The following opinion was filed April 3, 1923:
Thе defendant argues that the demurrers interposed to the two causes of action should have been sustained, it having been conceded by plaintiff, as appears from the record before us, and the contrary is not here urged, that the words relied upon in each of the separate causes of action did not import the charge of a commission of a crime by the plaintiff.
Construing the entire language of the first cause of action, though embraced in two distinct statements, yet all part of one address, made by defendant to his congrеgation on July 31, 1921, concerning plaintiff, we are of the opinion that so construed together they support а conclusion that their plain and reasonable import charged a lack of fidelity, honesty, and integrity by plaintiff in the discharge of his duties as trustee and officer of the congregation, and because so tending to disgrace and disparage him as such officer they were slanderous per se.
It is urged that, to be recognized as sufficient foundation to support an action for slander, words tending to disparage or discredit one in an official capacity must relate to one as a public officer only. We can see no reason for such suggestеd distinction, and the rule seems to be well established'that
We are therefore satisfied that the demurrer to the first cause of action was. propеrly overruled.
On the second cause of action, however, construed as it now must be, upon the challengе to it by the demurrer, entirely independent of what is charged in the first cause of action and independent of thе testimony on the trial, we are forced to the conclusion that it is controlled by the ruling of this court in the case involving substantially similar language of Laurent v. Van Somple,
The demurrer to the second cause of action should therefore have been sustained.
Defendant by his answer pleaded a conditional privilege
Other errors are assigned relating to the charge to the jury and on questions of admission of evidence. Another •assignment is based upon refusal to grant a new triаl on account of a showing made by affidavits subsequent to verdict relating to the subject matter of the examination of one of the jurors on the voir dire. An examination of all these assignments satisfies us that they are not well taken.
Thе trial court held that the damages as assessed by the jury and aggregating for the two causes of action $16,000 werе highly excessive. With that view we agree. He also held that, though excessive, it could not properly be "considered as indicating such perversity as required the setting aside of the entire verdict, and with this conclusion we alsо agree.
In his written opinion disposing of the motions after verdict and referring to the option he gave first to plaintiff and then to defendant to have judgment entered for the $2,200 damages in place of the $16,000 as found by the jury, the court stated, referring to the reductions in both compensatory and punitory damages in the two causes of action, as follows: “These several amounts and total are considered as low and as high as an impartial jury, in the exercise of a sound discretion, acting reasonably upon the evidence, would be warranted in assessing upon another trial.”
The method thus indicated by the trial court of fixing the optional sum as high and as low as would bе fixed by a jury on another trial is not the method indicated as the proper one in Gerlach v. Gruett,
By the Court. — Judgment modified by striking therefrom the $1,200 allowed as damages for the second cause of action, and then affirmed in the sum of $1,000 damages, defendant to have costs in this court.
A motion for a rehearing was denied, with $25 costs, on June 5, 1923.