242 N.W. 526 | N.D. | 1932
This is an action brought by a wife to recover damages from her husband for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by her because of his negligence.
The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's case and *194 again at the close of the whole case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence failed to establish negligence on the part of the defendant; that the plaintiff was herself guilty of contributory negligence; and that an action by a wife to recover damages for personal injuries resulting on account of the negligence of her husband does not lie under the statutes of the state of North Dakota. This motion was resisted and denied. Plaintiff had a verdict. Thereafter defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. This motion was denied and judgment was entered on the verdict. Hence this appeal.
In September, 1930, plaintiff accompanied her husband, the defendant, to town. He drove an automobile. On their return it was necessary to cross a line of railroad. As they approached the railroad from the south it was possible to see easterly along the track for a long distance, excepting for some five or six hundred feet just before they reached the track, whence the view to the east was obstructed by a grain elevator and by a string of box cars. At this crossing there were three tracks. First on the south, the house track, on which were the box cars, then a passing track, and last, to the north, the main track. The main track and the house track were about thirty-five feet apart. The defendant was driving at a rate of about twenty-five miles per hour. He drove past the box cars and discovered a gasoline propelled train approaching the crossing from the east. The operator of the train sounded a warning signal just as defendant passed the box cars. Before that neither defendant nor plaintiff had seen or heard the train. Plaintiff saw the approaching train first, screamed and called defendant's attention to it. It is inferable from the record that the defendant believed the train was approaching on the passing track and that he could cross ahead of it, so he increased the speed of his automobile. He reached the passing track and then discovered that the train was on the main track. It was too late to stop, so he continued across and the train hit the rear end of his car as it passed over the main track. The plaintiff was very severely injured. If either plaintiff or defendant had looked as they approached the crossing and before the view became obstructed they would have been able to see the approaching train. However, neither of them looked. Both were acquainted with the crossing. The train made very little noise and *195 of course no smoke arose from it. Defendant contends that under these circumstances it must be said, as a matter of law, either that there was no negligence on his part, or, though there was, that since the plaintiff had the same opportunity as he had to look and discover the approaching train and was acquainted with the crossing and knew the danger attendant on passing over it, she was, in any event, guilty of contributory negligence.
Questions of negligence and of contributory negligence are questions of fact for the jury unless there can be no reasonable division of opinion respecting them. Martin v. Parkins,
But the principal ground urged by the defendant in the lower court, and the one on which he now chiefly relies, is that the plaintiff has no cause of action; that under the law of this state plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, cannot recover against him on account of his negligence which resulted in her injury.
It is conceded that at common law the wife might not sue her husband in tort. "At the common law the husband and wife were regarded as one, . . . the legal existence of the wife during coverture being *196
merged in that of the husband, and, generally speaking, the wife was incapable of making contracts, of acquiring property or disposing of the same without her husband's consent. They could not enter into contracts with each other, nor were they liable for torts committed by one against the other." Thompson v. Thompson,
"Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which the other might, if unmarried. The wife after marriage has with respect to property, contracts and torts the same capacity and rights and is subject to the same liabilities as before marriage, and in all actions by or against her she shall sue and be sued in her own name,"
clothes her with both the right and the capacity to recover damages against her husband on account of his torts. Section 4331 provides:
"In this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the codes."
And plaintiff insists that pursuant to this statute and § 4411, supra, the common law rule is abrogated and must be wholly disregarded. While § 4411 does control, nevertheless in its construction and application some regard must be paid to the common law. "Manifestly civil statutes must be regarded as they have always been construed to be, but continuations, affirmances, modifications, or repeals of basic common law governing principles, and to be interpreted in the light of the common law as has been done for generations." Reeves Co. v. Russell,
While the question now presented is novel in this jurisdiction, it has been considered by the courts elsewhere many times. Counsel on both sides have searched diligently for precedent and authority to sustain their respective contentions and in that behalf have cited a multitude of cases. It would needlessly lengthen this opinion to enumerate all of these cases here, but they may be found cited in the *197
following cases and in the notes appended thereto. As sustaining the defendant's contention, are: Thompson v. Thompson,
Of course, in considering and applying the statute, our sole aim must *198 be to discover and carry out the legislative intent as expressed therein. We are not to be concerned with questions of policy except as the general policy of the law otherwise disclosed may aid us in doing this. Nor are we concerned with the wisdom or expediency of the statute. These are for the legislature. In this business of construction it will be worth while to note the history of our statutory law touching the capacity, rights, and obligations of married women respecting property, contracts and torts. The early territorial statutes gradually emancipated the wife from her husband's control. Chapter 38, Laws of Dakota, 1862, exempted her property from the debts of her husband. The first territorial civil code was passed and approved on January 12, 1866. Sections 75 to 85 inclusive, thereof, permitted the wife to hold, control, and dispose of her own property and to deal with others, including her husband, as though she were an unmarried woman. Nor was this legislation wholly one-sided. Both husband and wife as such were absolved from liability for the acts of the other. As to property, § 79 (Dakota Comp. Laws 1887, § 2590), expressly provided:
"Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either might, if unmarried, . . ."
