Wе granted this discretionary appeal to resolve an issue of first impression: whether a garnishee’s failure to accept certified mail notification that a default judgment has been entered against it satisfies the requirement of “actual notice” in OCGA § 18-4-91 so as to commence the running of the 60-day period during which, upon payment of accrued costs, a garnishee may move to modify the default judgment. We hold that it does and affirm the judgment below.
Colonial Credit Union obtained judgment against Jackie Sneed in the amount of $5,424.71. Colonial believed Five Star Steel Contractors, Inc. to be Sneed’s employer, and summons of garnishment was personally served on Five Star. Sneed’s employment with Five Star, however, had terminated several weeks prior to the service of the summons. Mistakenly believing there was no need to answer since it did not owe Sneed any money, Five Star ignored the summons. Default judgment was entered against Five Star on January 6, 1992.
In January 1992, Colonial mаiled a copy of the default judgment to Five Star via certified mail return receipt requested. A certified mail envelope postmarked January 24, 1992, indicаtes that it was sent by Colonial’s attorney on that date to Five Star at its correct address and that no postage was due. After several attempts at delivеry, the envelope was returned “unclaimed” in February 1992. In July 1992 Colonial obtained a fi. fa. Postjudgment interrogatories were personally served on Five Star on September 1, 1992.
Five Star’s motion for reduction of the amount of the default judgment pursuant to OCGA § 18-4-91 was filed on September 18, 1992, and accrued costs were paid. In that motion and the accompanying affidavit of its president, Five Star alleged that it first learned of the default judgment on September 1, 1992. The court denied the motion as untimеly, i.e., outside the 60-day period within which such motions may be filed, finding that Five Star had received notice when it refused to accept the certified mail in February.
OCGA § 18-4-91 allows a defaulting garnishee to move “not later than 60 days from the date [it] receives actual notice of the entry of the judgment against him, . . . upon payment of all accrued costs of court, [to] have the judgment modified so that the amount of the judgment shall be reduced to an amount equal to the greater of $50.00 or $50.00 plus 100 percent of the amount by which the garnishee was indebted to the defendant from the time of seryice of the summons of garnishment through and including the last day on which a timely answer could have been made. . . . Notice to the garnishee by certified mail shall be sufficient notice as required in this Code sec *695 tion. On the trial of the motion, the burden of proof shall be upon any plaintiff who objects to the timeliness of the motion to establish that the motion was not filed within the time provided for by this Code section.”
Five Star contends the court erred by denying its motion because the statute requires receipt of actual notice of. the default judgment, and none was received until September 1, 1992, when the postjudgment interrogatories were personally served. It argues that although a different statute, OCGA § 18-4-64 (a) (2), which governs notice to the debtor of the issuance of the summons of garnishment, provides that the debtor’s refusal to accept notice sent by certified mail is deemеd to satisfy the notice requirement, OCGA § 18-4-91 includes no such provision, and its absence must be construed as an indication that a garnishee’s refusal of the notice does not satisfy the statute’s requirement of “actual notice.”
Where no proceeding is pending between the parties at the time a notice is required to be given, due process requires personal service of the notice.
Henry v. Hiawassee Land Co.,
Having been personally served at the outset of the proceeding, and default judgment having been entered only by virtue of the garnishee’s failure or rеfusal to respond in appropriate fashion, this provision does not offend the requirement of due process.
In some instances, particular statutеs or contracts mandating notice are not complied with unless or until the notice is actually received. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Edwards,
In determining whether notiсe required under a specific statute must be received, the language of the particular statute in issue must be interpreted in accordance with recognized principles of construction, in each case keeping in mind that the cardinal rule is to seek diligently the intention of the legislature and effectuate the statute’s purpose. Statutes must be construed as well so as to square with common sense and sound reasoning. “ ‘It is the duty of the court to consider the results аnd consequences of any proposed construction and not so construe a statute as will result in unreasonable or absurd consequences not сontemplated by the legislature.’ . . . [Cit.]” (Emphasis omitted.)
General Elec. &c. Corp. v. Brooks,
In addition to authorizing a plaintiff’s use of an inexpensive, efficient means of notifying a garnishee of the entry оf a default judgment, OCGA § 18-4-91 is clearly a remedial statute. It provides a second chance for a garnishee who, having been personally served with a summons of gаrnishment, ignored its call for an answer. A limited window of opportunity is afforded such a garnishee through which it can reduce a debt imposed by its initial inaction.
We conclude that it was not the legislature’s intention to allow such a garnishee to unilaterally enlarge the statutory window simply by repeating its failure to act and ignoring the notice. Such a construction would make the certified mail method of notice dependent on a defaulting garnishee’s diligence in retrieving the mail. It would also penalize a plaintiff who has faithfully followed the procedure for notice set forth in the statute. The procedure, having been rejected by the garnishee, would have to be abandoned and another more costly method utilized. Delay would work to the garnishee’s advantage. We hold, therefore, that when the garnishee fails or refuses to claim a notice by certified mail given under OCGA § 18-4-91, the 60-day period in which the garnishee may move for modification of a default judgment begins to run on the date of the first attempted delivery of such notice, provided the notice is correctly addressed and contains *697 adequate postage.
Judgment affirmed.