History
  • No items yet
midpage
Flewallen v. State
368 N.E.2d 239
Ind.
1977
Check Treatment

*1 90 motion, receipt jurisdiction. Upon of that appellate jurisdiction abeyance in the further

appeal is held fact- trial court as a pending is extended to the matter finder. its determination.

2. the trial Notification grant motion, it (a) intends to If the trial court jurisdiction appellate re- notifies court of which would granting. appeal mand the to the trial court for deny motion, (b) If the trial court determines to it may appellate do so without remand from the court of jurisdiction. moving desires, may party appeal If the ruling merged denial of its motion and said into the appeal on the merits. procedure recognized promoting

The above has been judicial economy. HARVEY, true See: AND RUL RULES LAWYER, INGS FOR THE TRIAL RES GESTAE (November 1974) ; Washington v. Board Education School 89, (7th 1974) 11; District Wright, supra, F. Cir. 2d Ryan Co., (C.A. 2d, Lines 1962) F.2d It burdening system eliminates the appellate further awith preliminary remanding review before to the trial court for a ruling on the merits of duplication the motion. judicial This unnecesary effort is both and undesirable. grant

I would therefore adopt procedure transfer and opinion. set forth in this Reported at 368 N.E.2d 235.

Note. — Marion Dale Flewallen v. State Indiana.

[No. 976S304. Filed October 1977.] *2 Krochta, VanStone, Evansville, for ap- Thomas Rice & pellant. Boioers, Lesley General, A. Attorney Sendah,

Theodore L. General, appellee. Deputy Attorney guilty of the was found Appellant Flewallen Pivarnik, J. eighteen-month- Grigsby, degree murder of Erica second marriage. At Virginia, by daughter wife, a former old of his Court, Vanderburgh Circuit trial the conclusion of life im- appellant on March was sentenced prisonment. child on appellant had beaten the evidence was that death, times previous there were to her and that

occasions overnight apartment Virginia when her from their removed beatings. protection testi- Several witnesses from these baby’s in- they sign hanging fied crib saw a scription Monster,” picture a head and a there of “Erica is a August 30, hangman’s in a noose. In the afternoon of Virginia presence went to the bedroom and left Erica living noise room. heard an unusual She *3 running lying and came out to find Erica at the bottom of Virginia Appellant present. stairs. was not ran out of apartment carrying child, calling Shortly help. there- for by apartment after, appellant outside the several was seen autopsy trial, performed neighbors. physician who At puncture a wound the cause of death was on Erica stated that by opinion, In produced rib. the doctor’s the heart a broken from a soft instru- resulted from a forcible blow this wound falling ment, hand, down possibly a and not from the child’s the stairs. specifications of error are submitted to us for review

Five discharge appellant’s appeal: (1) that motion for in this overruled; (2) that the admission of should not have been prosecution witnesses, prior were statements of several who testifying, right appellant’s present in court and violated confrontation; prosecutor it was that error to allow guilty appellant’s pleaded to ask wife whether she ever had charge cruelty; appellant’s (4) that of child motion hypothetical granted, because aof have been should mistrial appellant’s expert which by witness question put the state to conduct; (5) that appellant’s previous criminal referred to by improperly incor- expert state questions appellant’s diagnosis appellant’s condition mental porated another’s time. made at another

I. against September appellant was filed on The indictment jail 19, 1974, All that time. and he has been held since delay coming parties agree occasioned that to trial was by appellant’s moving change venue, actions in for a which moving granted, and further evaluation to mental During competency determine to stand trial. much this Beatty Hospital, time was incarcerated in Norman Vanderburgh County returned to until was not Jail 4,1975. September 17, 1975, March On set this cause by jury objected Appellant for trial for December setting, stating was six months after March 4, 1975, discharge subject date and that he was therefore 4(A) 4(A). provides P. Rule under R. Ind. Crim. recognizance own to release on his after is-entitled defendant delay incarceration if the has not been occasioned six months by 4(C) provides P. that if the his own action. R. Crim. charges year pending is held for total of one defendant being against him, delay and the his own occasioned action, discharged. prop- he has to be The court then erly appellant’s discharge motion for in this cause. overruled

II. appellant’s objection, the court Over allowed state- *4 police, state made the ments of witnesses coroner, grand jury jury. Although read to and the to be conflicts, minor most of there were some the statements were given by consistent statements the witnesses on the stand, though previous statements detailed were more

in he made each case. Each witness confirmed that or she had prior Appellant statement. these claims admission of statements violated his Amendment of confronta- Sixth tion. by

This issue was decided this court Patterson v. 324 N.E.2d 482. The evidence both present Patterson and the case was relevant as it incriminating was more detailed and thus more than testimony Here, the trial of the witnesses. as in Patterson, the witnesses were available for cross-examination judge and for the trier of fact to observe their demeanor and credibility. primary their Thus one of the reasons for the application hearsay prohibition missing: of the old in- susceptibility of pres the evidence to cross-examination. The ence of the witness for disposes cross-examination also problem, pursuant confrontation to the rule of California Green, (1970) 399 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 26 L.Ed.2d 489. all Since of the witnesses whose form statements voluntary coroner, grand statements police, to the and trial, were available at and were in fact cross-examined by defense, the statements were admissible re and no versible error occurred.

