Plaintiffs have moved pursuant to R. 4:50 fоr relief from a judgment of this court dismissing their complaint. The complaint had sought correction of an alleged error in the assessment on plaintiffs’ property in Lawrence Township, Mercer County. See N.J.S.A. 54:2-41. The complaint, filed November 10, 1982, claimed that plaintiffs’ land had been overassessed in 1979,1980 and 1981 because the assessment had been based on a lot size of 6.866 acres when in faсt the land consisted of only 5.226 acres. The difference in taxes was $2,785.65 for the three years. Defendant’s assessor agreed that plaintiffs’ allegations were true and defendant’s attorney consented to the form and entry of a proposed judgment which would require Lawrence Township to refund $2,785.65 to plaintiffs.
This court issued a letter opinion setting forth its reasons for the entry of a judgment dismissing the complaint. The letter provided, in part, as follows:
This court has considered the correction of error statute, N.J.S.A. 54:2-41, in Manczak v. Dover Township, 2 N.J. Tax 529 (Tax Ct.1981). In that case, both plaintiff and defendant consented to the entry of a judgment changing a local property tax assessment for specified years. The error complained of in Manezak was that the subject property had been assessed as if it had had a basement when in fact it had no basement. That factual situation is clearly analogous to that presented in the present case. Judge Rimm in Manezak held that the correction of error statute does not apply to such mistakes and that the taxpayer should have filed an appeal in the normal fashion challenging his assessment on or before August 15 of each tax year.
The court is aware that there may well be many types оf errors in the underlying data upon which assessments are made throughout the State. However, there is an appeal procedure established by the Legislature for challenging such errors and for seeking changes in assessments. The correction of error statute has a very limited purpose and that is to correct errors in the nature of*100 typographical errors оr clerical errors. In the present case, if the assessor’s property record card had reflected the acreage figure now agreed upon by the parties but the computation made based upon that correct figure had been in error the court would be inclined to treat this as a correction of error case. However, that is not the allegation made by this complaint.
For the reasons set forth in Manczak v. Dover Township, I cannot find that the correction of error statute is available to provide relief to the parties in the present case.
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was prompted by the decision in Sabella v. Lacey Tp., 188 N.J.Super. 500,
Were it necessary to consider the point, we would probably incline toward disagreement with Manczak to the extent it suggests strict construction of the correction of errors statute, on the basis of such a procedure “denying tax revenues to the taxing districts.”2 N.J.Tax at 534 . It is likely that this particular statute, being remedial and prophylactic, should be liberally construed. ... [id at 503, 457 A.2d 1220]
Plaintiffs contend that the opinion of the Appellate Division so undermines the authority of Manczak that this court should reconsider its dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint. According to plaintiffs, their case and Sabella involve similar circumstances since in neither case was a clerical, administrative or ministerial error made after the assessor had arrived at his assessment determination. See Manczak v. Dover Tp., supra 2 N.J.Tax at 536.
However, approximately one month prior to the decision in Sabella, a different part of the Appellate Division rendered an opinion in Bressler, et al. v. Maplewood, 190 N.J.Super. 99,
*101 The construction urged by appellants would permit correction of assessment based on incorrect information. This would permit bypassing the normal appeal procedure and extend the appeal deadline contrary to legislative purpose, [id at 101,461 A.2d 1218 ]
It is apparent that the decisions of the Appellate Division in Sabella and Bressler are in conflict. In neither case was the Supreme Court asked to review the Appellate Division decision. This presents a dilemma to the trial court which must follow and apply decisions of the Appellate Division as the law of the State until they are reversed or overruled. See State v. Rembert, 156 N.J.Super. 203, 206,
This court was recently faced with a similar predicament in Seatrain Lines v. Edgewater, 4 N.J.Tax 378 (Tax Ct.1982), aff'd (App.Div.1983), rev’d on other grounds, 94 N.J. 548,
In affirming the Tax Court decision in Seatrain Lines a majority of the Appellate Division part that heard the appeal indicated its preference for the opinion in Newark, “not because it is later in time but bеcause we believe it to be the better reasoned case.” Seatrain Lines v. Edgewater, supra (slip opinion at 2). On June 8, 1983 the Supreme Court summarily
I have not found any other authority in this State on this point. Two cases which might appear similar are Robinson v. Hallberg, 107 N.J.Super. 290,
The relative dates of conflicting Aрpellate Division opinions are not necessarily pertinent to a trial court’s determination regarding which opinion should be followed. The various parts of the Appellate Division act in large measure independently of each other and the decision of one part is not binding on any other part. Cf. State v. Market Associates, 134 N.J.Super. 282, 286,
In my opinion a trial court faced with two inconsistent decisions of the Appellate Division should follow the better reasoned decision. In so doing, thе trial court should carefully set forth why it considered the decision it followed to be better reasoned than the one it did not follow.
