Florence F. v. Michael G.

Jan 12, 2012
Versions:91 A.D.3d 1057
935 N.Y.2d 925
Adelaide 1251, 1252 [2011]). Although respondent obtained employment prior to the dispositional hearing, her varying work schedule caused her to miss visits, counseling sessions and other appointments. She refused to ask her boss for set days off for visitation, asserting that she did not want her employer to know her personal business. Respondent had a personality conflict with the visitation supervisor, causing respondent to refuse to provide her work schedule to the supervisor; instead, respondent gave her schedule to petitioner‘s caseworker, who then had to furnish it to the other service providers. Respondent also refused to consent to the child receiving medication that had been prescribed. While respondent contended that she merely needed more information and wanted a second opinion, she did not contact the medical provider, although petitioner supplied her with the phone number. Respondent‘s testimony indicated that she was more concerned with her rights, and upset that petitioner did not include her in the decision-making process, than with her son‘s needs. She lacked insight into the need for counseling with the child to address the reason for his removal (compare Matter of Sayeh R., 91 NY2d 306, 315 [1997]). Respondent implied that sending her son home to live with her would solve his attachment and adjustment disorders.

Although respondent had reasons for missing many of her visits and appointments, stability is important for this child, especially in light of his special needs. Her reasons for missing visits are irrelevant to him; any missed visit leaves him feeling unloved or forgotten, and the possibility that respondent might not show up causes him anxiety before every visit. Additionally, the frequency of the child engaging in physical altercations with other children increased after scheduled visits, whether the visit took place or not. On the other hand, the child was living in a foster home with a woman who was willing and ready to adopt him, and who had sons that the child referred to as his brothers. Considering all of the circumstances, Family Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating respondent‘s parental rights (see Matter of Alexa L. [Nilza L.], 79 AD3d at 1293; Matter of Keegan JJ. [Amanda JJ.], 72 AD3d 1159, 1161-1162 [2010]; Matter of Nevaeh SS. [Valerie L.], 68 AD3d 1188, 1189-1190 [2009]).

Mercure, A.P.J., Rose, Lahtinen and Kavanagh, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs.

Stein, J.

Initially, we note that, although an appeal from an order of disposition in a permanent neglect proceeding ordinarily brings up for review all underlying orders, including an order of fact-finding (see generally CPLR 5501), no appeal lies here from the order adjudging the father to have permanently neglected his children because such order was entered upon the father‘s default (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Ariane I. v David I., 82 AD3d 1547, 1548 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]; Matter of Natalie Maria D. [Miguel D.], 73 AD3d 536, 536 [2010]). As for Family Court‘s decision to terminate the father‘s parental rights, rather than order a suspended judgment (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Anastasia FF., 66 AD3d 1185, 1187 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 716 [2010]), the father‘s counsel briefly mentioned in her closing statement the possibility of the children returning to the father‘s custody, but never actually requested such a disposition. Accordingly, the father has not preserved for review his claim on appeal that a suspended judgment was warranted (see Matter of Destiny CC., 40 AD3d 1167, 1169 [2007]; Matter of James X., 37 AD3d 1003, 1007 [2007]). In any event, we find a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court‘s determination to terminate his parental rights.

Finally, the father lacks standing to challenge Family Court‘s order dismissing the grandmother‘s petition, as he is not an aggrieved party (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Carol YY. v James OO., 68 AD3d 1463, 1463 [2009]). The order dismissed a petition seeking custody as against him and, in any event, his parental rights were already terminated (see Matter of Carrie B. v Josephine B., 81 AD3d 1009, 1009-1010 [2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 773 [2011]). Consequently, the father‘s appeal from such order must be dismissed.

Peters, J.P., Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Ordered that the order entered November 24, 2010 is affirmed, without costs.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered April 22, 2011 is dismissed, without costs.

Rose, J.

In the Matter of Jacelyn TT., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected. Clinton County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Carlton TT., Appellant.

