18 Vt. 45 | Vt. | 1843
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The bill sought, originally, to effect an application of the two notes in satisfaction of each other. But the defendant
That a judgment at law may have worked injustice between the parties is not, of itself, enough to authorise a court of equity to relieve against it. For suggestions of injustice can always be made ; and if it were competent for equity to interfere upon such grounds alone, no determination at law would ever be final. It would moreover be a manifest repugnancy in any system of jurisprudence, that the decisions of one ultimate and 'final jurisdiction should be subject to the revision and correction of another. Hence it is only upon collateral grounds, which were not directly passed upon by the court of law, that a court of equity can proceed in such cases; and then it acts upon the conscience of the party in fault, and not upon the court of law. It is therefore usual to allege and show, that the party seeking relief had a just defence, either legal or equitable, of which, through the fraud or wrongful act of his opponent, he was unable to avail himself in time. Mere accident or mistake on his own part is rather to be accounted his misfortune, than imputed as a wrong to the other party ; and it must be a strong case, when this alone can be made the ground of equitable interference at so late a stage. We think it clear, that no proper ground is disclosed, on which to decree a restitution of the fruits of the judgment.
In general the statute of limitations, where its terms are applicable to the subject matter in question, is equally a defence in equity, as at law. Nor will a court of equity deny the protection of the statute, except when to claim it would be evidently unjust and dishonest. And whenever a party is restrained from using this defence, or denied the benefit of it, the court proceeds upon grounds consistent with the general object and policy of the statute. It is
Deere,e of the chancellor affirmed.