The question presented by this appeal is whether defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy released him *129 from a judgment in a personal injury action in which plaintiff’s injuries were the result of his grossly careless and reckless conduct.
Plaintiff commenced an action against defendant to recover damages for injuries that she received when struck by an automobile driven by him. The сomplaint alleged that he drove his automobile “at a fast, furious, reckless and dangerous rate of speed, in a grоssly careless, reckless and unlawful manner, and at an illegal rate of speed”; that he drove “negligently, carelessly and recklessly,” and that plaintiff’s injuries were “due to the wanton, gross carelessness, recklessness and negligence of said defendant.”
Defendant suffered his default to be entered and a judgment was rendered against him on May 17, 1944, for the sum of $7,500 and costs. The judgmеnt recited that he had been regularly served with process, had failed to answer, was not in the military service of the United Stаtes, and that his default had been entered.
On December 12, 1944, defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy and schedules in the District Court оf the United States. In the schedule of creditors whose claims were unsecured he listed the judgment, together with plaintiff’s name аs the holder of the claim, and she was notified in the manner required by law. On or about April 12, 1945, defendant received his discharge in bankruptcy.
Thereafter, plaintiff brought this action on the judgment seeking a new judgment for the amount thereof, with interest. The comрlaint alleged the rendition of the judgment in the former action and that it was on a cause of action for damages suffered by her for personal injuries “proximately caused by defendant through his willful, wanton and grossly careless conduct, under cirсumstances manifesting an utter disregard of the rights of plaintiff by defendant. ’ ’
On motion of defendant the latter allegation was stricken from the complaint. He then answered pleading his discharge in bankruptcy.
At the trial the complaint and the judgment in the formеr action were offered by plaintiff and received in evidence. The facts relating to defendant’s bankruptcy as аbove set forth were stipulated to be true.
For the purpose of showing that the judgment was not discharged in bankruptcy plaintiff offered to prove the allega *130 tions in the complaint in the former action with reference to defendant’s “wаnton, gross carelessness, recklessness and negligence”; that defendant was driving at approximately 80 miles an hour; that he was drunk at the time of the accident. The offer of proof was refused by the court. Findings were filed to the effect that defendant had been discharged in bankruptcy of plaintiff’s claim. Judgment was rendered in favor of defendant from which plaintiff has аppealed.
1.
The effect of defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy.
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 35) provides: “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from аll of his provable debts, . . . except such as . . . are liabilities . . . for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another. ...” The cause of action stated in the complaint in the first action was of the type excepted in the statute from the operation of the discharge, and if the allegations in the original complaint are true defendаnt’s liability was not discharged.
(Woehrle
v.
Canclini,
Notwithstanding the change in the form of a debt from that of an unliquidated claim by merger into a judgment of a court of record, it still remains the same debt as that on which the action was brought.
(Boynton
v.
Ball,
121 U.S.
*131
457, 466 [
Willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act that is against good morals and wrongful in itself and that necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, is a willful and malicious act within the exception in the bankruptcy statute.
(Van Epps
v.
Aufdemkamp, supra,
at p. 623, quoting from
Tinker
v.
Colwell,
Thе acts of defendant were charged in the original complaint to have been grossly careless, reckless, negligent and wanton. To avoid a discharge in bankruptcy it was not necessary that the words “willful and malicious” be used. The terminology in the complaint is the equivalent of “willful and malicious” as used in the Bankruptcy Act.
(In re Greene,
(C.C.A. 7)
It follows that defendant was not released from liability on the judgment by his discharge in bankruptcy.
2.
The effect of the default judgment.
Since the judgment in the former action had become final, the court erred, not in rejecting plaintiff’s offer of proof, for such proof was unessential, but in rendering judgment in favor of defendant on the evidenсe before the court, consisting of the complaint in the original action, the default of defendant, and the judgment for plaintiff. The evidence tendered by the offer of proof would have established nothing more than defendant had admitted by his fаilure to answer in the first action. By permitting his default to be entered he confessed the truth of all the material allegatiоns in the complaint
(Wilshire Mortgage Corp.
v.
O. A. Graybeal Co.,
Judgment reversed with instructions (1) to vacate the order striking out portions of the complaint; (2) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accord with this opinion; (3) to enter judgment for plaintiff as prayed.
Moore, P. J., and McComb, J., concurred.