III. Virginia state, Flewallen When testified for the was she prosecutor pleaded guilty charge if asked she had to a cruelty Vanderburgh child in to a a case in the Circuit objected Appellant answered in the She affirmative. Court. answer, question to this and and moved for a mistrial. He argues appeal improper, that this irrelevant prejudicial, and since “a husband and wife are often tradi- single tionally Thus, argument as a goes, viewed unit.” question and answer portray appellant were meant to type a criminal who was married to a woman who could be child, cruel to a who therefore sanctioned such behavior part argues on the of his wife. The state the evidence

95 defense, to the favorable considered just well be as could person the only from the other an admission since she had been child’s death that the apartment the time of appel- cruelty. agree, and find that guilty of child We found showing prejudice in this of his burden lant has not met 284, 291, (1974) 315 State, Ind. alleged error. Hester v. 351, 355. N.E.2d

IV. Pontaoe, question propounding hypothetical to Doctor a In witness, prosecution included back expert a defense burglarized his appellant ground at one time had facts that objected parents’ Appellant this inclusion home. irrelevant, grounds prejudicial, and not within it was jury was objection sustained and the The was evidence. disregard State, by Young it. admonished the court to In v. 379, 386-87, 572, 577, (1970) court Ind. N.E.2d said: by objected “Appellant he was not harmed the answer plea a He he filed of

to. has fact that overlooked by guilty special plea guilty reason and a of not insanity. temporary Appellant examined of was by psychiatrists trial. On who testified at guilty appellant opened plea the door by insanity of not of reason as his entire the admission of life, certainly any any admis criminal record he had and may sions he have made relative thereto.” temporary plea entered a cause also Appellant in this question under the insanity, would fall the evidence Young State, v. above. same test jury Furthermore, presumed an admonishment to the granting of a mistrial is within error. The cure error in trial and clear discretion

sound overruling must of a motion for mistrial court’s Dewey conviction. to mandate reversal be shown 345 N.E.2d alleged requires proving misconduct burden has appeal. either a mistrial or reversal on such clear error No appears admonished, creating pre- here since the sumption of correction of error which has not been rebutted.

V. expert testifying the same While witness v/as on cross- examination, prosecutor asked him if he had examined report of one Doctor Tullen. The witness he stated that had, give report and was allowed the court to the entire *6 Doctor Tullen from the report witness stand. Doctor Tullen’s was not inconsistent with the witness Doctor Pontaoe’s testi- mony. opinion It was Doctor appellant Pontaoe’s was temporarily insane at the time of the commission of the act question, in and he opinion further had the that Doctor report Tullen’s would confirm report this. Doctor Tullen’s contained appellant 1970, observations diagnosis of in a and of “sociopathic” as a personality. expert opinion an as the

While to defendant’s mental condi person tion for not available cross-examination is not testimony, report may

admissible such be used as testifying expert’s opinion basis of a as the de sanity in fendant’s if it form that he would nor mally making professional in use his evaluation. Smith 187, 259 Ind. N.E.2d cert. denied 409 (1973). S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d 261 It was im proper permit the court to Doctor Pontaoe to read the including report entire diagnosis. However, Doctor Tullen’s doing we any way fail to see how inso this in prejudiced case appellant. Appellant urging temporary the defense of insanity, presented and had prove Doctor Pontaoe such a condition existed. Doctor Pontaoe testified that after studying report question, in compatible he believed it and supportive even of opinion was, his stated that the defendant fact, temporarily in insane time of the death of this Therefore, child. permitting reading error of report was harmless. specifications, these error no reversible find we

Since affirmed. judgment the trial of J., DeBruler, JJ., concur; Hunter, Prentice, C.J., Givan, opinion. dissents Opinion