In 1887 the territorial legislature further enacted chapter 98 of the Session Laws of 1887, found as § 2600 in the Dakota Compiled Laws 1887, providing:
"From and after the passage of this act, woman shall retain the same legal existence and legal personality after marriage as before marriage and shall receive the same protection of all her rights as a woman, which her husband does as a man; and for any injury sustained to her reputation, person, property, character or any natural right, she shall have the same right to appeal in her own name alone to the courts of law or equity for redress and protection that her husband has to appeal in his own name alone; Provided, This act shall not confer upon the wife a right to vote or hold office, except as is otherwise provided by law."
The several statutory provisions above referred to continued in effect in this state after its admission into the Union until the Revised Codes of 1895 were adopted, and with the exception of §§ 2590 and 2600 were included therein. But these sections, 2590 and 2600, were omitted *199 in the revision and in lieu thereof § 2767, Revised Codes 1895, was enacted, providing:
"The wife after marriage has with respect to property, contracts and torts the same capacity and rights and is subject to the same liabilities as before marriage and in all actions by or against her she shall sue and be sued in her own name."
This section was in turn amended by chapter 100, Sess. Laws 1899, and as so amended now appears as § 4411, supra.
Thus the ever widening deviation from the common law is shown. First the exemption of the wife's property from the debts of her husband; then the enactment of a provision permitting her to hold, control and dispose of her own property and to deal with others, including her husband, respecting property as though she were unmarried and, conversely, absolving her husband from certain liabilities on her account theretofore imposed by the marriage relation; then a statute giving her a legal personality and clothing her with rights coequal with those of her husband respecting reputation, person, property and character, and the capacity to vindicate the same in her own name for her own benefit in the courts; and finally by the enactment of § 4411, supra, the statute under which the present question arises.
We know of no jurisdiction in which the strict rule of the common law with respect to the legal status of a married woman has not been modified or abrogated by statute. But while we have searched diligently we have found no other statute identical with our § 4411, supra. However, statutes exactly the same as § 2600, supra, have been enacted in other jurisdictions and have been construed and applied there. Thus in Strom v. Strom (1906)
Read by itself without regard for the common law, it seems to us that the language of § 4411, supra, can be susceptible of but one interpretation; — that a woman after her marriage shall have the same capacity and rights she had and be subject to the same liability she was subject to before her marriage. Read in the light of common law principles alone, however, there would be, to say the least, good room for argument to the contrary. This is attested by the formidable array of authorities cited above wherein statutes of a more or less similar character have been thus read and construed. But taking into consideration the growth and development of the idea of the emancipation of the wife and of the equality of husband and wife before the law as disclosed by the history of our legislative enactments, we hold that in this state the common law rule is wholly abrogated and that a wife may sue her husband for a personal tort. It seems to us that when the legislature saw fit to discard § 2600, Dakota Compiled Laws, 1887, supra, and adopt in its stead § 2767, Revised Codes 1895, later enlarged to § 4411, supra, the present statute, it unmistakably evidenced such a purpose and intent. Construed most strictly, § 2600, gave a married woman every right that her husband had with respect to person, reputation, *201 and property. Strom v. Strom, supra. But § 4411 does more than merely put a married woman on an equality with her husband with respect to person, reputation and property. It recognizes her legal individuality and preserves for her every right that she had prior to her marriage. As to whether it does likewise for her husband we are not now required to and do not decide.
The judgment is affirmed.
CHRISTIANSON, Ch., J., and BURR, BIRDZELL and BURKE, JJ., concur.