Clear, consistent and well reasoned judicial precedent is particularly important in the field of local property taxation. There are 567 separate taxing districts and 21 county boards of taxation in New Jersey. Thousands of officials at the local, county and state levels must administer on a day-to-day basis a complicated and interrelated statutory tax assessment system. Assessments on millions of individual parcels of real property are involved. Local property taxation accounted for almost $4,500,000,000 in municipal, county and school-purpose revenues in this State in calendar year 1982. 1982 Annual Report, Division of Taxation, at 17. The State Constitution requires that the administration of the local property tax system be uniform throughout the State. N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § I, par. 1(a). In recognition of these considerations the Legislature established the Tax Court in 1979 to deal with state and local tax matters. N.J.S.A. 2A:3A-1 et seq. One of the primary responsibilities of the Tax Court is to promote uniformity in both procedural and substantive areas of the local property tax system. The accomplishment of this responsibility is aided by regular and formal discussion and coordination among all the Tax Court judges. As a consequence, when this court is faced with inconsistent opinions of the Appellate Division that could confuse those who must deal with our tax laws, this court should make every effort to resolve the dilemma in the interest of uniformity.
In my view Bressler is a better reasoned decision than Sabella with regard to the construction and application of the
The proper application of the correction of errors statute is to clerical, administrative or ministerial actions after the assessor has made the assessment. The purpose of the statute is to correct errors in the assessment records of a municipality once the assessor has completed his work and then ministerial, clerical or administrative errors occur in the preparation of the assessing records. This construction of N.J.S.A. 54:2-41 accomplishes uniformity and relative ease of administration. Any other construction would lead to abuses in the entire statutory appeal process and would disturb the finality of assessments which the general statutory plan for taxation seeks to accomplish. [2 N.J.Tax at 536]
The conclusions of Manczak and Bressler are well reasoned and correct. On the other hand, the decision of the Appellate Division in Sabella is based on a misreading not only of the Tax Court opinion in Manczak but also of the trial court decision in the Sabella case itself. With regard to Manczak the Sabella court said:
The fundamental error in Manczak v. Dover Tp., supra, is the holding there that the Tax Court jurisdiction in correction of errors cases depends upon compliance with “underlying statutory procedure controlling tax appeals.” [188 N.J.Super. at 502,457 A.2d 1220 ]
This was not the holding of Manczak. The holding of Manczak, quoted above, had nothing to do with Tax Court jurisdiction. In fact, nowhere in Manczak is the nature of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction discussed. The sum and substance of Manczak is that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:2-41 and that they should have pursued their remedy to thе county board of taxation on or before August 15 of each tax year pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. Therefore, the observation of the Appellate Division in Sabella that the time limitations applicable to complaints filed under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 are different from those
A related problem with Sabella is that the Appellate Division’s quotation from Manczak was taken out of context. The words of Judge Rimm quoted in Sabella are an integral part of his analysis of the limited relief available under N.J.S.A. 54:2-41 as distinct from the relief more generally available under N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. In context, the quotation is as follows:
The primary consideration in dealing with the correction of еrrors statute is therefore the underlying statutory procedure controlling tax appeals: [text of N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 omitted] Any deviation from this appeal procedure, which is the method established by the Legislature for reviewing assessments, is analogous to an exemption and must be strictly construed. Both the correction of errors statute, when a complaint is filed by a taxpayer, and exemption statutes have the effect of denying tax revenues to taxing districts.... The correction of errors statute also has the effect of bypassing the normal procedure for challenging assessments and of extending the deadline for such challenges from August 15 of the tax year to December 31 of the third year following the tax year. Such a statutory provision must be strictly cоnstrued if it is not to do complete violence to the concept of finality of assessments requisite to the orderly financing of government. [2 N.J.Tax at 534]