Dissenting of use wholesale case involves DeBruler, J. This less than enthusiastic testimony statements and out-of-court Five during direct examination. their prosecution witnesses given by police, one statement to the witnesses statements read, grand jury were coroner, and six sets during entirety, virtually jury the examination to the in their extrajudicial of two of statements witnesses. The six only witnesses read after those introduced and witnesses were pro- had questioned the events involved had been remaining remembering difficulty those events. The fessed purpose simply stand toitnesses toere called to the four testimony, respective authenticating statements and their were asked witnesses which were read to the these before surrounding any questions death the events about Grigsby. Erica majority of extra sanctions indiscriminate use *7 by relying holding

judicial on this Court’s Pat statements terson v. 55, 482, State, (1975) N.E.2d out- 324 that 263 hearsay of-court statements are not inadmissible as when at declarant is available trial cross-examination. Patterson not a criminal Amendment did consider defendant’s Sixth against The to him. be confronted the witnesses any by relying majority “disposes problem” confrontation 149, 1930, Green, (1970) v. 90 S.Ct. California language It is true L.Ed.2d 489. contains such Green as this: historically good . is conclude “Viewed . . there reason to admitting the Confrontation is not violated Clause statements, long as a declarant’s out-of-court the declar- testifying subject ant is as witness and to full and effec-

tive . . . cross-examination. absent, present not is to declarant is but “[W]here testify cross-examination, cases, if and to to our submit anything, support the conclusion that the his admission of out-of-court statements does not create a confrontation 158, 1935, 1937, problem.” 162, 399 U.S. at 90 S.Ct. at 622, quoted S.Ct. O’Neil, 626-27, in Nelson (1971) v. 402 U.S. 1723, 1726, L.Ed.2d and Ortiz 265 Ind. 356 N.E.2d believe, however, Supreme I cannot that the Court intended obligation attempt to relieve State make prove through given its case of sworn witnesses open court where the trier fact can observe their de- meanor and where place cross-examination less takes more or contemporaneously testimony’s reception. In Green the witness whose ques- out-of-court statement was used was tioned about the professed facts of the offense but a lack of memory drugs as to those facts due to he had taken. required Court was therefore permitting between choose evidentiary substantive prior use of his statements and the total loss of necessary danger relevant and evidence. The losing evidence, such view, the Green Court’s warranted admission of despite the statements diminished confrontation protection. seriously one asserts that

No cross-examination as extra- judicial equivalent statements the full is of cross-examination testimony given trial; the most that is attributed to such substitute preferred confrontation is that it is to be to the loss extrajudicial of the evidence contained in the utterance. difficulty “The most essential with the claim that cross- ‘by hypothesis’ requisite examination is when the contradictory physically declarer present It this. denigrates the real officeof cross-examination. Cross-exami- postulates nation thing a witness who avows a under inter- rogation by lawyer it, deny who would him have or a thing inquisition witness who by lawyer denies under who would have him affirm it. Cross-examination essen- is thus tially adversary. Cooperation antonym is the cross- *8 cross-interrogator’s suc measure of the The examination. destroy the witness’s he is able to which is the extent to cess retractions, de witness, chief, elicit testimony shake adopt his credibility. witness declines stroy If the his adversary true, cross-examination no statement as former Attending Biggs, Witnesses’ possible.” Beaver & it is about Reality, Theory as Evidence: Prior Declarations vs. omitted) ; (Footnote also 309, See (1970) Forum 317-18 L. Exceptions, 2 Falknor, Hearsay Its U.C.L.A. Rule and The 43, (1954). L. Rev. Supreme noted: Court the Minnesota As is not that at some cross-examination chief merit of “The right gives party opponent to dissect future time adverse application testimony. principal is the immediate Its virtue testing process. Its fall while strokes of the 362, Saporen, Minn. (1939) 205 iron is hot.” State v. 285 898, 901. N.W. Michigan Supreme Court has said cross-examination The extrajudicial as to statements: only denied the “The would-be cross-examiner is adversary, choice left with no to but the declarant’s he is be friend, protector savior. the witness’ and to become may questions Though permitted in the form he be to ask cross-examination, be re of his effort will the substance simple. The examination rehabilitation. reason direct and Every cannot recant. cross-examiner tries to witness bring changes story— point where he his the witness literally presence jury. . . . eats his words —in the cross-examiner, deadly the matter how thrust No ghost questions stands. will statement His always attempts permit explain sound like the witness to coming court, changed story why he has his before jury being might infer that he have been induced

the to some unrevealed left to change story intervening years, his months or for in the Roby, reason.” sinister Ruhala 125, 150 Mich. N.W.2d no effort to elicit from con- Where the witness cerning trial, compelling the facts issue made no such safeguards legal dispensing reason exists our assuring system provides the trustworthiness of evidence: *9 oath, demeanor, observation witness’ and contem- poraneous Permitting cross-examination. such evidence will cause criminal trials in this state to resemble trials in the English perogative courts, parte whose reliance ex affi- davits to persons convict principal sought accused was a evil guarantee be remedied the constitutional of confronta- tion of one’s accusers. Green, See supra, v. California 10-11, at 156-157 nn. 90 S.Ct. 1934. Reported at 368 N.E.2d 239.

Note.—

William Gaddis State Indiana. 20, 1977. Rehearing [No. 575S136. Filed October denied December 1977.]

Case Details

Case Name: Flewallen v. State
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 14, 1977
Citation: 368 N.E.2d 239
Docket Number: 976S304
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.