No. 62249 | Fla. | Feb 24, 1983
Lead Opinion
Bradley F. Steinbach, a suspended member of The Florida Bar, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar to reinstate him to membership in The Florida Bar. This Court has original jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(8), Florida Constitution to issue a writ of mandamus. Adhering to Thomson v. The Florida Bar, 260 So. 2d 495" court="Fla." date_filed="1972-03-29" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/thomson-v-florida-bar-7448376?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7448376">260 So.2d 495 (Fla.1972), we order the bar to reinstate Steinbach upon full payment of all fees and charges.
Shortly after being admitted to The Florida Bar in December 1949, Steinbach relocated to New York. Steinbach never paid his annual membership dues and was declared a delinquent member. He continued to reside outside Florida for thirty-two years and in 1981 petitioned for reinstatement. He has never been suspended for any misconduct, but his right to practice law in Florida has been stayed because of article VIII, paragraph 2, Florida Bar Integration Rule, which provides:
When any member is in arrears in the payment of annual dues for 45 days, the executive director shall send written notice by registered or certified mail to such member at his last business address. Within 30 days after the posting of the notice, such member may pay his dues in full, together with a delinquency charge of $25.00. Upon failure to make these payments within the 30 day period, he shall become a delinquent member, entitled to none of the privileges of membership in The Florida Bar, and shall not practice law in this state. He may thereafter reinstate this membership upon petition to and approval by the Board of Governors and the payment of all fees and charges owing by him, including a reinstatement fee of $50.00.
In Thomson we distinguished an article VIII suspension from an article XI suspension by noting that “an Article VIII suspension for failure to pay dues is automatic unlike an Article XI disciplinary proceeding, which deals with violations of the disciplinary code.” 260 So.2d at 496. We held that “[o]nce petitioner’s petition for reinstatement following his suspension for failure to pay dues was complete, the Board of Governors should have automatically reinstated him. This is a ministerial action and should be done promptly.” Id. at 497.
The facts in Thomson are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the case at hand. Thomson practiced law in Florida at the time of his suspension for failure to pay dues and filed for reinstatement less than one year after his suspension. As a consequence the Court had little or no reason to doubt Thomson’s knowledge of Florida law. Steinbach, on the other hand, has never practiced law in Florida, and his suspension has been for approximately thirty-two years. There is no indication in the record that Steinbach has attempted to keep up with the changes in Florida law.
This Court agrees that The Florida Bar has legitimate concern over Steinbach’s competency in Florida law. In addition we
We therefore conclude that the writ of mandamus should be granted and order The Florida Bar to reinstate Steinbaeh immediately upon full payment of all fees and charges.
It is so ordered.
The Florida Bar has filed proposed amendments to this provision, The Florida Bar in re Amendment to Florida Bar Integration Rule, article II, subsections 3 and 6, Integration Rule Bylaws, article II, sections 2 and 3, (Reinstatement after resignation), article VIII, subsections 1, 2, and 4, and Integration Rule Bylaws, article VIII, sections 1 and 3 (Reinstatement after dues delinquency), case no. 61,736, filed Feb. 17, 1982, but any amendment would not affect Stein-bach’s petition.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I would deny Steinbach’s petition for writ of mandamus directed to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar. He should not be reinstated until he has proven his knowledge of the law and his competence to represent any person on any legal matter in any court in this state by passing all parts of The Florida Bar Examination.
This case is not at all like Thomson v. The Florida Bar, 260 So.2d 495 (Fla.1972), wherein Thomson was automatically “suspended” from the Bar for failure to pay dues and within less than a year sought reinstatement by paying delinquent and current fees and charges owing. The general holding of Thomson that once the reason for automatic suspension is removed the suspension should be automatically lifted should not be applied to the peculiar facts of Steinbach’s case.
In the present case, Steinbaeh has been suspended from membership in The Florida Bar for over thirty years. In seeking reinstatement, he makes no representation that, during this time, he has made any effort to keep abreast of the changes in Florida law, and, unlike Thomson, there is every reason to doubt Steinbach’s knowledge of Florida law.
In its response to Steinbach’s petition for mandamus, The Florida Bar states that although the Board of Governors has no indication that petitioner has any present knowledge of any of Florida’s laws or procedures, the Board is being asked to certify to the public that Steinbaeh is competent to practice law in this state. The Board is unable to make this declaration at the present time. Certainly, the Board’s primary obligation is to protect the public, and it is primarily for this reason that The Florida Bar exists. Were the Board to blindly certify to the public that Steinbaeh is competent to practice law in Florida after suspension from Bar membership for over thirty years, the Board would be derelict in its duty to the public.
In my view, Steinbaeh must be required to show his competence in the law before reinstatement, and I would require him to pass The Florida Bar Examination. If Thomson compels the result reached by the majority, I would recede from it insofar as concerns the facts of the present case. To do otherwise and reach the result that the majority does will be a great disservice to the public whom this Court is charged to protect from incompetent lawyers.