199 Pa. 128 | Pa. | 1901
Opinion by
The appellee is the proprietor of glass works at Tarentum, in the county of Allegheny. In his complaint he sets forth that he has been engaged in the business of manufacturing glass bottles of various kinds, and, in and about their manufacture, has been compelled to employ divers workmen and apprentices; that the appellants and others are members of an association known as the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor; that, for a long time prior to the year 1894, he had been greatly hampered and annoyed in his business by the control sought to be exercised over his workmen and apprentices by the said American Flint Glass Workers’ Union and the American Federation of Labor, with which it is affiliated; that in the year 1894, he established his factory on an independent basis, employing no workmen or apprentices who were connected with either of the associations named, and expressly requiring his said workmen and apprentices not to be connected with the said American Flint Glass Workers’ Union, and, from that time until the filing of his bill of complaint, he had conducted his factory as an independent one, with mutual satisfaction to himself and the men and apprentices employed by him ; that the appellants knew his factory was so being conducted as an independent one, and that his workmen and apprentices were not connected with the said American Flint Glass Workers’ Union, and had agreed not to connect themselves with the samo, and, particularly, that his apprentices were under agreement not to so connect themselves; that his workmen and apprentices were working in harmony until about September 15, 1899, when the said appellants, acting under orders of the said American Flint Glass Workers’ Union, claiming the right of declaring strikes and otherwise interfering with the employment of labor, well knowing that his apprentices were under covenant and agreement not to be connected with the said A merican Flint Glass Workers’ Union, began to entice, and did entice, a number of them to break their
This is not a controversy between the employer and his employees, but between him and certain individuals associated -as
In the several statutes called to our attention by the learned counsel for appellants, we can find nothing to aid us. The act of September 29, 1770, 1 Smith’s Laws, 309, simply provides that a minor may enter into a valid contract of apprenticeship; by that of May 8, 1869, P. L. 1260, the legislature properly declared that “ it shall be lawful for any and all classes of mechanics, journeymen, tradesman and laborers to form societies and associations for their mutual aid, benefit and protection, and peaceably meet, discuss and establish all necessary by-laws, rules and regulations to carry out the same; ” and the Act of June 14, 1872, P. L. 1175, is that “it shall be lawful for any laborer or laborers, workingman or workingmen, journeyman or journeymen, acting either as individuals or as the members of any club, society or association to refuse to work or labor for any person or persons, whenever, in his, her, or their opinion, the wages paid are insufficient, or the treatment of such laborer or laborers, workingman or workingmen, journeyman or journeymen, by his, her, or their employer, is brutal, or offensive, or the continued labor by such laborer or laborers, workingman or workingmen, journeyman or journeymen, would be contrary to the rules, regulations, or by-laws of any club, society or organization to which he, she, or they might belong, without subjecting any person or persons so refusing to work or labor to prosecution or indictment for conspiracy under the criminal laws of this commonwealth.” But nowhere does it appear in the foregoing enact
The appellee had an unquestioned right, in the conduct of his business, to employ workmen who were independent of any labor union, and he had the further right to adopt a system of apprenticeship which excluded his apprentices from membership in such a union. He was responsible to no one for his reasons in adopting such a system, and no one had a right to interfere with it to his prejudice or injury. Such an interference with it was an interference with his business, and if unlawful, cannot be permitted. The court found that the inteference was injurious to him, and if allowed to continue would utterly ruin his business. The damages resulting from such an injury are incapable of ascertainment at law, and justice demands that specific relief be furnished in a court of equity. The test of equity jurisdiction is the absence of a plain and adequate remedy at law to the injured party, depending upon the character of the case as disclosed in the pleadings. If equity alone can furnish relief, the injunction must be issued: Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 79. With this test applied to the pleadings and the facts found by the learned judge in the court below, the decree which he made was proper. It is now affirmed and the appeal from it is dismissed at the costs of the appellants.