*1 TfiQ FLOOD, Petitioner Elizabeth BUREAU, ADJUSTMENT
MERCANTILE
LLC, Respondent.
No. 06SC699. Colorado,
Supreme Court Banc.
En
Jan.
Rеhearing Denied Feb. 2008.* * Rice, the Petition. Eid would have Granted Justice Justice Coats and Justice *2 Merenstein,
Gary Boulder, Colorado, Pen- dleton, Friedberg, Hennessey, Wilson & P.C., Hennessey, Richard F. Susan M. Har- gleroad, Lorenz, Denver, Colorado, Karen E. Attorneys for Petitioner. Plotkin, P.C., Plotkin,
Adam L. Adam L. Makyla Moody, M. Douglas Patricia A. Den- ver, Colorado, Attorneys Respondent. Suthers, General, W. Attorney John Laura Udis, General, E. Attorney First Assistant Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Cu- Attorney riae Colorado General. Justice delivered Opinion HOBBS the Court. granted certiorari in this Colorado Debt
Fair Collection Practices Act1 ease to Throughout The Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices opinion C.R.S. we will -137, Act is codified at sections 12-14-101 to sale, sought rescind the but dealer the District Court rеview a decision of thereafter, Shortly lost her County a decision of the refused. upholding Boulder experience County.2 job began financial difficul- Both for Boulder County Court payments, After Flood missed several commu- ties. ruled that the debt collection courts Bureau, car repossessed Transouth and sold it for Adjustment that Mercantile nication *3 (“MAB”) than what Flood owed on the com- an amount less to Elizabeth Flood LLC sent then transferred Flood’s provisions 12- vehicle. Transouth the notice of section plied with MAB., 14-109, account that MAB did not violate section and 12-14-105(2) n 13, 2004, it utilized an automated when July MAB Flood the On sent print and mail commu- mailing service to communication that is written debt collection nication. opinion Appendix A. attached to this judgment in district court’s We rеverse the service, mailing Corp. MAB a Unimail uses part. in affirm its We part and (“Unimail”), print mail and its collec- ‘ debt collection communica- hold that MAB’s electronically It transí tion communications. provisions of the notice section tion violated necessary' to Unimail. mits the information 12-14-109, mail- but use of an automated process to Unimail then uses a mechanized communica- print and mail the service communication, stuff seal the print the and 12-14-105(2). not violate section tion did .Ac- envelopes, envelopes in place and the sealed cordingly, we remand this case to district delivery the mail for consumer. Uni- court, it return with directions printed communi- mail and mailed above county entry for consistent court cation to Flood. opinion, including a dеtermination with this county against Flood filed suit MAB damages, is entitled to of whether Flood court, bringing several claims under Col- costs, pursuant to attorney’s fees section and alleged statute.. Flood that the debt orado 12-14-113.3 comply communication did not 12-14-109, it because failed to include section I. necessary contradictory and information was January obligations In Flood a used under Colo- purchased about purchase alleged also that MAB automobile. She financed rado’s statute. Flood (“Tran- a through impermissibly Financial-Transouth communicated with third Citi south”). ear, 12-14-105(2), purchasing by Shortly party, after violation of section mailing damaged printing was of its outsourcing Flood discovered it The dealer re- to Unimail. Flood dealership. turned it to collection сommunications refund; instead, costs, attorney’s sought damages, fees request fused Flood’s a provided replace- against pursuant with a to section 12-14-113 the dealer Flood ment vehicle. statute. judgment in fa- county court entered May replacement vehicle be- and, MAB, ruling problems that the collection com-
gan a few vor to exhibit electrical later, require- again complied with the notice munication months broke down. specific provisions fees cost Colora- al cost statute when the cite to the relevant within the 12-14-113(1.5) provisions are section do Statutes. Revised preempted by the Federal Fair Debt Collection granted case to consider Practices Act. 2. We certiorari following questions: whether Coloradо Flood on requires compliance Because we have ruled in favor of with the no- caselaw strict communica- of whether MAB’s collection provisions tice the Colorado Fair Debt Collec- issue 12-14-109, and, Act, so, complies MAB no with section if whether the notice tion Practices