OPINION
This matter comes before the Supreme Court on the wife’s appeal from a Family Court justice’s dismissal of her complaint requesting an amendment to a final divorce order. Wе affirm.
On February 17, 1983, a final judgment of divorce that was entered in the Rhode Island Family Court ended the marriage of Elza and Natalie Flora (hereafter Elza and Natalie). The divorcе decree contained a property settlement but made no provision for the distribution of Elza’s military pension. The military pension had not been divided upon entry of final judgment оf divorce in 1983 because of the holding in
McCarty v. McCarty,
The USFSPA provides that a state court can distribute a military pension if the stаte court has jurisdiction over the parties. In particular 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(1988) provides that
“the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than because оf military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, *724 (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court.”
Congress included strict jurisdictional requirements in this statute to prevent forum shopping. Congress wanted to prevent spouses from “searchpng] for the State jurisdiction with the most advantageous law and procedures in which to commence a divorce proceeding. The most favorable jurisdiction might be a State with which the spouse or member has had little previous contact.” H. Conf. Rep. No. 97-749, 97th Cong, and S.Rep. No. 97-502, 2d. Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1570, 1603.
Natalie, respondent in the divorce proceedings, argues that 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(C) confers personal jurisdiction to the Rhode Island Family Court over the pеrson of Elza. Specifically Natalie asserts that the “consent” provision of the statute is satisfied by Elza’s “implied consent” to the jurisdiction. Implied consent, according to this argument, is derived by Elza’s consent to Rhode Island’s being the jurisdiction in which the original divorce was heard.
Elza, petitioner in the divorce proceedings, argues that he is not a resident of Rhode Island or domiciled in Rhode Island for the purposes of distributing his military pension and thus is not subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. Second, Elza asserts that he has not consented to thе jurisdiction of the Rhode Island court as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(C). Finally, Elza argues that defending this action in Rhode Island would be a personal and financial hardship which would deny him his right to due process.
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before the court has the authority to hear a case involving that defendant is based on due-process concerns. At a minimum due process requires that a nonresident defendant “have certain minimum contacts with it [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does nоt offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
Section 1408(c) provides the sole methоd of obtaining jurisdiction over Elza in the present case. 1 Clearly the § 1408(c)(4)(A) and (B) requirements of residence in the jurisdiction or domicile in the jurisdiction are not met since Elza is now living in Califоrnia. Thus Natalie must show that Elza consented to jurisdiction in Rhode Island in order for the court to have jurisdiction to distribute Elza’s military pension.
Natalie asserts that Elza has impliedly consеnted to the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Family Court and relies on the reasoning of courts in cases like
Gowins v. Gowins,
The Go-wins court noted that Carroll had consented to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana court for the divorce proceedings. Id. at 36. The court reasoned that because Carroll actively participated in the divorce proceedings, he had impliedly consented to Louisiana’s assertion of jurisdiction. Id. at 37. Furthermore the court determined that his implied consent gave Louisiana jurisdiction over all matters incidental to the dissolution of the marriage, including the division of Carroll’s military pension. Id. Thus the consent рrong of § 1408(c)(4) was met, and the Louisiana court had jurisdiction.
Other courts that have been asked to review the same issue have ruled differently. For example, in
Mortenson v. Mortenson,
Similarly, in
Hattis v. Hattis,
Applying these principles to the casе at bar leads to the conclusion that the Rhode Island Family Court does not have jurisdiction over Elza Flora in order to distribute his military pension. We are sympathetic to the faсt that Natalie Flora will have to go to California if she wishes to pursue her claim to divide her ex-husband’s military pension. Nevertheless, we think Congress has clearly set out the requiremеnts for establishing jurisdiction when a spouse petitions a state court for a division of a military pension. In this case the requirement of consent is not met since Elza in no way consеnted to the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Family Court. We do not find a sufficient basis, in the legislative history of the USFSPA or in the case law, to persuade us that implied consent can meet thе consent requirements of § 1408(c)(4). Finally, Elza’s actions do not provide a basis for a Rhode Island court to assert jurisdiction over him without raising due-process difficulties. Therefore, the Rhode Island Family Court does not have jurisdiction over Elza Flora for purposes of distributing his military pension.
For all these reasons the judgment of the Family Court is affirmed, and the wife’s appeal is denied and dismissed.
Notes
. Natalie has argued that long-arm jurisdiction should apply to the present case. This argument is not applicable, however, because 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(4)(1988) does not specifically provide for long arm jurisdiction based on minimum contacts when a spouse is petitioning the court for division of a military pension.
See Mortenson v. Mortenson,