Flores Arana v. Blanche

Aug 5, 2026
2:26-cv-01627

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Jose Gonzalo Flores Arana, a citizen of Guatemala, is currently in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otero County Detention Center in Chaparral, New Mexico. Doc. 1 ¶ 9. Petitioner previously entered the United States without inspection and began residing in Lakeland, Florida. Id. ¶ 17.

On April 26, 2025, Petitioner noticed he had a flat tire on his way home from work. Id. The local sheriff’s deputies approached him and asked him, among other things, whether he had consumed any alcohol. Id. Petitioner disclosed that he had drunk a few beers before driving. Id. The deputies then arrested him and transported him to the local jail. Id. Petitioner paid a $1,000 bond and was released from jail. Id. ¶ 18. After stepping foot outside of the facility, ICE agents immediately arrested Petitioner without a warrant. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Petitioner has been detained for nearly 16 months. Id. ¶ 21. He has an appeal of his order of removal pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and a T visa application pending before the U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Id. ¶¶ 25–26. Petitioner alleges that his continued detention violates, inter alia, his Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights and seeks release from detention. Id. ¶¶ 56–59. Respondents do not dispute any of the above-stated facts. See Doc. 8.

DISCUSSION

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226

Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.” Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.

Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond hearings. Id. at 306.

Respondents take the position that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2) as an “applicant for admission.” Doc. 8 at 2. However, they concede that if this Court applies the reasoning articulated in Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026), Petitioner would be subject to § 1226 and mandatory detention would not apply. Id.

The Tenth Circuit recently confirmed this Court’s interpretation of §§ 1226 and 1225 (discussed in Martin Ramirez), which mirrored the conclusion of the vast majority of district courts in this circuit, in Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026). The court held that noncitizens “who entered the United States without admission and who have lived here since” cannot be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. Id. at 1239. These individuals are “categorically unable to seek admission while they remain in the country.” Id. “The Government’s interpretation disrupts § 1226(a)’s coverage of inadmissible noncitizens. If the Government is correct that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of all applicants for admission, then there are no inadmissible noncitizens left for § 1226(a) to cover.” Id. at 1247. Following Santillan Quiroz, Respondents’ argument in favor of applying § 1225 to the present case has no merit.

II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights.

The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights. The United States’ power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”). Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and Respondents have deprived him of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.

Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018). Petitioner has been detained for nearly 16 months. The Government’s burden to justify a detention of that length is immense.

“Due process requires that, whenever the Government detains somebody, it must have a good reason for doing so. If the detention is civil and nonpunitive, like the immigration detention here, that reason must rise to the level of a ‘strong special justification.’” Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1249 (citation omitted). Here, the Government has offered neither justification nor process for the deprivation of Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. There is no evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk (indeed, he has a clear incentive to remain in the country while his appeal and T-visa application are pending), a threat to the community, or that the Government has any interest whatsoever in his ongoing detention. Nevertheless, the Government has detained Petitioner for over a year. The Government has therefore violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights and he is entitled to habeas relief.

CONCLUSION

It is hereby ORDERED:

  1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
  2. Respondents shall release Petitioner within 48 hours of this Order being entered;
  3. Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility, and provide all necessary identity and travel documents to return him to his primary address;
  4. Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location, or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of release;
  5. Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
  6. The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SARAH M. DAVENPORT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Notes

1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the case caption shall be updated to reflect that Markwayne Mullin is the Secretary of Homeland Security. All future filings should be in the name of the substituted party.