54 P. 884 | Or. | 1898
Lead Opinion
Decided 24 October, 1898.
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
[54 Pac. 884.1
Opinion on the Merits
Decided 26 March., 1900.
On the Merits.
[60 Rao. 603.]
Bill by Solomon Hirsch and others, doing business under the firm name of Fleischner, Mayer & Company, and the Kuh, Nathan & Fisher Company (Sweet, Orr & Company, interveners), against the First National Bank of Mc-Minnville and others to set aside, as fraudulent and void, four chattel mortgages given by the defendant F. W. Redmond to his co-defendants, and a deed of assignment from him to defendant Jacob Wortman, on the ground that they were made for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding creditors, and especially the plaintiffs. On August 12, 1897, and long prior thereto, Redmond was engaged in business at McMinnville, Oregon, and during such time had become indebted for goods purchased and money borrowed to such an extent as to render him insolvent. The plaintiffs and others, holding
On October 30,1897, and before trial, the Kuh, Nathan & Fisher Company and Sweet, Orr & Company were allowed to intervene, upon a petition alleging that at the time of the making and execution of the mortgages and deed of assignment referred to in plaintiffs’ complaint
Affirmed.
after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs are met at the outset with the objection that the court is without jurisdiction, because (1) the property in controversy, being in the possession of an assignee, under an assignment regular upon its face, at the time the suit was commenced, was in custodia legis, and the validity of the assignment could only be attacked in the circuit court of the county in which it was filed ; and (2) the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief, because they failed to prove that prior to the commencement of the suit they had attached the property of Redmond in the action at law brought by them against him.
4. Where a debtor is insolvent, according to the weight of authority, the issuance of an execution and its return nulla bona are not necessary: 5 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 521; Smith, Rem. Cred. 195, 196; Ryan v. Spieth, 18 Mont. 45 (44 Pac. 403); Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688, 25 L. Ed. 1004; Dillman v. Nadelhoffer, 162 Ill. 625 (45 N. E. 680). And therefore the fact that no execution was issued on the judgment is of no consequence in this suit.
5. No objection was made to the supplemental complaint by demurrer, and the rule is that, even where a supplemental bill seeks to maintain the suit upon new facts which have occurred since the filing of the original bill, objection must be made at the 'hearing, or it is waived. In Pinch v. Anthony, 10 Allen, 470, it appeared that at the time of the filing of the original bill the plaintiff had no cause of suit; but he filed a supplemental bill, setting forth certain facts that had occurred during the pendency of the suit. It was objected that the facts set forth in the supplemental bill could not be considered ; that the original bill should be dismissed, and the plaintiff have leave to bring a new suit if so advised. But the court said : “We have found no authority that goes so far as to authorize a party, who has no cause of action at the time of filing his original bill, to file a supplemental bill in order to maintain his suit upon a cause of action that accrued after the original bill was filed, even though it arose out of the same transaction that was the subject of the original bill. It would seem to be contrary to principle to allow this to be done. Milner v. Milner, 2 Edw. Ch. 114, is an authority against allowing a new cause of action to be stated in a supplemental bill. But the plaintiff may, by means of a supplemental bill, introduce into
6. In accordance with this rule, a general creditor, who had filed his bill for relief against a judgment fraud
We have not overlooked the cases of Morrison v. Shuster, 1 Mackey, 190, and Brown v. Bank of Mississippi, 31 Miss. 454. In the former the original suit was not a creditors’ bill, but one to obtain the possession and redelivery of certain goods sold by the plaintiff to the insolvent, on the ground that there was no valid contract of sale between the parties, and the title did not pass. Thereafter other parties sued and obtained judgment against the defendant, and filed supplemental bills in the original suit, alleging that fact, and it was claimed that such bills cured a fatal defect in the original proceedings. But the court held that the subsequent judgment of other parties would not be effective to confer jurisdiction in the original case, and hence this decision can hardly be regarded in point. The case of Brown v. Bank, however, seems to be directly
The case of the bank does not impress us as one where
Rehearing
Decided 11 June, 1900.
On Petition for Rehearing.
[61 Pao. 345.]
delivered the opinion of the court.
The record shows that, after the plaintiffs rested, defendants’ counsel moved for a nonsuit, pending which counsel for plaintiffs asked leave to file a supplemental complaint, “ to conform to 'the facts proven at this trial, setting up, in addition to the one filed in the other complaint, a judgment;” to which counsel for defendants objected, “for the reason this ought to have been filed before ; plaintiffs knew' about the judgment, and should have filed this supplementary complaint before; ” to which counsel for plaintiffs replied, “ I simply desire to
Counsel also rediscusses in the petition for rehearing the facts in the case. But, in view of the original opinion, it is sufficient to say that a re-examination of the record has confirmed us in the views already expressed.