97 Mo. 192 | Mo. | 1888
At the March term, 1886, of the Kansas City court of appeals, a decision was rendered in this case reversing the judgment of the circuit court of Platte county (23 Mo. App. 120), wherein one of the judges of said court sitting in the case delivered a-dissenting opinion in which he says: “In this case, what purports to be a bill of exceptions has been considered by a majority of the court as a bill of exceptions proper, because it has been so considered by the counsel on either side. The fact is, the paper purporting to be a bill of exceptions is not signed by the judge of the trial court, and therefore is not a part of the record in the case. * * * I deem the decision in this case contrary to the decisions in State v. Jones, 58 Mo. 506, and Smith v. Railroad, 55 Mo. 601, and the case should be certified to the supreme court.” It was accordingly so certified.
Since the case has been in this court, a certificate of the clerk of the circuit court of Platte county has, by agreement, been filed herein, showing that the original bill of exceptions was duly signed by the judge of the circuit court.. The omission of his■ signature in the transcript was a clerical inadvértence. The majority of the court of appeals, in reply to the dissenting opinion, say: “* * * By rule 15 of this court, it is provided in substance that in all cases the appellant or
It is unnecessary to recite the cogent reasoning of the majority of the court in support of its position. Its correctness is obvious and in harmony with the practice in this court under a similar rule. Eules 15 and 16, consolidated April term, 1884. There is nothing in this ruling in conflict with the decisions in State v. Jones, 58 Mo. 506, or in Smith v. Railroad, 55 Mo. 601, in which it is held that the signature of the judge is essential to a bill of exceptions to make it a part of the record. The suggestion that there is such conflict is fully met in the opinion of the majority in the following extract: “ We are all agreed that a bill of exceptions must be signed by the judge before it is entitled to record, but the question here is one of practice under the rule of this court as to what is evidence of what the record does contain. The rule says the abstract on which the parties have agreed. The parties surely could come into this court and stipulate that while the transcript sent up here, through mistake of the clerk, omitted the signature of the judge, as a matter of fact the bill of exceptions was signed by the judge and this court would accept this as correct and dispose of the case accordingly without certiorari. The effect of the respondent’s silence and treating the case as if the bill of exceptions, as stated in the appellant’s abstract, was regular, is equivalent to such stipulation.”
In harmony with this ruling are the cases of Snyder v. Hopkins, 39 Mo. 418, and Disse v. Frank, 52 Mo. 551, which hold that a case cannot be by agreement submitted to the court on the record, without abstract,
It is not suggested that the appellate court in its ruling on the merits committed any error, nor do we discover any. The judgment of the court of appeals, reversing the judgment of the circuit court of Platte county, is therefore affirmed.