.This action is upon a policy of fire insurance and in the circuit court plaintiff recovered a judgment for $1,000 and interest. The errors alleged by defendant on appeal are not numerous, and, of those argued, such as relate to the language used by plaintiff’s, counsel in the examination of witnesses, and before the jury, cannot be considered, because not covered by proper assignments.
It is conceded that the policy was in force when the fire occurred; the destruction of the property insured, or of a large portion of it, is not denied, and there is no question raised as to the value of the property. The sole defense, practically, is that proofs of loss were not furnished as. required by the terms of the policy. And while a copy is not given in the record, it must be assumed that the policy in question is a Michigan standard policy, with the usual terms. Plaintiff concedes that full and sufficient proofs of loss were not furnished, and claims that such proofs were waived by the company through its adjuster, who, he testifies, absolutely denied the company’s liability under the policy, and declared that it would not pay anything upon the loss. The adjuster, who was sworn as a witness on behalf of the company, unqualifiedly denied making such statements, or any of them, and the question of fact, thus raised, was submitted to the jury, who held with the plaintiff.
First. That the jury, in finding such disclaimer and refusal to have been made by the adjuster, acted against the great weight of the evidence.
Second. That an adjuster for an insurance company has no authority, by virtue of his employment, to bind the company through such disclaimer and refusal.
Considering the latter proposition first, it has been determined in this State that an adjuster, when acting in the line of his employment, has such authority. Popa v. Insurance Co., supra. This might not have been quite clear when the appeal was taken, although it was practically so held in Morgan v. Insurance Co., 130 Mich. 427 (90 N. W. 40). In. the instant case, however, the authority of the adjuster was even more apparent. In reply to a letter from plaintiff’s attorney asking that the loss be paid at once, the company replied that the adjuster was looking after its interest in the matter, and that the letter had been referred to him for an answer. The fair implication from this is that the adjuster had full charge of everything relating to the loss. It is true that the letter was written after the adjuster had denied the company’s liability, but there is no indication that his authority was any less at the time of the denial than it was when the inquiry by plaintiff’s attorney was referred to him.
As to the first proposition, it is not shown by the record that the jury acted against the weight of the evidence in finding that the adjuster did deny the
The judgment is affirmed.