37 Tex. 152 | Tex. | 1873
We learn, from the statement of facts in this case, that, on the 16th day of January, 1836, Michael Reed and Z. N. Morrell entered into a contract in writing with Joseph West, who was entitled to one-fourth of a league of land as a colonist, that they, Reed and Morrell, would locate
The doctrine of notice is invoked in this case with but little effect. The contract of January 16th, 1836, regarded only a chattel; it was not so executed as to entitle it to record. (See the able opinion of Wheeler, C. J., in Holliday v. Cromwell, 26 Texas, 193.)
But the case of Glasscock v. Nelson, 26 Texas, 152, and the authorities therein cited, are conclusive of this case. The court there say, that unless there were equitable circumstances of no ordinary character, to excuse or account for the. delay, ten years would be certainly most ample time within which the remedy should be pursued. Glasscock v. Nelson is a case remarkably coincident with the one at bar, and there are no extraordinary circumstances or equities in this case to excuse or account for the delay.
The case of De Cordova v. Smith, 9 Texas, 147, is a strong authority in support of our view of this case. So is the case of Smith v. Hampton, 13 Texas, 463. A silent reference to these cases becomes us rather than any attempt at comment upon them. The reasoning they furnish is so able and conclusive, and so well founded in common sense, that we could give neither clearness nor force to what has already been said. The reference in Glasscock v. ¡Nelson to the remarks of Sir Thomas Plumer, Master of the Bolls, in reviewing the cases decided in the English Equity Courts, shows conclusively that those courts have clearly laid down the rule which our own courts have followed.
We wish, however, to say, before disposing of this case, that this court believes abundant precedent may be found for excusing delays, and what might otherwise seem laches, where there are extraordinary circumstances and equities, appealing to the conscience of the court.
The judgment of the District Court in this case must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Eeversed and remanded.