24 Pa. 47 | Pa. | 1854
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This is an action of debt on bond, and the question is, whether entry of satisfaction on the record of an accompanying mortgage, given for the same debt, was discharge of the bond.
It is material to observe that this question arises between the
There was evidence in this case that Parry was endeavoring to effect a loan on the credit of his property; that this mortgage was spoken of as an encumbrance; that he said he thought he could have it removed, and that afterwards he exhibited the certificate of the recorder that the mortgage was satisfied. The defendant’s ledger was also offered in evidence, showing charges for various sums of money paid to Fleming after satisfaction of the mortgage, which the plaintiff insists were applicable to the accruing interest on the bond. The Court overruled this evidence, and decided, as a conclusion of law, that the satisfaction of the mortgage was
In Morris v. Brady, 5 Wh. 541, we have an instance of satisfaction of a judgment enteied on the bond accompanying a mortgage without impairing the effect of the mortgage; and in Roberts v. Halsted, 9 Barr 32, the satisfaction of a mortgage was held void as against assignees of accompanying bonds; but in these cases the rights of third parties were involved, and therefore they are not in point here. They show, however, that there is no magic in an entry of satisfaction, either on a judgment or a mortgage, which can prevail against the truth and equity of the transaction.
The Court relied much on the words used in satisfying the mortgage. They were substantially but not exactly the words prescribed by Act of Assembly, but neither the debt nor the bond are mentioned. “ I, Andrew Fleming, do hereby acknowledge to have received satisfaction in full of this mortgage.” These words, signed and sealed by the mortgagee, were all-sufficient to put the mortgage out of existence, and sufficient, too, to satisfy the debt, if so intended. Prima facie they would indeed import extinguishment of the debt as well as the mortgage, and the burden of showing they were not so intended was on the creditor; but when he submitted evidence on that point, proper for the consideration of the jury, it was for them to decide whether the words had been satisfactorily explained, as intended only to wipe off the mortgage. The error consisted in setting up a conclusive presumption of law, on grounds fitted only for a presumption of fact. The words were under seal; but that does not estop the plaintiff from explaining them; and if they were put on the record at the instance of the mortgagor, and for his benefit, without actual payment of the debt, he is not entitled to plead an estoppel: Miles v. Miles, 8 W. & Ser. 135.
We do not feel the force of the argument drawn from the law of assignments. A clear assignment of the mortgage-debt carries with it all the securities by the most necessary implication of intention. Nothing else is meant, and therefore nothing else is to be understood. The rule of common sense is the rule of law on the subject, said Justice Lewis, in Phillips v. Bank of Lewistown; and, in speaking of the assignment in Selfridge v. The Northampton Bank, he added, “ that it was so intended by the 'parties was too clear for argument.” The intention of the parties governs in the case of assignments, and may be reasonably deduced from a transfer of the debt. The intention of the parties is the rule in this case, but there being no decisive circumstance from Avhich the law will imply it, it becomes a question of fact for the jury.
It is necessary only to add that we think Mrs. Parry’s declarations were properly rejected, but that the evidence mentioned in the other bills ought to have been received.
The judgment is reversed and a venire de novo awarded.