77 N.J.L. 563 | N.J. | 1909
The plaintiff in her declaration avers that a corporation, the Northside Land Company, was the owner of certain lands which represented all of its assets; that defendant’s testator proposed to the company that he would pay all of its debts and the par value of the stock to each stockholder if it would sell and transfer to him and three others all of the lands of the company; that the proposition was accepted and the transfer, made; that thereupon the plaintiff became entitled to be paid by the defendant the par value of her stock, which, upon demand, was refused. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the correctness of the judgment entered thereon is the subject of the review required by this writ of error.
The plaintiff, in support of the contract thus set out, offered as evidence the minutes of a meeting of the stockholders of the corporation held on February 8th, 1904, and also the minutes of a directors’ meeting held by the same persons, on the same day, immediately after the stockholders’ meeting, and they were admitted. The defendant’s testator, I. 'Whilden Moore, a stockholder and director, was present at each meeting, and the minutes of the stockholders’ meeting-show that he, after stating that the debts of the company amounted to $30,000, offered a resolution, which was adopted, authorizing the board of directors “to sell the property or mortgage the property for settling the debts for the best possible price.” The minutes of the directors’ meeting show that Moore proposed that the company sell the property to him and three other persons, who were also stockholders, in consideration of which they would pay the debts of the company, and the par value of their stock, to such stockholders as were not purchasers. Whereupon a resolution was adopted accepting the proposition and authorizing the president and secretary to execute a conveyance, “the consideration to be $51,400.” It also appeared that the plaintiff was a non-purchasing stockholder; that all the outstanding stock amounted to- $¾1,400, which, added to the debts, $30,000, made the amount required to pay the debts and stockholders, $51,400; that this sum was
The first point argued by the plaintiff in error is that the contract proven differs in two respects from that declared on— (a) that it was not the contract of Moore, but the joint contract of four persons; (b) that it was not a contract for the benefit of all stockholders, but for those only who were not purchasers of the corporate property, and therefore plaintiff must show that she was not a purchaser, and having failed in this she is not within the terms of the contract. The argument in support of these propositions assumes that a contract was established by the minutes of the directors’ meeting, which recited that Moore proposed that the company sell the land to himself and three others for which “they” would pay the debts of the company and the stockholders, who were not purchasers, the par value of their stock, and that therefore the contract proven, viz., to pay only non-purchasing stockholders is not the contract declared on which was to pay all stockholders.
Assuming for the present that it sufficiently appears that a contract was established by the minutes which was joint and not several, that condition would not prevent a recovery, for the representative of a deceased joint obligor or contractor may be prosecuted separately during the lifetime of the other joint contractors for non-performance. The third section of “An act concerning obligations” (Gen. Stat., p. 2336), authorizes an action against the representatives of one jointly bound with another for the payment of a debt, or for the “per
The second assignment argued is that it was error to admit in evidence the minutes, because they were not sufficiently proven to be the minutes, and also that such minutes cannot bind third parties, although evidence of corporate action. We think the minutes were sufficiently proven and properly admissible to show the contractual intent of the corporation, and the authority of its officers to execute the deed for the purposes and consideration therein named as the corporate act determined upon, and to this extent were competent. While the minutes of a board of directors will not bind a stranger, and business transactions of a corporation with its members stand on the same footing as those with strangers (Wetherbee v. Baker, 8 Stew. Eq. 501; Rudd v. Robinson, 126 N. Y. 113), they are admissible to show the extent of the
The plaintiff in error next urges that the defendant in error has no standing because the agreement was not made for her benefit. The contract was that the purchaser would pay to
An exception to the charge rests upon the following excerpt: “He produces the minutes of the company written by him as secretary which show a proposal of that kind and an unanimous acceptance by the directors.” The only ground upon which this is challenged is that, although the secretary testified that they were the minutes, and his testimony was not controverted or impeached, it was shown that there were other minutes not produced. It is true that there were other minutes, but not of this meeting, which the proof shows were delivered by the secretary to Moore, and in the absence of any explanation or contradiction will be presumed to be in the possession of his representative. The uncontradicted testimony was that the record admitted was the minutes of the corporation, relating to the transaction in question, they were in the handwriting of its secretary, produced by him, and after due proof admitted in evidence. Under such circumstances it was not error to refer to than as the minutes of the company.
It is also insisted that there was error in the admission of the testimony of the witness Voorhees regarding a conversation with Moore. The objections stated are that the evidence was admitted to prove a contract with the company, and also that what Moore said proved a different contract from that which the minutes say he made. On the first point it is argued that the witness did not represent the company and could make no contract for it. The difficulty with this positioij is that counsel have misapprehended the purpose of the testimony; it was not to show the making of the contract, but an admission by Moore as to a contract already made. On the second point it is urged that the court assumed that the testimony of Voorhees supports the minutes, whereas the effect of what he testified Moore said would tend to show a different contract from that declared on. We think the testimony tends to support the contract sued on, and that the trial court in dealing with the evidence of this witness treated it properly
For reversal—None.