36 How. Pr. 97 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1868
The plaintiff is a mason by trade and occupation, and carries on his trade as a means of livelihood. The defendant, at various times, uttered words charging the plaintiff with gross want of skill, knowledge and capacity in his craft, and, among other things, said of him, “that he was no mechanic; that he could not make a good wall, or do a good job of plastering; that he was no workman; and that he was a botch.”
The only question is whether the words proved, having been publicly spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, and of his trade, are actionable per se. It is claimed by the counsel for the appellant that they are not actionable, as they involve no charge of moral turpitude or of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff in his trade or occupation, and therefore do not in any manner affect his character. But in actions founded on this species of defamation, the question is not whether the plaintiff has suffered in his general reputation; it is whether he has been prejudiced in his employment. It is said by a learned author that if the injurious words clearly relate to the plaintiff, and his
E. D. Smith, Johnson and J. C. Smith, Justices.]
In the case of Redmond v. Pyne, (1 Mod. 19,) the words spoken of a watchmaker were, “He is a bungler, and knows not how to make a good piece of work.” After verdict for the plaintiff, the words, on motion in arrest of judgment, were held by the court not to be actionable, not having been laid to.be of the plaintiff’s trade; but it was said that had the words been, “ he knows not how to make a good watch,” they would have been actionable.
Hpon authority, therefore, words imputing tó a mechanic want of skill, or knowledge in his craft, are actionable per se, if they are clearly shown to have been spoken with reference to the plaintiff’s occupation, and the employment is one requiring peculiar knowledge and skill.
In this respect the authorities recognize no distinction between a learned profession and a mechanical trade, and manifestly, there is none in principle.
In the present case, not only did the words themselves distinctly refer to the plaintiff’s trade, but the referee has found the fact that they were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, and of his occupation as a mason.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.