accidents between two clearly distinguishable. facts on their unnecessary trial to discuss whether a new It is against granted the verdict was should be because against weight of the evidence. Cf. evidence supra; Pittsburgh Railways go 376 v. Co., Pa., War Connecting Monongahela Duffy R. R. v. The 371 Co., Dupont Gallagher, v. 89 A. 2d 360 Pa. 804; Pa. 361, Equitable King A. 2d v. Gas 307 Pa. 28; 419, Co., Allegheny County, A. 65; Smith 377 Pa. 105 A. 2d 137. judgment is the lower Court reversed The granted. trial a new is Opinion

Dissenting Mr. Justice Musmanno: visiting be- ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍On March while warehouse 7, 1951, longing & Emil Norristown, Rosbuck Sears, Florig, this and sustained fell case, J. injuries His left hand and wrist back. Kaplan, physician, informed after Dr. Herbert him, repairing treating for some time, the hand Florig process one and he advised to use a slow *10 430 atrophy.

the affected lest it In obedi- hand, waste and Morig ence to this a resumed his work as direction, painter. painting

On June was 1952, while he a the roof, ailing gave way (the plaintiff hand described it as a “collapse”), being prevent sliding' and, unable to his rolling slope working, down the on which he was dropped damaging he to the cement floor his beneath, right practically an heel to such extent has now his lost the use of foot. He sued Roebuck & Sears, claiming that his second accident the result injured through of debilitated hаnd which had been negligence the of the defendant at the time of the first jury accident. The returned a verdict of in $11,000 his favor. The defendant moved for a new trial, con- tending that there was no causal connection between the first second accidents. The lower Court re- reversing the fused new and this Court is trial, the lower Court. mishap way

Of if the course, second in no a sequel to the first the defendant is entitled a one, imрossible new trial for it would be for this Court any jury Court to much determine how the allowed the plaintiff for each misfortune. appeal really presents only question,

This one name- ly, consequence inevitably was the second fall so a of the first fall that the event of March can 7, be considered cause the event of 14, 1952, June question, This is a medical-factual an not effect? judicial appellate and we are one, outside our field juridical trying apply stethoscope to the heart problem. of Kaplan, physician,

Dr. testified: “In my opinion collapse the cause of the of the wrist on causalgia-like pain day was due to the which had. day persisting injury. since 'been If I can my opinion, simplify say, that this could will it, roof.”* have caused him to slide from the Opinion doc- Majority in the fault The sees some phrase him”, havе caused tor’s use of the “could part and crucial it overlooks the more essential collapse namely, Doctor’s “the cause answer, causalgia-like day due to the of the wrist on that day persisting pain of the since which had been injury (the doctor ex- 1951].” The of March 7, collapse pressed of the wrist no doubt about *11 namely, then the first and accident, caused what it, caused” him to “could have added that this condition being simply candid. Here he was slide from the roof. or he to be dishonest would have He have had would retrospective say infallible Cassandra to had to be an personal knowledge my positively: that the “I of know brought collapse Florig’s about the to of wrist foot.” his anyone actually

How would the not on doctor, plaintiff, the roof the know the mechanics of the with top plunge ground? the hоuse from the of to How testify beyond could the doctor was the ken what knowledge? categorically his did state of He that the pain collapsed because of the and weakness wrist re- sulting up jury It from the first accident. was to the workingman years age to decide whether a on a precipitate slanting roof could arrest a descent when power drained from one of his all and Ms wrists, en- impediment an tire left arm thus became instead of a gravitation. to the forces of staff of resistance picture must be added to this There fact that positively himself testified that it was the his caused the failure of left wrist which disastrous drop. hearing jury all this After did

* Italics mine.

find causal connection between first accident the ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​‌‍second. hospital injured patient, suffering

If a from an foot slips to a due tortious because of accident, falls, leg, per- the weakness of that and breaks a foot, responsible injured son for the foot liable for will be leg leg as much as if he had at the broken struck during original the commission of the tort. Nor would change patient the situation if the had left the hos- pital leg subsequently, long his broken as so subsequent break due to the weakness of the foot. only inquiry us is Thus, before whether there was upon jury sufficient evidence could base its Florig rooftop fell conclusion from the because inability precarious perch to hold on to his as a result the weakness of his left for which wrist, admittedly responsible. agree defendant with the lower Court that there such evidence. It is noted to be that not even the defendant’s doctor ven- say that the tured second accident was plaintiff’s exploded not caused the defection of the helpless wrist. dispоsing The lower Court, of the defendant’s *12 judgment properly for motion n.o.v., rationalis- tically jury may said: “The have inferred that the sec- original injury. ond fall resulted from the If such so, supported by inference was of two medi- experts by cal also of the being any There himself. total absence of evidence pointed any other cause of the second fall, opinion plaintiff’s of the we are evidence fur- including damages a rational for nished basis a verdict resulting from the second accident.” agree Judge this with statement. who I Forrest, Opinion in the lower cited as Court, wrote author- position ity behalf of the Court’s the case of Bender v. 344 Pa. Welsh, 398. believe what we good said in namely: that case is still “Evidence law, subsequent injury is admissible to affect the meas- damages original injury ure of only on the if the sub- sequent injury proximately by original cаused negligence. Defendants contend that Mrs. Bender slipped independent from an cause and that therefore original way responsible, citing accident inwas no Wineberg v. DuBois 209 Pa. 430. In Boro., that case by injured second fall ‘was not caused leg, slipping of the sound foot’. In the in- plaintiffs subsequent stant case was attributable fall injured to the properly, limb to failure of function original injury. and this was the result The properly evidence therefore admitted: Marshall v. Superior Pittsburgh, Gallagher 119 Pa. Ct. 189, 197-8; Superior Hudson 117 Pa. Coal Ct. 480, 483.” Berger, Appellant. Bream v.

Argued January 1957. Before J., Bell, C. Jones, *13 Jones JJ. Musmanno, Arnold, Chidsey, Cohen,

Case Details

Case Name: Florig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 25, 1957
Citation: 130 A.2d 445
Docket Number: Appeal, 114
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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