Accordingly, longer prevailing complied, gave alleged a debt collector. notice to an here when it the third issue before us— using language than that re- we decline to address different debtor quired statute; (2) prevailing is entitled to debt collector whether a whether 12-14-105(2) general cost stat- recover costs under Colorado’s out- violated section specific provisions company; and cost sourcing operations prohibited ute when the fees to a its 12-14-113(1.5) preempted by prevailing section whether a debt collector Act. gener- Debt Collection Practices Federal Fair entitled to recover costs under Colorado’s whole, ments of section and use of an construe statute as a mailing consistent, harmonious, giving service did not violate automated and sensible prohibition against party all parts, adopt statute’s third com- effect to of its and we will not interpretation illogical munication connection leads to of debt. Colo. absurd results. Water Conservation Upper Bd. v. Gunnison River Water Conser county MAB then filed bill of costs Dist., vancy (Colo.2005); 109 P.3d court, requesting as well as a motion attor- Comm’rs, County County Bd. Costilla 12-14-113(1.5) ney’s pursuant fees to section Dist., Conservancy County Costilla 88 P.3d of thе statute. The court denied (Colo.2004). 1188, 1192 attorney’s request pursuant fees 12-14-113(1.5), holding statute, construing we con *4 provision preempted was the federal Fair persuasive authority juris sider of another However, Debt Collection Practices Act. diction —for example, when Colorado’s stat court pur- trial did award MAB certain costs closely patterned ute is on a related federal statute, general suant to Colorado’s costs statute, Gardner, as v. Furlong here. 956 section C.R.S. 545, (Colo.1998); P.2d 551 see also v. Udis appealed county judg- court’s Co., 1177, Universal Commc’ns 56 P.3d 1179 cross-ap- ment the district court. MAB (Colo.App.2002) (relying arising on caselaw pealed county court’s denial itsof motion under Fair the federal Debt Collection Prac attorney’s upheld for fees. The district court construing tices Act assist the Colorado county court. Act). Fair Debt Collection Practices us, In provi- the ease before the relevant II. parallel sions Colorado statute holdWe that MAB’s debt collection com- federal statute.4 Because the stat- Colorado provisions munication violated the section statute, patterned ute is on the federal we 12-14-109, but the use of an automated mail- guid- look to federal persuasive caselaw for print service to and mail the communica- bearing ance on the construction of our 12-14-105(2). did not violate section Ac- Udis, state’s law. See 56 at P.3d 1180. cordingly, remand we this ease to the district court, with directions to return it to the B. entry court for consistent opinion, including with this a determinatiоn The Federal Statute damages, of whether Flood is entitled to The purpose of the federal statute costs, attorney’s pursuant fees protect harassing is to consumers from 12-14-113 of the statute. practices. abusive debt collection See Rus (2d Cir.1996). 30, Equifax, sell v. 74 F.3d 33 A. previously We have observed that the federal
Standard of Review
is a
protection
statute
remedial consumer
statutory
review
liberally
issues of
con
statute and should be
construed
struction de novo.
CLPF-Parkridge
Shapiro
favor
consumer. See
Mein
&
Invs.,
One,
Inc.,
(Colo.
Zartman,
120,
L.P. v. Harwell
105 P.3d
hold v.
823 P.2d
124
658,
(Colo.2005);
1992).
Dep’t
661
construing
statute,
Colo.
Labor
&
the federal
Esser,
(Colo.
189,194
Employment v.
P.3d
compliance
30
courts
statutory
assess
with its
2001).
primary
Our
responsibility
provisions
using
effec
the “least
con
Assembly’s
tuate the
E.g.,
Genеral
intent. CLPF-
sumer” standard.
v. S. Or.
Swanson
One,
Serv.,
(9th
Parkridge
660; People
Inc.,
1222,
105
P.3d
v. Credit
869 F.2d
1225
(Colo.2004). Cir.1998) (“[I]f
Yascavage, 101 P.3d
sophis-
1093
find
we
least
(Colorado
Compare §
requirements),
12-14-109
Act validation
Act validation notice
and 15
12-14-105(2) (Colo-
requirements),
§
notice
1692c(b) (2007) (Federal
U.S.C.
Act limitations
party
rado Act limitations on third
communica-
communications).
party
on third
tions),
(2007) (Federal
1692g
U.S.C.
forgo
rights to
consumer to
by the
cause the
likely be misled
would
tieated debtor
debt).
... we must
contest
consumer]
[sent
notice
has
service
violated
that the credit
hold
Contradictory language
impermissibly
can
Act.”);
Nat’l Fin. Servs.
v.
States
United
rights
or her
confuse the consumer about his
Cir.1996) (col
(4th
Inc.,
131, 135-36
98 F.3d
Ma
responsibilities under the statute.
Jackson,
cases);
988 F.2d
lecting
v.
Clomon
Inc.,
Sys.,
F.Supp.2d
can
Transworld
Cir.1993).
(2d
1314, 1319
Heibl,
(D.Conn.1998).
In Bartlett v.
(7th
Appeals
Cir.1997),
States Cоurt
As
United
128 F.3d
United
observes,
pur-
“The basic
Appeals
Circuit
Cir
the Second
Court
the Seventh
States
least-sophisticated-consumer
an
pose of
in which
cuit addressed several scenarios
that the
stat-
unsophisticated
[federal
is to ensure
would be confused
standard
consumers,
gullible
protects all
under the federal statute.
ute]
about her
likely
standard is consis-
as the shrewd. This
situation where
well
The most
scenario
contains,
sufficiently
courts have tradi-
with the norms that
but fails
tent
the notice
tionally
consumer-protection
though
law.”
applied
apparent
“an
not actual con
explain,
Clomon,
(emphasis
original).
To the the letter line, including signature the the the phone a call as communication invites effectively can dis- representation that one only necessary disputing for means purposes. If the orally the for all making pute forth no deadline for it sets printed material recipient down to the portion reads phone letter of the commu- call. The “signature,” import of the the “Respectfully.” J. Dial’s closing below ends with the nication confused, veiled, contradicto- convey print is clearly smaller closing intended to This portion of the letter protecting ry, all and overshadowed that the writer is dedicated the communication. recipient’s rights in matter. of the the addition, days only thirty receiving date mentioned in the within of the the communi- portion the communication is the cation. letter half-pay- advantage of the taking date for This debt collection communication as a 21, 2004, August thirty-nine ment offer — confusing, contradictory, whole and mis- days from If the date the communication. leading light message in contained receiving a consumer the communication portion letter the the communication. The thirty-nine day until end of the
waited for taking advantage extended time period request written for verifica- make a personal- settlement within a offer —couched debt, beyond he or tion of the she would be that all her ized assurance will be thirty day invoking right period for preserved through oral communication —ef- writing. fectively delaying misleads the consumer into We conclude that MAB’s communication to the transmission of the consumer’s written statute; comply documentation, request verifying did not Flood Colorado’s thereby court and district court causing erred the loss valuable consum- concluding rights. otherwise. the letter er communication, prominently overarching purpose of the Col expressly encouraged contact it remedy prevent orado statute is de
phone allegеd if she issue with the had ceptive practices. and abusive debt collection debt, and it made offer settle the §§ (forbidding 12-14-106 to -108 harass matter. abusive, ing, misleading, and unfair debt col today prohibit practices).
Our pro decision does lection While the statute penalize agency inviting or from agency may vides that collection make making required oral settlement section 12-14-109 on disclosures consumer, offer. Such invitations back aid of the notice if front of the However, and the statute allows them. notifying when notice contains statement con made, fact, 12-14-109(1), these invitations sumers see agency prominently must alert consumer: statute does not authorize couch, conceal, veil, contradict, agency of his or her to documentation veri fying amount the debt and that the minimize the disclosures so as to actually-owes consumer forego confuse or mislead consumer into request rights. must a written consumer make thirty receiving for verification within writing disputes When right. the communication or else lose this alleged part, debt in whole or Assembly clearly is what This the General must cease further debt collection efforts intends the notices contained in section it gathers supplies proof while verifying accomplish. 12-14-109 to consumer, pursuant of the debt 12-14-109(2).5 peculiar wording of the debt collection The General Assem- *8 bly communication in this the least case leads intended that these verification-óf-debt believing rights into that and be cessation-of-debt-collection a trig- functioning oral part communicatiоn alone will suffice to of the statute. The consum- ger rights all her under In choice the statute. er’s not to invoke these must be personalized preceded plain, inviting by agency’s letter oral the collection communication, effective, unqualified conveyance there is dis- prominently no and played message right required by under sections notices section 12-14-109. For 14—109(l)(d) -109(2) reasons, we to receive verifi- the aforementioned hold that the 12— explaining by cation from MAB and debt collection communication sent to Flood if effectively convey would be lost she not MAB failed did to by writing part debt in whole or notices. addition, 12-14-107(1)(i) agencies, reporting section of the Col debt must credit collector requires communicating orado Statute that when agencies disputed. inform those that the debt is any person disputed including with about a
777 Unimail, service, as a debt collector such E. is a minimis communication with a third de Mailing of an Automated MAB’s Use party reasonably perceived be that cannot Not Violate Does Service privacy reputa- a to the consumer’s threat 12-14-105(2) Section Commentary tion. FTC Official Staff Cf. argues also that MAB violated (Dec. 805(b)(3), Fed.Reg. 12-14-105(2) using an automated section 1988) (stating that “incidental contacts” its mailing to and mail debt prepare service telephone a debt collector and a between With certain ex collection communications. in- company transmitting purpose 12-14-105(2) prohibits com ceptions, section to not formation the consumer do constitutе a debt collector and between munications impermissible an a third analysis of 12—14— parties. third Our section party). 105(2) that the General us conclude leads Accordingly, hold we use 12-14- Assembly did not intend section automatically print and mail its Unimail 105(2) using a from prohibit debt collector did debt collection communications not vio- mailing an automated service. 12-14-105(2). Thus, late we affirm section nearly federal statute contains The judgment district court’s part 1692c(b) 15 U.S.C. provision, identical upholding county court’s on 1692c(b) purpose section is to The this issue. privacy, reputation and “protect a consumer’s holding light of our violated jobs resulting prevent loss of as well as to portion of we vacate that section communication with from debt collector’s county judg- сourt’s and district court’s employer concerning the collec consumer’s against Flood and award costs ment Costen, F.Supp. v. a debt.” West court, county direct on MAB. We (citations omitted). (W.D.Va.1983) 564, 575 mand, Flood is to determine whether entitled The here that MAB utilized record shows costs, attorney’s statutory damages, printing mailing entirely an automated in 12-14-113. provided fees as county that MAB court found service. electronically the information in- transmitted III. communications to cluded in its collection printed then Unimail. Unimail judgment of Accordingly, we reverse communications, mechanically which were part court in and affirm the district envelopes. stuffed into part. We remand case county court use of concluded court, with directions return the district procedurе did not highly such a automated pro- court for further the case 12-14-105(2) it because did violate section opinion. ceedings with this consistent the risk of the consumer with threaten paying a being into coerced embarrassed EID part concurs dissents Justice because the debt collector contacted part, RICE and Justice and Justice member, friend, family or other employer, join in concurrence dissent. COATS Rapid Pearce Check party. third See also EID, concurring part Justice (D.S.D. Collection, Inc., F.Supp. dissenting part. 1990) (holding that commu collector’s the bank at which the consumer nication to majority agree that MAB While I two did not constitute had bounced checks service, mailing see use an automated *9 impermissible party contact because third holding maj. disagree with its op. at I the communication was there was no chance that “MAB’s debt collection no plaintiff to the and chance used embarrass 12- provisions of section the notice violated an inva that communication would cause the majority not Id. 771. The does 14-109.” at employment). privacy or loss of sion to con- dispute Flood that MAB’s disclosures required by all of the information holding of the tained agree the instead, 12-14-109; it finds that mailing use court. The automated (e)That upon disclosures contained “two contra the consumer’s written re- likely quest thirty-day period, consumer.” within dictions to confuse the Maj. majority, agency pro- at 774. I or will op. Unlike debt collector in compli find to be would MAB’s disclosures vide the consumer the name and ad- view, creditor, my original ance with section 12-14-109. dress of the if different majority’s holding today penal from the current creditor. —which permitting to izes MAB for consumers con 12-14-109(1)(a)-(e), § C.R.S. The by phone giving tact it and consumers majority dispute not that does MAB’s disclo additional time to consider a settlement offer complied requirements, sure with these as its they dispute after well harm debt — letter to Flood contained the amount of the long run. I consumers therefore re debt, name, MAB’s and an verbatim almost majority’s spectfully holding dissent from the language of the restatement subsections that MAB’s disclosures violated section 12- (e) (c), (d), (1) regarding and Flood’s 14-109. debt, dispute request, writing, to debt, request, verification and in writing, name address
I. original maj. op. appendix creditor. See A. requirеs Section 12-14-109 a collection MAB no had additional duties under section agency send a consumer written notice disputed 12-14-109 unless until following containing the five disclosures: 12-14-109(2).1 her debt. (a) debt; The amount of the compliance Despite MAB’s with section (b) name of whom The the creditor to majority concludes owed; debt is appar- MAB’s letter Flood contained “two “couch, conceal, veil, ent contradictions” that (c) That, consumer, within unless the thir- contradict, required or minimize the disclo- notice, ty days receipt disputes after sures so or confuse mislead into [Flood] debt, validity any portion or Maj. foregoing rights.” op. her 776. thereof, the be debt will assumed to be view, my however, “apparent these con- by valid the debt collector or colleсtion illusory. tradictions” agency; (d) That, if the consumer notifies the debt A. agency writing collector or collection thirty-day period contradiction,” within “apparent that the The first accord- thereof, portion disputed, majority, is that “the letter agency debt collector or collection will encourages ob- the communication Flood to copy tain verification of the orally,” debt or a of a contact MAB required while the dis- judgment against copy the consumer and a print append- closures are “buried in the fine or judgment such verification will ed to be the bottom of the communication.”2 majority posits mailed to the consumer Id. at collec- 774. The that some- agency; tor or collection how the consumer will be confused and at- 12-14-109(2) requires requested if the Section con- collection activities while informa- provides dispute request maj. op. (stating sumer tion written is obtained. See at 776 address, original adequate name the consumer must have creditor’s then notice before choosing agency invoke to cessation of must cease its debt collec- activities). debt-collection But the statute con- activities until it mails verification or the requirement. tains no such requested name and address to the consumer. However, stop the fact that a written will one collection activities is not of the disclosures majority goes 2. so far as to state “MAB section 12-14-109. See 12-14- prominently expressly encouraged Flood to 109(d), (e) (requiring only disclosure of the con- by phone." Maj. op. (emphasis contact it at 776 ability case, request added). obviously sumer's debt verification as This is not the as the original address). well as the name language creditor's actual letter to Flood does not might fact, majority opinion suggest "phone,” be read to use the words “call" or it provide provides mailing must the con- MAB’s address before *10 right stop phone sumer with some notice of her number. sion, view, my ultimately in will harm the rights section 12-14-109 tempt to invoke her very people majority help. the seeks to writing. in Id. at 774-76. orally, instead of must be only rights two importantly, But failing majority faults MAB for also right obtain writing: in the invoked in rights mention Flood’s section 12-14-109 right the the and verification of letter, and it of body of the accuses the original address of the the name and obtain print” “in “bur[ying]” thе disclosures the fine (e). 14—109(d), Those § See creditor. 12— Maj. op. at 774. the bottom of the letter. at body in not discussed the two are typeface in print,” for the “fine the used As disclosures, letter, in only appear the and the virtually body of letter is the same the clearly requests must be state that which typeface in as the used the disclosures. size express writing. These statements in majority’s complaint importantly, More not, view, any way by my in in contradicted mes prominently displayed “there is that no letter, body urges “[i]f which curious sage right,” id. is [Flood’s] impor- agree the balance it is you don’t analysis entirely is considering de that its you our office to discuss tant contact upon the consumer pendent its belief matter,” phone an and includes address perceive between thе would contradictions in Significantly, statement number. In body and the disclosures. letter 12-14-109(e), compliance full words, majority’s theory, other under (d) and contrast to subsections which—in “sufficiently have been disclosures must dispute the (e) permits consumer to v. S. Or. prominent — be noticed.” Swanson 12-14-109(e) (omitting orally. See debt (9th Serv., Inc., F.2d Credit “written any writing” to “in reference Cir.1988) requirement (applying this to dis entirely request”). This statement is also letters). fact, In collection closures disclosures, consistent with letter’s on placed could the disclosures MAB have which, above, an almost as noted contain Flood, could letter to or it the back (c). of subsection verbatim recitation up alone and then waited have sent letter sending the disclosures. to five before any majority apparently believes 12-14-109(1). certainly re It was not See of oral communication in connection mention body of quired place disclosures in the collection, the context with debt whatever letter, majority as the seems to contem necessarily purpose, and for whatever will maj. (noting that the plate. op. See at 775 requiring express statement contradict clearly not state” body of the letter “does words, writing certain instances. other rights). recipient’s section 12-14-109 majority, will according to a consumer sum, prom far were more disclosures assume that if she can contact the requires. than statute inent what the can do orally purposes, she for some only It is true that a consumer who reads Maj. op. at 775. Yet purposes. so for all body of the letter will be informed this is how statute is structured: Subsec- maj. op. legal rights. at 775. How (d) (e) rights must be invoked ever, let who reads the entire consumer writing, but the described subsection i.e., on language plainly all visible ter — (c) may through or oral be invoked written page front be informed both —will in the This distinction is communication. MAB, writing may either in contact she statute, should not be faulted and that she orally, to her debt repheating it. writing, request, verification original any the name and address of the “confusion” today, After to avoid such nor the agencies Neither section 12-14-109 majority, creditor. posited re sophisticated consumer standard may simply from contact- least prevent consumers consumers, Equi Durkin v. quires anything more. See phone. many For them (7th Inc., Servs., however, easiest, conve- Check F.3d phoning is the most fax Cir.2005) least nient, (stating that the commu- accessible means of most “rudimentary possess of oral deemed By equating mention nication. making “capable of confusion, today’s knowledge” to be deci- communication with *11 780 inferences”); type logical impermissibly contradictory deductions of choice is
basic (2d Jackson, 1314, See, F.2d e.g., 1319 and coercive. Peter v. Servs. GC Clomon v. (“[E]ven Cir.1993) (5th Cir.2002) sophisticated L.P., ‘least 310 F.3d presumed possess (“Courts can be consumer’ generally have found contradiction rudimentary amount of information about the printed contradiction of the ... willingness to read a world and payment where a con notice demanded (citation care.”) omitted). notice some day period thirty than stat crete shorter utory period.”); contest Graziano Harri
B. (3d Cir.1991) (“There son, F.2d majority’s “apparent second contra- probability ais reasonable that the least conflicting diction” is “the con- deadlines debtor, sophisticated faced with a demand thirty-nine tained in the days payment within ten and a threat of communication”— days advantage of to take MAB’s settlement legal if payment immediate action is not thirty days dispute validity offer and time, made would be to over induced Maj. op. of the debt. at 774. It no offers statutory right his to dispute look the debt analysis why the dates two are contradic- Swanson, thirty days.”); within 869 F.2d at tory, except they the fact are differ- (same). 1225-26 If the federal standard does Again, ent. as with the written oral Colorado, apply maj. op. indeed see above, communication issue discussed differ- then MAB was to set the settlement necessarily ence is not confusion. must dispute deadline later than the deadline. examine the reason for the difference. With letter, regard Today’s dates included in the opinion, combined with federal require common sense and caselaw caselaw, effectively prohibits agen- than thirty day settlement date be later setting any acceptance cies from deadline for dispute date. thirty A day settlement offers. deadline less) (or will be deemed coercive federal A position consumer in two Flood’s has caselaw, but a thirty deadline more than payment options: pay She can (which confusing will be deemed under the pay the settlement amоunt is less amount). majority’s decision. The effect of than combined making half But before any payment, majority’s opin- she want if the federal caselaw and the would to know first Thus, bar, was discourage, valid. in ion be to perhaps consumer will first, position dispute Flood’s should many settlement offers in Colorado. Yet for then, valid, up if being pay the debt ends consumers, accepting settlement the lesser If settlement amount. the statute less, many amount —which is and in cases far thirty days entitles to dispute less, than the debt amount —will be the best amount, 12-14-109(2), see then option. Again, as with the issue of oral beyond settlement deadline be should set communications, majority’s I fear that Thus, thirty days. fact that MAB’s set- approach ultimately will harm consumers. tlement deadline is than later consumer, cоnfusing deadline is not to the II. believes, majority helpful it is consumer. comply disclosures put To differently, it somewhat if set- quirements of section contain tlement deadline were same as the dis- contradictory no information. I therefore re- pute majority deadline —as the to re- seems spectfully dissent from quire would have been forced —Flood majority’s opinion holding that MAB’s disclo- choose either to settle the debt or to take sures violated section 12-14H09. advantage thirty days of the full she which legally purpose was disput- entitled for the 12-14-109(2). I the debt. See am authorized to state that Justice RICE Accord-
ing to interpretation join the federal courts’ Justice COATS this concurrence standard, least and dissent. *12 (Debt Letter,
Appendix A Communication redacted) information personal
consumer’s Colorado, of the State PEOPLE
Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross- Appellant, WELSH, Defendant- Claire Christine Cross-Appellee. Appellant and No. 04CA2581. Appeals, Court of Colorado