Lead Opinion
Arkеe Sheriff Flanders was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in connection with the shooting death of Jessica Tower.
Construed to support the verdict, the evidence showed that Jessica Tower was shot in the head at close range with a .380 caliber semiautomatic pistol while she was sitting alone in her car in the early morning hours. The car lurched forward and subsequently сrashed into a nearby building where the police later found it.
Flanders, an ex-boyfriend of Jessica’s sister, Erica Tower, was a suspect in a theft of money from Jessica’s residence three weeks earlier. On that occasion, after a fight between Flanders and Erica at the Towers’ home, Flanders entered Jessica’s car and stole $377 from her purse. Jessica called the police and made a full report of the theft, and the police questioned Flanders about the stolen money. Flanders initially denied knowledge of the theft, but later admitted taking the money.
Jessica did not pursue prosecuting Flanders; instead she attempted to arrange for the return of the money without his arrest. On the night in question, Flanders was on his way home from a nightclub when he telephoned Jessicа and proposed that they meet in Shaw Park where he would return the money. Flanders took with him a Larson .380 semiautomatic handgun, which had been left at his home by a friend the previous day. Jessica drove to Shaw Park and pulled her car up to Flanders so that he was standing on the passenger side. She rolled down the passenger window. Flanders, who was armed with the gun, leaned into Jessica’s car аnd from a distance of about six inches, shot Jessica in the head. Flanders did not attempt to render aid to Jessica; instead, he ran from the scene.
Later that morning, Flanders hid the weapon under a friend’s mattress. That afternoon, Flanders was picked up for questioning concerning the shooting. He received Miranda
1. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found Flandеrs guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Arguing that the State exercised a pattern of racially discriminatory strikes by striking all of the three African-Americans on the jury panel, Flanders asserts the trial court erred when it denied his Batson
The evaluation of a Batson challenge involves a three-step process: (1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven discriminatory intent.
Thomas v. State,
Flanders made a prima facie case of racial discrimination by establishing that the State struck all of the African-American jurors on the panel. The State then proffered its reasons for each of the strikes.
The State explained it struck the first prospective juror because his recollection abilities were called into question when he could not remember on what type of jury he had previously served; his service would create an extreme hardship because he was required to care for a dependent aunt; and he would find the evidence too offensive. These explanations are race-neutral, related to the case to be tried, and are all clear and reasonably specific reasons for exercising the challenge. Gamble v. State,
The State struck the second prospective juror because her son recently had been prosecuted for a DUI. The prior conviction of a family member is a sufficiently race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike. Henry v. State,
The prosecutor explained that he struck the third prospective juror because of her employment as a social worker, and that it is the practice of his office to strike jurors with backgrounds in social work and psychology.
Flanders fаiled to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. See Foster v. State,
3. We reject Flanders’ assertion that his statement to the police was induced with the hope of benefit, and therefore involuntary. The investigating officer testified at
Flanders did not testify at the hearing or provide a specific basis for excluding his statement. And nothing in the record suggests the investigating officers coerced Flanders either by threats to his mother or by threats as to the length of time they would keep him at the police station. Pittman v. State,
Thе trial court determined that Flanders was advised of his constitutional rights, that he knowingly and voluntarily relinquished those rights, and that his subsequent statements were voluntary. Considering the totality of the circumstances, that determination is not clearly erroneous. Atkins v. State,
4. Any assertion that first appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of Flanders’ statement is rendered moot by our ruling in Division 3.
5. Flanders asserts that his statement to the police was a confession which the State failed to corroborate at trial.
The State cannot rely solely on Flanders’ statement to prove its case. “If [the] statement is an admission, the State must present additional direct or circumstantial evidence of his guilt of felony murder. [Cit.] If the statement is a confession, the State must introduce additional evidence which corroborates it. OCGA § 24-3-53.” Walsh v. State,
Flanders admitted to the police that he called Jessica and arranged the meeting at Shaw Park; that he came armed with the .380 pistol because he thought she may bring a companion in an attempt to ambush him; that he wаited for her to drive up and then approached the front passenger window; and that he leaned inside with the gun in hand. Flanders stated that he “forgot [the gun] was in my hand... and it just went off.” Although felony murder does not require malice or intent to kill, it does, however, “require that the defendant possess the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony.” Holliman v. State,
6. It follows that the trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested charge on the principle of corroboration since such a charge was not adjusted to the evidence.
