— The petition alleges that defendant and one Beason were a copartnership, owning and operating a sorghum mill upon the premises of the defendant, and that plaintiff was employed by them to work at said mill, and while so employed in the act of feeding cane into, the mill, his hand was drawn into the unguarded rollers and injured; that defendаnt was negligent in not providing proper guards at and upon the rollers, and in failing to provide belt shifters or other mechanical contrivances to throw belts off and on pulleys, as provided by statute, and in failing to provide plaintiff a safe place to work.
The answer is in general denial, and that the only relation existing between him and Bеason at any time was that of landlord and tenant; that defendant had nothing to do with the hiring of plaintiff; and that, if plaintiff had been so hired, it was done by said Beason; that plaintiff assumed the risk; and that his injury was the result of contributory negligence.
For reply, plaintiff says that, in his employment by defendant, through Beason, it was stipulated that the defendant would pay one half of plaintiff’s wages; denies defendant’s plea of assumption of risk and contributory negligence; and states further that plaintiff notified defendant of the unguarded condition of the rollers, and was promised by defendant that it would be properly equipped, and that, relying upon said promises, he continued in the work until he was injured.
Plaintiff was injurеd September 16, 1919. He was 71 years of age, now living at the county farm. At the time he was injured, he was feeding cane into the mill, when some of the cane became tangled or twisted around his hand, and drew it in. He does not claim that he had any conversation with the defendant *1176 in regard to his employment, or in regard to the unguarded condition of the rоllers, or any promise to remedy. Over objection that it Avas hearsay, he testifies to the conversation with Beason as to his employment, and describes the mill, and says that it AA'as not guarded; that it Avas a three-roller mill. He gives his experience Avith other mills, and says that he had been engaged in feeding cane mills, off and on, all his life. He tells Iioav he was hurt, pushing Avith the left hand the stalks he had in the right hand, and says he pushed until the right hand Avent into the roller; that, AAdien the cane gets started through the mills, the rollers draw the cane in; that it Avent through itself; that the mill was run by a gasoline engine; that he had done some of the stripping of the cane before. As to the conversation with Beason in regard to his employment, plaintiff testifies that Beason said that Mr. Fox was to be the paymaster, that witness AArould liaA^e to Avork under those conditions; that thereafter, he went right and started to work at Fox’s place.
“He said Mr. Fox Avanted me to come and help take care of the cane and feed the mill; Avorked there in the cane the day before, on the farm. Beason was the man in charge of the business there; he Avas there on the place.”
As avc understand the record, plaintiff Avas grinding cane Avhich had been raised on the premises leased by defendant to Beason, although the record is not entirely clear. The record is:
“Q. And how long had you been working there, before this mоrning that your hand was hurt? A. The day before. Q. And you had been Avorking around there on the farm of Mr. Beason? A. "Working there in the cane.”
It is argued by the plaintiff that defendant and Beason Avere operating a custom cane mill for profit. We do not so understand the record, and find nothing in the evidence to indicate that such Avas the fact. Appellant further states and argues that the operation of the cane mill was an out-and-out manufacturing enterprise, and had nothing to do with, nor Avas it incident to, their farm lease. "We think appellant is laboring under a misapprehension of the record in regard to this. The agreement betAA^een defendant and Beason in regard to the cane *1177 mill in question was included in or made a part of a written lease between defendant and Beason, by which defendant, as party of the first part, leased to Beason 120 acres of land for one year from the 1st -of March, 1919; and recites that second party, in consideration of the leasing of the premises, as above set forth, covenants and agrees with the first party to pay rent for the same in the manner following, — that is to say, as per slip- attached thereto. This slip provides that first party is to furnish the cows which are to be cared for on the place, and all calves are to be fed until they are old enough to live on the grass, when first party is to remove them; the milk and cream to be accounted for, and first party to have one half of the proceeds. Each party to furnish, share and share alike, of the hogs and brood sows, and share alike in the profits and increase from same, and both parties to share and share alike in all poultry raised on the place. First pаrty .sells to second party one half of the rye now growing on the place for $20, and second party is to pay for same, in work on the place during the year. First party is to furnish binder, and both parties are to pay all expense of threshing, share and share alike, including board of help. First party furnishes the gasoline engine, and second party furnishes a cane mill, and each is to pay one half of the expense of same. Both parties must be informed of all sales of stock or buying of stuff for the farm, and each has equal rights. Second party is to have a suitable garden patch, and the fruit from the orchard. Second party is to furnish a team, and same is to be fed on the place. In case more horses. are needed, first party will furnish them during the time needed. The lease contains other and usual covenants; that second party shall yield possession of the premises in as good condition, etc.; that second party is to farm the premises in farm-like manner, and raise the greatest amount оf grain that the nature of the soil and the season will permit; that second party is to preserve and protect fruit and ornamental trees from injury, and keep hedges and fences in repair. It also provides that the grain raised shall not be sold until the rent is paid, and contains other provisions.
