This is аn appeal by the self-insurer from a judgment of the Superior Court awarding compensation to the deceased employee’s widow under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, G. L. c. 152. The judgment affirmed the decision of the reviewing board whiсh had affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member. We granted an application for direct appellate review.
The crux of the self-insurer’s appeal concerns whether there were errors of law which tainted a finding by the Industrial Accident Board (board) that a mental or emotional disorder caused by a mental or emotional shock suffered at work is a “personal injury arising out of employment.” We find no errors of law and affirm the judgment оf the Superi- or Court.
We summarize the facts. On August 24, 1973, the employee, Vincent P. Fitzgibbons (Fitzgibbons), a supervisory correction officer at the Billerica house of correction, ordered several officers to place an inmate in a more segregated unit in an effort to quell an inmate disturbance at the facility. During the removal of the inmate a scuffle ensued. One officer involved in the altercation became ill and was dispatched first to an infirmary and then to a hоspital where he was pronounced dead.
Fitzgibbons, on being informed of the officer’s death, began to cry and became very shaky and upset. Fitzgibbons then went to the infirmary and later to a hospital where a diagnosis of acute anxiеty reaction was made and medication was prescribed. Within a day or two Fitzgibbons saw his own doctor who prescribed even stronger medication.
*635 After the incident on August 24, Fitzgibbons never worked again. He became withdrawn and talked mostly of thе officer’s death and of his personal responsibility for the death. During conversations with his wife, his family, and the assistant deputy master of the facility, Fitzgibbons often cried and appeared nervous and upset over the officer’s death.
On Seрtember 14, he kept an appointment with a representative of the county retirement board. According to the county representative, Fitzgibbons appeared in good spirits. Mrs. Fitzgibbons (claimant) came home about 1:45 p.m. Shortly after her arrival she found her husband bleeding from the head due to a gunshot wound. Fitzgibbons was taken to the hospital. On October 5, 1973, he died from the gunshot wound.
The board in adopting and affirming the findings of the single member found that following the prison incident “the employee became obsessed with guilt, and was unable to function normally, concentrating solely on his imaginary responsibility for the death of a guard. As a result of his obsession and overwhelming guilt, the employee shot himself. ...” Accordingly, the board cоncluded that “the employee sustained a personal injury on August 24,1973, as evidenced by his immediate emotional reaction following the dramatic incident at work. . . . [A]s result of said injury, i.e., psychotic depression, the employee committеd suicide and . . . said suicide was the result of the employee being of ‘such unsoundness of mind as to make him irresponsible for his act of suicide’ [G. L. c. 152, § 26A].”
The self-insurer first argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the board’s finding of causal connectiоn between the prison incident of August 24, 1973, and the employee’s suicide. Where the causation between the work-related injury and the resulting physical or psychological ramifications is not common knowledge, as is the case here, expert testimony is required. The probative value of this testimony is to be weighed by the fact-finding tribunal. The board’s decision is “to be accepted as final if . . . supported
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by the evidence, including all rational inferences which could be drаwn therefrom, and if not tainted by error of law.”
Foleys Case,
The self-insurer’s expert testified that the employee suffered from involutional or change of life melancholia which began at the time of the employee’s hospital admissions for treatment of his diverticulitis 1 and that the employee’s depression leading to suicide was the result of the involutional melancholia, not the August 24 incident.
The psychiatrist called on behalf of the claimant testified that the employee sufferеd from a psychotic depressive reaction caused by the prison incident and that the psychotic depressive reaction was responsible for the unsoundness of mind that resulted in suicide. The testimony of this expert if believed dispоses of the self-insurer’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding of causal connection.
Lambert’s Case,
The claimant’s expert gave reasons for his opinion and explained that the employee’s medical history and background were more consistent with a diagnosis of psychotic depressive reaction resulting from the prison incident than with a diagnosis of involutional melancholia. This evidence constitutes more than the mere possibility or chance of the existence of a causal connection between the employee’s work
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experience and condition. The board’s decision is supported by the record and thus must be sustained.
Anderson’s Case,
The insurer next contends that the personal injury in this case is not compensable. While the term “personal injury” is not defined comprehensivеly under our act, G. L. c. 152, § 1 (7A), it has been interpreted in light of the act’s policy to provide “relief for workers receiving injury in the course of and arising out of their employment.”
Duart
v.
Simmons,
Thus, we have interpreted the term “personal injury” to include mental and nervous disorders arising оut of employment where such injuries are the result of physical trauma, no matter how slight the impact. See
McEwen’s Case,
We conclude that the term “personal injury” also permits compensation in cases involving mental disorders or disabil
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ities causally connected to mental trauma or shock arising “out of the employment loоked at in any of its aspects.”
Caswell’s Case, supra
at 502. There is no valid distinction which would preclude mental or emotional disorders caused by mental or emotional trauma from being compensable. See
McMurray’s Case, supra
at 32; 1A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation § 42.23 (1973). In genеral, decisions elsewhere have awarded compensation where mental disorders have been causally connected to mentally traumatic events arising out of employment. See, e.g.,
Pathfinder Co.
v.
Industrial Comm’n,
The self-insurer, however, contends that recovery is foreclosed in this case by
Begins Case,
It is also argued that the injury here was caused by the employee’s unwarranted guilt feelings and that the subjec
*639
tive nature of these feelings made them a personal idiosyncrasy, not a work-related injury.
Korsun’s Case,
The self-insurer further assigns error in the denial of its motion to strike the portions of a hospital record and death certificаte which relate to suicide. It is not necessary to determine whether or not the portions to which the self-insurer objects are admissible under G. L. c. 233, § 79, 2 and c. 46, § 19, respectively, since the single member stated that her finding of suicide was “based on evidence, independent of any verbiage in the Death Certificate or hospital or police reports concerning ‘suicide.’”
The self-insurer argues that the board’s finding of suicide is speculative in the absence of this evidencе. However, there was evidence of the location of the entry and exit wounds, the location of the powder burns, the position of the employee in relation to the gun, and the employee’s mental condition. An expert testified that he found that these facts were more consistent with suicide than with an accident. The finding of suicide was based on reasonable inferences from the evidence; it cannot be said that the board’s finding is wholly lacking in testimonial supрort.
The self-insurer suggests that the costs and fees allowed in the Superior Court were unreasonable and excessive. “There
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is nothing in the record showing the amount of work done by the attorney, the necessary time spent in its performance, or the various other details which must be considered in arriving at a fair estimate of the value of his services.”
Watson’s Case,
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. Costs and expenses of apрeal under G. L. c. 152, § 11 A, shall be allowed by a single justice.
So ordered.
Notes
In addition to the incident of August 24,1973, the employee’s relevant medical history included four hospitalizations during the period from February, 1972, to February, 1973, in connection with a diverticulitis condition which rеquired surgery. As a result of this medical problem he was out of work for approximately twenty weeks during that year-long period. The employee returned to work in April, 1973, and worked until August 24,1973. The board found that the employee “experiencеd no further medical difficulties sufficient to prevent him from carrying out his normal duties” following his return to work in April, 1973.
It is unclear on the record whether the hospital records were admitted under G. L. c. 152, § 20, which contains no limitation on the admission of hospitаl records, or under G. L. c. 233, § 79. Since we find no error, in any event, we will assume that the more restrictive statute, G. L. c. 233, § 79, might be applicable under these facts. However, in most instances, admission of hospital records in workmen’s compensation hearings is governed by G. L. c. 152, § 20.