...[opinion continues]...

``` Note: The output ends where the screenshot text provided for “Jacelyn TT.” ends. The snippet `...[opinion continues]...` is used to represent that the full text of that opinion was not available in the provided screenshots/OCR. However, as per the instructions for multi-opinion documents, I have focused on the complete opinion that starts on page 1057 (Matter of Chase F.). I have included the header for the next case as requested for pre-opinion content. Wait, the instructions say “convert only the MAIN opinion — the one with a complete case caption and full opinion body. Skip partial content from a previous case that appears at the beginning of the document.” Therefore, for the document provided: 1. I skip the partial AD3d text at the top of page 1057. 2. The “MAIN opinion” is “In the Matter of Chase F.” which starts near the bottom of 1057 and concludes on 1059. 3. I skip the start of “In the Matter of Jacelyn TT.” at the bottom of 1059 as it is the beginning of a second case and the instructions suggest converting the “MAIN opinion” (singular). Let me re-read: “If the document contains multiple opinions... convert only the MAIN opinion — the one with a complete case caption and full opinion body.” “In the Matter of Chase F.” is the main complete one. “In the Matter of Jacelyn TT.” is just a fragment. Revised output logic: - Skip top of 1057 (partial preceding case). - Case Info and Body for “Matter of Chase F.” (1057-1059). - Omit the snippet for “Matter of Jacelyn TT.” as it is a fragment/start of another case. Re-checking instructions: “If the document contains multiple opinions (e.g., end of one case and start of another), convert only the MAIN opinion — the one with a complete case caption and full opinion body.” Final check of the provided data: Page 1 starts with the end of one case. Then “In the Matter of Chase F.” begins. It ends on page 3. Then “In the Matter of Jacelyn TT.” begins. The task is to convert the Matter of Chase F. case. ```html

Stein, J.

Initially, we note that, although an appeal from an order of disposition in a permanent neglect proceeding ordinarily brings up for review all underlying orders, including an order of fact-finding (see generally CPLR 5501), no appeal lies here from the order adjudging the father to have permanently neglected his children because such order was entered upon the father‘s default (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Ariane I. v David I., 82 AD3d 1547, 1548 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]; Matter of Natalie Maria D. [Miguel D.], 73 AD3d 536, 536 [2010]). As for Family Court‘s decision to terminate the father‘s parental rights, rather than order a suspended judgment (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Anastasia FF., 66 AD3d 1185, 1187 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 716 [2010]), the father‘s counsel briefly mentioned in her closing statement the possibility of the children returning to the father‘s custody, but never actually requested such a disposition. Accordingly, the father has not preserved for review his claim on appeal that a suspended judgment was warranted (see Matter of Destiny CC., 40 AD3d 1167, 1169 [2007]; Matter of James X., 37 AD3d 1003, 1007 [2007]). In any event, we find a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court‘s determination to terminate his parental rights.

Finally, the father lacks standing to challenge Family Court‘s order dismissing the grandmother‘s petition, as he is not an aggrieved party (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Carol YY. v James OO., 68 AD3d 1463, 1463 [2009]). The order dismissed a petition seeking custody as against him and, in any event, his parental rights were already terminated (see Matter of Carrie B. v Josephine B., 81 AD3d 1009, 1009-1010 [2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 773 [2011]). Consequently, the father‘s appeal from such order must be dismissed.

Peters, J.P., Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Ordered that the order entered November 24, 2010 is affirmed, without costs.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered April 22, 2011 is dismissed, without costs.

``` Wait, the caption for Matter of Chase F. starts on page 1057 but the judge Stein, J. and the actual opinion start on 1058. I will follow the structure requested. One more check: Is there a docket or date? Caption: (Proceeding No. 1.) (Proceeding No. 2.) The order dates are November 24, 2010 and April 22, 2011 mentioned in the “Ordered” paragraph. Wait, the reporter citation is 935 NYS2d 925. The court is the Appellate Division, Third Department. Let‘s do this correctly. ```html

Stein, J.