7. During opening statement, defense counsel opined that the lead detective did not believe that Flanders “knew how to handle that particular gun, much less pull the trigger. So I think when you hear the evidence, the State’s own detective . . . believed that it was an accident.” During the State’s direct examination of the detective, the prosecutor asked, “Did you ever in your own mind feel like this was —■ was there any way that this was an accident?” The trial court allowed the question, over objection, because it was raised in opening statement by the defense.
8. The trial court charged the jury:
You may infer that a person of sound mind and discretion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences of that person’s intentional acts. And if a person of sound mind and discretion intentionally and without justification uses a deadly weapon or instrumentality in the manner in which the weapon or instrumentality is ordinarily used and thereby causes the death of a human being, you may infer the intent to kill.
At the time of Flanders’ trial in 1999, this was considered a proper, although discouraged, charge. Subsequently, in Harris v. State,
Notes
A grand jury indicted Flanders on June 11, 1998, and charged him with malice murder, felony murder predicated on the underlying felony of aggravated assault, pоssession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, theft by taking for the taking of money from Jessica Tower, and both burglary and theft by taking for the unlawful entry and taking of property from the dwelling house of Ray Harris. Trial commenced on April 20, 1999; four days later, a jury found Flanders guilty of all charges, except for the burglary and theft counts relating to Harris. The felony murder conviction was vacated as a mаtter of law, Malcolm v. State,
Miranda v. Arizona,
Batson v. Kentucky,
In fact, the prosecutor stated his intention to strike a Caucasian juror on the subsequеnt panel for exactly the same reason, and the record reflects that was done.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
While agreeing with everything written in the majority opinion, I write separately to highlight the importance of ensuring that the jury selection process remains free not only of racial and gender prejudice, but also free of racial and gender stereotypes. In addition, I write separately tо remind the bench and bar of the adverse effects a discriminatory jury selection process has on the community and the judicial system.
Seldom do we, as judges, recount personal experiences in an opinion, but sometimes it is necessary to explain the importance of a legal issue. I believe an experience I had while in private practice drives home the point I wish to make about the jury selection process, so I share it here.
Prior to the U. S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Batson v. Kentucky,
In response to my statement, the lady informed me that she had been humiliated by the whole process and that she saw the court system as sending a message to her that, because of her race, the legal system did not deem her fit to sit in judgment of her fellow citizens. She further stated, “The next time
Such a statement shocked me, but I realized it reflected some of the real evils that result from an abuse of the exercise of peremptory strikes. The attitude she expressed is exactly what happens when people lose faith and confidence in our legal system. Thе spirit of cooperation is snuffed out and the government loses one of its most valuable resources, citizen input.
It is because of this fear of losing input from a cross-section of the community that I raise legal, ethical and professionalism concerns in the area of Batson challenges. Although lawyers are sometimes allowed to use fanciful reasons for the exercise of peremptory strikes, they may do serious harm to our legal system by eroding faith and confidence in the administration of justice.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author of Batson v. Kentucky, spoke at the dedication of the State Bar Headquarters of Georgia on January 15, 2005. He stated, “Jurors are one-time players in the governmental arena.” Since jury service is a one-time event for most citizens, we can assume they are highly impressionаble and we, as lawyers, should work to ensure that they leave their encounter with a good impression, not only of the case in controversy, but also of the entire legal system. If we, through the use of peremptory strikes, exclude, for suspect reasons, individual jurors or entire cognizable segments of the population from service, we add to the erosion of respect for and сonfidence in our system of justice.
Jury service is one of the most highly regarded privileges of civic life. Jury duty preserves the democratic element of the law as it guards the rights of participants in the legal system and ensures continued acceptance of the nation’s laws. Powers v. Ohio,
For many years the judiciary has recognized the terrible effects of a discriminatory jury selection process. Over a century ago, the U. S. Supreme Court acknowlеdged,
the very fact that [members of a particular race] are singled out and expressly denied ... all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Strauder v. West Virginia,
The harm from the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in the jury selection process extends well beyond that inflicted on the excluded juror. Batson v. Kentucky, supra,
The overall integrity of the jury selection process, and thereby the entire judicial system, is enhanced when fitness for jury service is not determined through a discriminatory process. See Hayes v. State,