3 La. Ann. 174 | La. | 1848
The judgment of the court was pronounced by
Florance obtained a judgment against Jacques Bachemin, which was executed upon several lots of ground of the debtor. At the sheriff’s sale the property seized was adjudicated to Jacques Bachemin and Theodule Bachemin, children of the judgment debtor, who refused to pay the price of adjudication, on the ground that they had a mortgage on the property superior to that of the plaintiff in execution, and for a sum exceeding the amount of their bid. The sheriff proceeded to readvertize the property for sale, whereupon the
The plaintiffs’ offered in evidence the record of the suit in which they obtained a judgment against their father and natural tutor, upon the confession of the latter. That judgment fixed no date at which the father became the debt- or of his children, or at which the tacit mortgage of the latter attached, and was obtained subsequently to the judgment in favor of Florance. The record of a former suit between Bachemin, the father, and Florance, was also offered in evidence. It is only by an examination of' the testimony used on the trial of those causes, and on file in the records, but not separately offered as evidence, that the claim and tacit mortgage of the plaintiffs’ can be fixed at a date anterior to that of the judgment obtained by Florance. The testimony upon which the judgments in those proceedings were rendered formed no part of the records offered, and did not become evidence between the parties to this cause by the introduction of those records. Baptiste v. Soulié, 13 La., 268. Nor could the testimony upon which the judgment in favor of the minors was founded have been received or considered in this cause by the judge if it had been separately offered, being the confession of the father, who cannot be heard as a witness for or against his child. C. C. art. 2260.
In the absence of this, which is the only testimony relied on to fix the date of the tacit mortgage, the judgment of the District Court is unsupported by evidence. Justice, in our opinion, requires that the cause should be remanded.
Itis therefore oi'dered that the judgmenit of the District Court be reversed. It is further ordered that the cause be remanded fora new trial, the appellees paying the costs of this appeal!