Appellant argues the questions of negligence, contributory
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negligence, assumption of risk, and so on; but аppellee says that there is but one question in the case, and that is whether defendant and Beason were partners, and concedes that, if it be so held, the case should have gone to the jury. Appellee cites
Ault Co. v. Baker,
Plaintiff has the burden to show the existence of a partnership. 20 Ruling Case Law 849. There are several tests usually relied upon to determine whether a partnership exists, one of which is the intention of the parties, 20 Ruling Case Law 831. In
Lutz v. Billick,
Another test of the existence of a partnership is founded on the ansAver to the question AAdiether the supposed partners acquired any control, as owner, over the profits, Avhile they remained undiA’ided. 20 Ruling Case LaAV 829. There is nothing in the record in the instant case to show that defendant had any control, as owner, over the profits, had there been any, while they Avere undiAuded, or that he had anything’ to do Avith the management of the farm, including the sorghum mill. As said in one case, the defendant Avas interested only in the proceeds, and this he was to haAm as' rent for his land. Neither did defendant have any interest in the profits as such, nor any interest in the crops or proрerty on the farm generally, except that it appears that he OAvned the gasoline engine and helped to furnish the hogs and coays. See cases in 18 L. R. A. (N. S.), supra, at 1042.
Another test is that of community of interest. Doubtless every partnership is founded on a community of interest, but not eArery community of interest necessarily constitutes a partnеrship. It has been held that the salient features of an ordinary partnership are a comnmnity of interest in profits and losses, a community of interest in the capital employed, and a community of power in administration; that there must be such community of interest as enables each party to make contracts, manage the business, and dispose of the Avhole property. 20 *1180 Buling Case Law 830. It is true, of course, that there may be exceptions to some of these rules: for instance, one may agree to furnish all the capital, or define the specific duties of each in regard to the management, etc. There is nothing in the instant case to indicate that defendant would have any right to dispose of the property on the farm.
Another test is that there must be an agreement to share in losses, as well as profits. It seems to be now well settled that participation in the profits does not constitute a partnership in respect to the adventure from which the profits arise, and this court is committеd to the doctrine that there must be a share in the losses.
Richman v.
Richman,
We do not understand appellant to controvert these several propositions, but he contends that, in the contract in question, “expenses and losses are synonymous.” They concede the rule
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that there must be a sharing in the losses, as well as the profits, but they say that the contract provided for the sharing of “losses,” Avhich is included in the term “expenses.” Some of these refer to net profits and gross profits. 20 Ruling Case Law '826 (Section 31), 828
et seq'; Toocy v. Percival Co.,
“The profits, if any, are to be divided betwеen the said Kuhn and the said Newman, share and share alike, and all losses in the business, of every kind, is also to be borne by the parties equally.”
Clearly, this case does not support appellant’s contention.
22 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d Ed.) 40 is to the effect that an agreement to share both the profits and the losses or expenses of a business is held to be, in some cases, conclusive evidence of a partnership. The same citation also says that an agreement to share profits and losses does not absolutely, as a matter of law, create a partnership; and that, if other circumstances in the transaction show that the parties did not intend to create a partnership, none is created. It is doubtless true, as some of the cases hold, that the sharing of profits, Avith other circumstances before indicated, may bo considered as a circumstance bearing’ on the question as to whether losses were to be shared. But -we must take the entire situation and all the circumstances, in determining what Avas the purpose or intention of the parties. 24 Gyc. 1466 is substantially to the same effect, that, where the parties jointly engaged in an enterprise of cultivating the land, one furnishing the land and farming utensils, and the other, labor and superintendence, sharing the expenses, etc., this constitutes a partnership. These and other cases cited by appellant do not, under all the circumstances of this case, run counter to the prior discussion of the subject, or show that there Avas a partnership. There is nothing in the record to show that defendant held himself out to others as a partner.
We are of opinion that the trial court properly ruled that plaintiff had not shown the existence of a partnership between Beason and the defendant. — Affirmed.