It is apparent from this quotation that the Tax Court in Manczak simply did not hold, as stated in Sabella, that “the Tax Court jurisdiction in correction of errors cases depends upon compliance with ‘underlying statutory procedure controlling tax appeals.’ ” 188 N.J.Super. at 502,
It is also apparent that the Appellate Division in Sabella misconstrued the trial court holding below in that case. The Appellate Division said that the Tax Court had found an absence of jurisdiction to entertain the correction of errors application. However, in the portion of the trial court’s decision from the bench, as quoted in Sabella, the court clearly stated that “... this is not an error correctable under Manczak....” Ibid Thus, the trial court in Sabella held that the plaintiffs had no
The Appellate Division’s opinion in Sabella may have been influenced by the unfortunate circumstances of that case. Both parties in Sabella agreed that an error had been made in the taxpayers’ assessment. A frontage figure of 580 feet had been used when 58.0 feet should have been used. The resulting assessment of $182,800 should have been only $40,800. The Appellate Division used subjective language to characterize the situation:
This is an аppeal by beleaguered taxpayers from a determination which, if left undisturbed, would undoubtedly represent the ultimate in the exalting of procedural technicality at the expense of substantial justice.
... Simply put, on account of the conceded failure of the re-evaluation company to insert a decimal point, the taxpayers were assessed оver four times (448%) that which should have been the proper assessment. Despite the fact that the municipality joined in the application to correct this obvious error, the judge of the Tax Court ... ordered the entry of a judgment imposing a tax liability which, all concerned agree, is far in excess of that which it probably should be. [188 N.J.Super. at 501,457 A.2d 1220 ]
The Tax Court is not insensitive to the result it reached in Sabella in which it found that it could not change an assessment that the parties agreed should have been different. Nor is this court insensitive to similar results in other instances, such as the
In recognition of this potential problem the Legislature tightened the correction of errors statute with the adoption of L.1979, c. 44. This amendment limited the time within which a correction of errors application could be filed and attempted to define the types of errors which could be corrected by this means. It also required that county boards of taxation be served with the application and gave county boаrds standing to object to the correction of any alleged error pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:2—41. These provisions were apparently adopted at the urging of the county boards of taxation which were concerned about a trend toward giving more and more cases treatment beyond that regularly available in the appeal process established in N.J.S.A. 54:3-21.
It should perhaрs be stressed at this point that the Legislature has made the normal appeal process readily available to all taxpayers. Any taxpayer or taxing district feeling aggrieved by a local property tax assessment of $750,000 or less may have the assessment reviewed promptly and without a great deal of formality by filing a petition with the county board of taxation оn or before August 15 of the tax year. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. There was no suggestion in the present case, nor was there any in Manezak, Sabella or Bressler, that the taxpayers had been unable to exercise this simple remedy, or that the assessment error they sought to correct pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:2-41 was in any way different from errors routinely corrected by county boards of taxation during the normal appeal process.
The more restrictive construction of N.J.S.A. 54:2-41 by the courts in Bressler and Manczak is consistent with the legislative scheme for the orderly resolution of tax assessment disputes and should be followed. Since Bressler is a better reasoned opinion than Sabella I will rely on Bressler as precedent with regard to the proper construction of N.J.S.A. 54:2-41. Because plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in this matter was made in reliance on Sabella, the motion is denied.