92 S.W.2d 169 | Mo. | 1936
Lead Opinion
Respondent, William Fleischaker, in case number 33788, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Jasper County, Missouri, in which he asked the court to construe the terms of the last will and testament of Isadore Fleischaker. The defendants in that suit were the five children, devisees, and only heirs of Isadore Fleischaker. William Fleischaker, the plaintiff, a brother of Isadore, was named in the will as trustee of the estate.
The trial court entered a decree construing the will, and one of the defendants, Albert Fleischaker, the oldest son, appealed from the judgment. The appeal was lodged in the Springfield Court of Appeals. The case was there briefed and submitted for decision. That court, on February 20, 1934, delivered an opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court. [See
We have reached the conclusion that this court does not have jurisdiction of the appeal in this case, because the record fails to show that the amount in dispute exceeded $7500. The facts in brief, pertaining to jurisdiction, are as follows: Isadore Fleischaker, by his last will and testament, left all of his property to his brother William in trust for the benefit of his five minor children. The will provided that the trust should continue until the youngest child reached the age of twenty-one years. The testator also provided in his will that the property should be divided equally among his children. The trustee took charge of the estate and administered the trust. When the youngest child was about to reach his majority the trustee filed a petition in the circuit court stating that a dispute had arisen over the *799 division of the estate, the question of dispute being whether the property of the estate should be divided equally between the five children, as of the date of the testator's death, or whether the division should take place at the termination of the trust, and the maintenance of the children charged against the bulk of the estate in place of against each devisee's share.
It was alleged in the petition that the estate was originally inventoried at approximately $24,000; that at the time the trustee filed his petition he had on hand, after making some distributions, the sum of approximately $13,000. As mentioned above the appellant, Albert Fleischaker, was the oldest of the five children. He filed an answer to the trustee's petition contending that the estate should have been divided into five equal parts at the time of the testator's death and the maintenance of each child charged against his separate share. The trial court, by its decree, ruled that under the terms of the will the property should be divided into five equal parts at the termination of the trust; that the cost of the maintenance of the children should be charged against the bulk of the estate. From this judgment Albert Fleischaker appealed. The Court of Appeals, as above noted, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
[1] On the question of jurisdiction the query is whether the entire estate, that is $13,000, is to be considered the amount in dispute, or is it the difference appellant would receive depending on the date decreed as a proper time for distribution of the estate. The contending forces have cited many cases in their briefs on the question of jurisdiction. The rule consistently followed, where jurisdiction depended upon the amount in dispute, was clearly stated by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in an early case. This rule was later quoted with approval by this court en banc in Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice
Fuel Co.,
"One of the clearest legal minds that ever graced an appellate bench in Missouri formulated the Missouri rule of determining jurisdiction in cases wherein relief other than a money judgment is involved.
"That rule (Evens Howard Fire Brick Co. v. St. Louis Smelting Refining Co., 48 Mo. App. l.c. 635), reads:
"`It is settled that, where the right of appeal depends on the value of the matter in dispute, such value must be estimated in money. When the object of the suit, however, is not to obtain a money judgment, but other relief, the amount involved must be determined by the value in money of the relief to the plaintiff,or of the loss to the defendant, should the relief be granted, or vice versa, should the relief be denied. If either isnecessarily in excess of the sum within the appellatejurisdiction of this court, then the Supreme Court has exclusive cognizance of the appeal. We took this view in the case of *800
Gartside v. Gartside,
"It will be observed that the learned writer was particular, in a few words, to say that if the amount involved upon eitherside exceeded the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction was in the Supreme Court. There was a reason for this rule. If plaintiff had judgment, his relief gained might exceed $7500, whereas the loss to defendant (appellant) might be much under $7500. If loss to defendant (appellant) alone controlled, the plaintiff might lose his judgment (for relief in value much more than $7500) in an appellate court which had no jurisdiction over the amount involved in plaintiff's judgment. Hence the rule says:
"`If either (plaintiff's gain or defendant's loss, or viceversa), is necessarily in excess of the sum within the appellate jurisdiction of this court (Court of Appeals) then the Supreme Court has exclusive cognizance of the appeal.'"
In the case now before us no money judgment was sought. In the above rule it was stated:
"When the object of the suit, however, is not to obtain a money judgment, but other relief, the amount involved must be determined by the value in money of the relief to the plaintiff,or the loss to the defendant, should the relief be granted, orvice versa, should the relief be denied."
A judgment in the case before us, responsive to the pleadings, could be neither a financial detriment or a benefit to the plaintiff in the case. The judgment, as entered, probably meant a financial loss to appellant. The amount of this loss cannot be determined from this record. It appears, however, from the record that in any event it would not exceed $7500. It is, therefore, apparent that upon the theory and reasoning in the Aufderheide case the Springfield Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of this appeal.
[2] Relator, however, contends that the entire estate of $13,000 should be considered the amount in dispute. In support of this, cases are cited involving injunction proceedings wherein it was sought to prevent a breach of building restriction covenants, such as Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church,
In Fowler v. Fowler,
The general statement in the above cases, that the amount of the estate fixes appellate jurisdiction is inaccurate. It may be that in some cases the amount of the estate is actually in dispute, then of course the value of the estate fixes appellate jurisdiction. We have applied the rule in the Aufderheide case, supra, to various situations. For example in the cases of City of Doniphan v. Cantley,
In Clotilde v. Lutz,
"In our opinion the cause must be transferred to the Supreme Court, for the reason that the amount involved exceeds the sum of $2500. It is true that the plaintiff's legacy amounts only to $2000, but her application is for an order to sell real estate to pay all of the legacies, which amount to $4410."
This holding was approved by this court. The loss in that case to the defendant, the residuary legatee, was $4410, which was the total amount of the specific bequests to which the real estate was subjected. So also a close reading of the opinion in State ex rel. v. Reynolds,
[2] We do not deem it necessary to further discuss cases cited by relator. The Supreme Court has only such jurisdiction as has been specifically conferred by the Constitution. [Ward v. Consolidated School District,
The rule followed by this court, that where the relief sued for is other than a money judgment, appellate jurisdiction is determined by the value in money of the relief to the plaintiff or of the loss to the defendant, should the relief be granted, orvice versa should the relief be denied, should be applied to cases seeking the interpretation of, or contesting wills. Will contest cases and suits to construe wills are no different, on the question of jurisdiction, than the case of Blankenship v. Ratcliff,
It is, therefore, ordered that our alternative writ of mandamus, in case number 33701, heretofore issued, be quashed. It is further ordered *803 that case number 33788 be retransferred to the Springfield Court of Appeals. Cooley and Bohling, CC., concur.
Addendum
The foregoing opinion by WESTHUES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.