80 Fla. 405 | Fla. | 1920
J. W. Sherouse, whom we shall herein call the complainant, filed his bill in the Circuit Court for Alachua County against the Florida National Bank of Gainesville and the Sheriff of said county, alleging that a described sixty acres of land, the property of complainant, was about to be sold on execution to satisfy
The prayer of the bill is that the threatened sale of said lands be temporarily and permanently enjoined.
The bank answered, admitting that it had recovered and then held a judgment against C. C. Sherouse for the sum of $2,630.80, and denying that the complainant was the owner of the described lands, but, • on the contrary, alleging that said lands were the property of C. C. She-rouse and that two certain deeds thereof, the one ma(Je by C. C. Sherouse to his brother, L. A. Sherouse, and the other by L. A. Sherouse to their father, J. W. Sherouse, the complainant, were fraudulent and void as against the bank which was a creditor of C. C. Sherouse before said deeds were executed.
Whether or not said conveyances are fraudulent and void as against the said bank, the judgment creditor of C. C. Sherouse, is the ultimate question presented by the record. The Chancellor found for the complainant, and permanently enjoined the sale of the property under the said judgment. In view of said finding we have hesitated to reverse the decree because of the well-recognized principle of law that the findings of a Chancellor on the evidence will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless said findings are clearly shown to be erroneous. But if a decree is manifestly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to the legal effect of the evidence then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse the same. Newman v. Smith, 77 Fla. 667, 82 South. Rep. 236; Boyd v. Gosser, 78 Fla. 70, 82 South. Rep. 758.
A very careful study of this case leads us to conclude that the decree is contrary to the legal effect of the evi
L. A. Sherouse did not testify, but J. W. Sherouse and C. O. Sherouse both say that no written .evidence of indebtedness or of payment relating to said transactions at any time passed between any of the parties.
The evidence shows that the buildings on the property were worth, in 1916, $1,150:00, and that the land, with the improvements, was worth $2,800.00 or $2,400.00. It also appears from the evidence that L. A. Sherouse had no property but was working as a common laborer at odd
It further appears that the deeds were witnessed by, and acknowledged before relatives of the grantors and grantees.
There is practically no conflict or consideration in the testimony of the various witnesses. The question before the Chancellor was whether the facts testified to show that the intent or legal effect of the transactions involved was to defraud the creditors of C. C. Sherouse. It seems clear that this inquiry should have been answered by the Chancellor in the affirmative; and, having failed so to do, it becomes the duty of this court to reverse the findings, notwithstanding that the question involved is one partly of fact. In the very nature of the case, a fraudulent intent must usually be shown by circumstantial evidence, and “circumstances altogether inconclusive, if separately considered may, by their number and joint consideration, especially when corroborated by moral coincidences, be sufficient to constitute conclusive proof.”
Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow, 45 Fla. 638, 33 South. Rep. 704.
There are a multitude of circumstances in this case, which, to say the least, are calculated to create suspicion, and many of which are recognized badges of fraud. Among them are the close relation in point of time of the deed by C. C. Sherouse to his brother, L. A. Sherouse, dated August 3, 1916, to the bankruptcy of Webb, which was adjudged August 17th, 1916; withholding of said deed, and the subsequent deed from the record for a con
We deem it' unnecessary to accumulate authority in support of our conclusion, but on the question of what constitutes badges of fraud see 20 Cyc. 439 et seq; 12 R. C. L. 476 et seq.
For the reasons stated, the judgment should be reversed, with directions to the lower court t'o dissolve the injunction, and dismiss the bill.
Per Curiam.- — The record in this case having been considered by this Court, and the foregoing opinion prepared under Chapter 7837, Acts of 1919, adopted by the Court as its opinion, it is considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the decree herein be, and the same is hereby reversed; and the cause is remanded with directions to the lower Court to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill.