—This is a suit to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendant R. Phipps, to secure the payment of a promissory note payable to Humphrey and Flint for $13,045, dated September 23,1886, and signed by W. F. Owens and R. Phipps, due thirty days after date.
The defendant’s answer admits that Owens and Phipps signed the note, but deny that it was delivered, or that it was executed for value, or any consideration. The answer then alleges that the consideration for signing said note was the taking up and delivery to Owens and Phipps of a certain note given by Owens and Phipps, N. Cornutt, and H. Weaver to S. Hamilton, for twelve thousand dollars, dated January 29, 1884, upon which there was then due and payable the sum of eight thousand dollars, and also to loan said Owens and Phipps five thousand dollars in money; that they did not take up said note, nor did they loan Owens and Phipps five thousand dollars, or any sum; that there was no other consideration for said note. The answer admits that Phipps signed and acknowledged the mortgage, but denies that either it or the note described therein was delivered; that as soon as the defendant Phipps discovered that the plaintiffs had not taken up the Hamilton note, and did not have the same to deliver to him, he refused to deliver said note and mortgage to the plaintiffs; that W. S. Humphrey, one of the plaintiffs, unlawfully, wrongfully, and without the consent of the defendant Phipps, took and carried away said note and mortgage from the table on which they were then lying, and delivered said mortgage to the county clerk, and procured the same to be recorded on pages 596, 597, and 598, volume 7, record of mortgages of Douglas County, Oregon. Deny that said mortgage was duly delivered on the twenty-third day of September, 1886, or at any other time, or that the sum of money therein specified, or any part thereof, is now due or owing to the plaintiffs. Deny that thirteen hundred dollars, or any part thereof, more than two hundred and fifty dollars, is a reasonable attorney’s fee for foreclosing said mortgage. The reply denies the new matter in the answer. The cause was referred and the testimony taken in writing, after which the Circuit Court took the case under advisement.
1. The question of delivery is purely a question of fact. It is conceded that no particular form of words are necessary to constitute a delivery. “ It is not necessary,” said Lord, C. J., in Fain v. Smith, 14 Or. 82; 58 Am. Eep. 281, “there should be an actual handing over the instrument to constitute a delivery. A deed may be delivered by doing something and saying nothing, or by saying something and doing nothing, or it may be by both. (Shep. Touchstone, 57.) ‘But by one or both of these/ Spencer, J. said ‘it must be made.’” (Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. 421; Byers v. MoClanahan, 6 Gill & J. 256; Stewart v. Redditt, 33 Md. 67.)
W. S. Humphrey, since deceased, was one of the plaintiffs, and was called as a witness and testified in substance: “ That at the time the note and mortgage sued on were given, W. F. Owens, Robert Phipps, Hans Weaver, and others, were indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of §19,045, for money advanced on certain bonds given by them; that he and Phipps talked the matter over while the mortgage was being drawn up, and Phipps said he would give witness a mortgage on his land. He said he knew we boys were entitled to our money and he would give us a mortgage, but he did not know whether his wife would sign it or not. He said his wife had said she would not sign any mortgage, but that we could go out and see her about it; but before the note and mortgage were concluded said that he did not think it was worth while for us to go out to see her about it, but that he would go ahead and give us the mortgage. He said he knew we were entitled to our money and he would
Mr. J. C. Fullerton gives the following account of the execution and delivery of the note and mortgage in controversy: “In the evening of September 23, 1886, I was sent for to come over to town and prepare, or assist in preparing, a mortgage which Mr. Phipps was to give to secure a debt he, Owens, and others, owed the bank. I came over, and Mr. Phipps came into town shortly afterwards. I went down to Lane’s office, and at the request of some of the parties I went to the clerk’s office to secure the description of Mr. Phipps’ land, Mr. Flint accompanying me. We procured the description from the record the
On his cross-examination this witness, referring to the execution and delivery of the mortgage, said in substance: “The mortgage after it was signed and acknowledged was slid along the table from where Colonel Lane, who took the acknowledgment,
Mr. W. S. Humphrey was recalled, and testified further as to the delivery of the note and mortgage in substance: “When Mr. Fullerton and Mr. Lane had prepared the mortgage, Mr. Fullerton read the mortgage to Mr. Phipps and all present, with the exception of the description, which was a long one, and the note mentioned was signed by Mr. Owens and Mr. Phipps previously to this time. It was then inserted or copied in the mortgage, and passed to Mr. Phipps to be signed by him. After he had signed it, Mr. Fullerton and Colonel Lane witnessed it, and it was then passed or taken by Colonel Lane, and the acknowledgment was taken by him. He passed it La Fayette Lane, who indorsed it and passed it upon the table to our attorney, Mr. Fullerton. Mr. Fullerton examined it and passed it to me. I looked over it to see that it was filled out in all its parts, and put it in my pocket, where I already had the note. We stopped there a few minutes, and La Fayette Lane, I think, spoke up, not to any one in particular, but in a general way, and said that he was not altogether satisfied as to whether Mr. Phipps could get contribution from the rest of the bondsmen. In my opinion Mr. Fullerton remarked, he will have no trouble about that. I
S. C. Flint gives substantially this account of the transaction: “ The mortgage was drawn up by Lane, and while he was drawing it up Fullerton and I got the description of the land at the clerk’s office, and I read the description to Lane, and he copied it in the mortgage. Fullerton then read the mortgage over, Phipps signed it, and Colonel Lane took the acknowledgment, and then handed the mortgage, I think, to Fullerton, who folded it once and either laid it on the table or passed it over towards Humphrey, I would not be certain which; that is as near as I can remember now. Mr. Phipps made no objection to Humphrey taking the mortgage, and said nothing that I heard. He was standing right near the table in the back room of Lane’s office at the time. I heard Phipps say when he was out of doors near the corner, not to put the mortgage on record, and he would raise the money in a few days and pay it off. He also told me the same thing later in the evening just before I went home. He said don’t put the mortgage on record, and he would raise the money in a few days; those are the ivords he used, as near as I can remember.”
H. Phipps, the mortgagor, in substance gives this account of the execution of the note and mortgage: “Mr. Owens sent out to my house the twenty-third, I believe, evening of September last for me to come to town. I came to town. I found out when I came to town a United States deputy marshal was here to attach property for amount of five thousand dollars that Owens should have owed a company of the name of Hall, I think,
L. F. Lane, who drew the mortgage, and one of the defendants’ witnesses, said in answer to question ten: “As I stated before, he (Phipps) said nothing specifically for what he gave the mortgage. From what Mr. Humphrey said in his presence I inferred it was to secure the bank. He several times stated he (Phipps) would raise that five thousand dollars and pay off that claim next morning. Mr. Phipps did most of his talking after I called his attention to the effect of the mortgage.”
1. This is the material evidence on each side in relation to the execution and delivery of the note and mortgage. There are other facts referred to by the witnesses which affect the question more remotely, but the evidence above collated presents the account given on each side as to what occurred at the time, and from this evidence mainly we must determine whether or not said note and mortgage were in fact executed and delivered. On the question of the delivery, the note seems to have been lost sight of by the defense entirely. Their evidence relates altogether to the delivery of the mortgage; but I suppose they both rest upon the same facts, and that they ought to be so regarded by the court. Before proceeding to a further consideration of the facts, I think the circumstances under which it is alleged these papers were executed ought to be adverted to. On the evening of the day of their alleged execution, a deputy United States
The motive assigned by one of the plaintiffs is a desire or willingness on the part of Phipps in the presence of impending financial disaster to secure those whom they call “home creditors.” On the other hand, the motive assigned on the part of the defendant Phipps was to secure Dr. Hamilton, make him a preferred creditor, and to obtain from Humphrey and Flint a further loan of five thousand dollars to pay off Hall & Co. Between these conflicting motives and purposes, we are compelled to decide from the evidence in this record. Whatever may have been the motive of Phipps, it seems to us highly improbable that Humphrey and Flint would, in the face of threatened bankruptcy of Owens and Phipps, without any benefit to themselves whatever, make a further loan of five thousand dollars to Owens and Phipps, and assume Hamilton’s debt of eight thou
The learned author of Devlin on Deeds, volume 1, section 294, states the rule thus: “ The possession of a deed duly executed in the hands of the grantee is prima facie, but not conclusive evidence of its delivery. It therefore follows that he who disputes this presumption has the burden of proof, and must show that there has been no delivery
It being undisputed that the mortgage was executed with all the formalities required by law, and that the same is in the possession of the mortgagees named therein, makes a prima facie case for them. They need no other proof in the first instance. It devolves on the defendants to rebut this presumption, and to accomplish that, they must have a preponderance of evidence in their favor on that issue. Laying this presumption entirely out of the case, it seems to me that the evidence preponderates in favor of the delivery of the mortgage. There are a greater number of witnesses in favor of the plaintiffs. They had the same opportunity of knowing the facts; to say the least, they are of equal intelligence. .There is nothing in the character of their evidence to cast doubt or suspicion upon it, and the delivery of the deed follows as the usual consequence of its signing and acknowledgment ; in other words, it is the legal completion of the acts in which the parties were then engaged.
2. Equally untenable is the defendants’ claim that the note declared upon it:is without consideration. A promissory note imports a consideration. Whoever alleges the contrary has the burden of proof. (2 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 172; Story on Promissory Notes, § 7; Lines v. Smith, 4 Fla. 47; Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray, 496; Decon v. Carruth, 108 Mass. 242; 1 Parsons on Bills and Notes, p. 193; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 163.) But it is useless to multiply authorities on this question; they are all to the same effect. A very careful review of the evidence satisfies us that there was a sufficient and adequate consideration for the note, and that consideration was Owens’ indebtedness to the plaintiffs. It is true the plaintiffs are not required to prove in the first instance there was any consideration- for the note. They may content themselves with meeting such affirmative evidence as the defendants may offer tending to impeach the consideration.
The allegation of the answer is that the note was signed in consideration of said plaintiffs taking up and delivering to Phipps and Owens the Hamilton note, upon which eight thousand dollars was due, and the loaning to Phipps and Owens of five thousand dollars, and that plaintiffs did neither. But the learned circuit judge seems to have tried the case on the theory that the plaintiffs were bound to prove the consideration for the note, and inasmuch as their testimony tended to prove that Phipps was liable to plaintiffs on a bond given by Owens, with Phipps and others as sureties, if he reached the conclusion which he did, that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that Phipps signed
The decree of the court below must therefore be reversed, and a decree entered here foreclosing said mortgage.