8 Nev. 271 | Nev. | 1873
By the Court,
Under authority conferred by the twenty-ninth section of the “act to provide revenue for the support of the government of the State of Nevada,” approved March 9, 1865, the district attorney of the County of Elko, on the 30th day of December, 1870, commenced actions in the name of the State of Nevada for the recovery of delinquent taxes assessed against certain real estate and improvements situate in said county, and against the owners thereof. Thereafter judgments were entered against the defendants and executions issued, and on the sixth day of April succeeding the real estate was subjected to sale in the manner provided by statute for the sale of property for delinquent taxes (Stats. 1866, 161), and was bought in by the county treasurer in trust for the State and county. So the district court finds; and by that finding we are bound, as this case is presented.
The appellant, the sheriff of Elko County during the period embraced by these transactions, brought suit in the court below for the recovery of his fees in these tax suits and sales, amounting to $6998 40. Erom a judgment for defendant and an order denying a motion for a new trial this appeal is taken.
The act of 1865 in its original form and as it stood at the commencement of these suits authorized and directed the district attorney to commence them, and provided that “no fees or costs should be paid to any officer unless the same
The amendment of 1871 obviously contemplates the payment of fees out of the county treasury in eases only in which suits are brought by direction of the commissioners. The language employed completely demonstrates that object, and it is a fundamental maxim in the interpretation of statutes that when the object of the legislature is plain and the language unequivocal effect should be given to the intent of the law-makers. We are clearly of opinion that the amendment did not contemplate such a case as this, in which the tax suits were commenced without the authority of the county commissioners.
But disregarding the requirements that these suits be brought with the sanction of the commissioners the plaintiff can not recover. It is a rule of statutory construction that new statutes apply to new cases unless the contrary expressly appears: therefore we must presume that had the legislature
In these cases the inquiry of the courts was only to the intention of the legislature. Being enactments of the British parliament in the exercise of its unlimited authority no judicial question of their validity could arise.
This rule of construction has been constantly followed by the courts of this country. Said Monell, J., in Trist v. Cabanas, 18 Abbott’s Pr. R. 145: “ When the statute is silent it must be presumed that it was the intention to limit its operation to the period of time when it took effect, and to fasten its provisions only upon such proceedings as might be commenced thereafter.” See also, Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 479; Hastings v. Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Garrett v. Wiggins, 1 Scam. 335; Perkins v. Perkins, 1 Conn. 558; Prince v. United States, 2 Gall. 204. The injustice of a retroactive construction of this amendment is illustrated by the fact that proceedings for the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes for the fiscal year 1870 might have been and in some cases possibly were concluded before the amendment became a law. No provision in such case is made to pay the officer’s fees out of the general fund of the county. So unfair a discrimination can not be attributed to the legislature.
Judgment affirmed.