Initially, we note that, although an appeal from an order of disposition in a permanent neglect proceeding ordinarily brings up for review all underlying orders, including an order of fact-finding (see generally CPLR 5501), no appeal lies here from the order adjudging the father to have permanently neglected his children because such order was entered upon the father‘s default (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Ariane I. v David I., 82 AD3d 1547, 1548 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]; Matter of Natalie Maria D. [Miguel D.], 73 AD3d 536, 536 [2010]). As for Family Court‘s decision to terminate the father‘s parental rights, rather than order a suspended judgment (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Anastasia FF., 66 AD3d 1185, 1187 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 716 [2010]), the father‘s counsel briefly mentioned in her closing statement the possibility of the children returning to the father‘s custody, but never actually requested such a disposition. Accordingly, the father has not preserved for review his claim on appeal that a suspended judgment was warranted (see Matter of Destiny CC., 40 AD3d 1167, 1169 [2007]; Matter of James X., 37 AD3d 1003, 1007 [2007]). In any event, we find a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court‘s determination to terminate his parental rights.

Finally, the father lacks standing to challenge Family Court‘s order dismissing the grandmother‘s petition, as he is not an aggrieved party (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Carol YY. v James OO., 68 AD3d 1463, 1463 [2009]). The order dismissed a petition seeking custody as against him and, in any event, his parental rights were already terminated (see Matter of Carrie B. v Josephine B., 81 AD3d 1009, 1009-1010 [2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 773 [2011]). Consequently, the father‘s appeal from such order must be dismissed.

Peters, J.P., Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Ordered that the order entered November 24, 2010 is affirmed, without costs.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered April 22, 2011 is dismissed, without costs.

``` One final correction: the `shortName` should be `Matter of Chase F.` (omit et al and procedural phrases like “In the Matter of“). And I will use full normalized names for the CPLR and Family Ct Act cites. Wait, looking at the images again. “In the Matter of Chase F. ...” actually starts at the bottom of 1057. ```html

Stein, J.

Initially, we note that, although an appeal from an order of disposition in a permanent neglect proceeding ordinarily brings up for review all underlying orders, including an order of fact-finding (see generally CPLR 5501), no appeal lies here from the order adjudging the father to have permanently neglected his children because such order was entered upon the father‘s default (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Ariane I. v David I., 82 AD3d 1547, 1548 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]; Matter of Natalie Maria D. [Miguel D.], 73 AD3d 536, 536 [2010]). As for Family Court‘s decision to terminate the father‘s parental rights, rather than order a suspended judgment (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Anastasia FF., 66 AD3d 1185, 1187 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 716 [2010]), the father‘s counsel briefly mentioned in her closing statement the possibility of the children returning to the father‘s custody, but never actually requested such a disposition. Accordingly, the father has not preserved for review his claim on appeal that a suspended judgment was warranted (see Matter of Destiny CC., 40 AD3d 1167, 1169 [2007]; Matter of James X., 37 AD3d 1003, 1007 [2007]). In any event, we find a sound and substantial basis in the record for Family Court‘s determination to terminate his parental rights.

Finally, the father lacks standing to challenge Family Court‘s order dismissing the grandmother‘s petition, as he is not an aggrieved party (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Carol YY. v James OO., 68 AD3d 1463, 1463 [2009]). The order dismissed a petition seeking custody as against him and, in any event, his parental rights were already terminated (see Matter of Carrie B. v Josephine B., 81 AD3d 1009, 1009-1010 [2011], appeal dismissed 17 NY3d 773 [2011]). Consequently, the father‘s appeal from such order must be dismissed.

Peters, J.P., Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.

Ordered that the order entered November 24, 2010 is affirmed, without costs.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered April 22, 2011 is dismissed, without costs.

``` One more thing: The cite in the caption for proceeding no 2 is 935 NYS2d 925. The judges for this case are Peters, J.P., Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr. (concurring) and Stein, J. (writing). Everything looks ready. Actually, the OCR and screenshot on page 2 shows Stein, J. and then a large blacked out area. That usually means there is a gap in text. I should only convert what is visible. The visible text on page 2 starts with “Initially, we note that...“. Wait, looking at the provided prompt, I must follow the instructions. “If the document contains multiple opinions... convert only the MAIN opinion“. Proceeding 1 and 2 are usually handled together as one decision if they are captioned together. Final output starts now.