69 Conn. 375 | Conn. | 1897
To the original complaint in this case— which sought to enjoin the defendant from diverting, in the manner therein alleged, the flow of water into Park river— a demurrer was filed and sustained, with leave to amend. The complaint was then amended, a demurrer thereto was filed, and thereupon the questions arising upon both demurrers were reserved for the advice of this court. As the determination of the questions arising upon the demurrer to the amended complaint disposes of the case reserved, it will be unnecessary to consider those arising upon the demurrer to the original complaint.
The amended complaint consists of two counts. The substance of the material parts of the first count, by paragraphs, may be stated as follows:—
1. The plaintiffs are the owners of a valuable mill property on Park river in the city of Hartford, with mills upon both sides of the river, one upon Elm street, and the other immediately opposite upon Wells street. They are the owners, at that point and for a considerable space upon each side of it, of the banks of the river, and of its bed, and the exclusive owners of the water privileges at that point. 2. The water power available at this point to the plaintiffs, by means of their dam, is equivalent to about two hundred horse power upon the average. 3. The water privilege is an ancient one, having been established, used and occupied as-such for more than two hundred and fifty years. 4. The value of the mill property in connection with the water privilege is $250,000, and the plaintiffs have established a large and profitable business thereon as millers, and the water power is sufficient, without the assistance of steam, to carry on the entire business of the plaintiffs as such millers. 5. The defendant is the owner of a large and important system of reservoirs, for the use of the citizens of Hartford for domestic and other purposes. The water of all these reservoirs is communicated to a certain distributing reservoir, whence by leading pipes it
The relief prayed for was as follows: “ The plaintiffs claim an injunction restraining the defendant city from diverting into said intercepting sewer, or any part of the same, or elsewhere, the present current and flow of water into said Park river, at and above the said dam of plaintiffs, whether such present current and flow be through drains, pipes, sewers, surface flowage, or otherwise, until an assessment of the damages resulting to plaintiffs from such diversion shall have been assessed or agreed upon, and the payment thereof made
The first sixteen paragraphs of the first count were made part of the second count, and the remainder of the second count, with the relief prayed for, was as follows: “ 2. The defendant threatens to divert from said stream of water, and from the plaintiffs’ use thereof, nearly one half .of its flow and current, without any compensation whatsoever to the plaintiffs for their damages directly resulting from said so-called improvement. 3. The diversion of said water as aforesaid by the defendant will cause an irreparable damage to the plaintiffs, and damages incapable of estimate. 4. The defendant has never compensated nor paid in any way the plaintiffs for the accumulation of the water of Tumbledown Brook reservoir, as described in the 8th paragraph of the first count, nor has it attempted to agree with the plaintiffs as to the amount of said damages. 5. Until the plaintiffs are deprived of the use of said water, which is now returned to them as hereinbefore set out, they suffer no substantial damage; but when said water is carried past the plaintiffs’ dam, as proposed by the construction and use of said intercepting sewer as aforesaid, the same will be of great and irreparable damage to them. 6. For the accumulation of the waters of the stream and its tributary springs and brooks, described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the first count, no compensation has ever been made to the plaintiffs or their predecessors in the ownei'ship of the mill privilege aforesaid. 7. The storage capacity of said reservoirs is as follows: No. 1. 146,000,000 gallons, No. 2. 284,000,000 gallons, No. 3. 146.000. 000 gallons, No. 4. 601,000,000 gallons, No. 5. 94.000. 000 gallons, No. 6. 800,000,000 gallons. No. 6 is Tumbledown Brook reservoir. The average daily consumption of said water by the defendant’s water department is about 7,000,000 gallons.
“ The plaintiffs amend the prayer for relief, by making the same as it now stands paragraph 1 of plaintiffs’ claims, and
After the complaint as thus amended was filed, it was further amended by way of more specific statement as follows : “The plaintiffs herewith amend the complaint by making more specific statement as follows: (1) At the end of paragraph 19 add the following: The action and opinion of said court of common council referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19, were expressed by certain votes, copies of which, with the subject-matter and the correct dates thereof, appear in the annexed journals of the board of common council and the board of aldermen of said court of common council, which are marked Exhibits ‘ C ’ and ‘D ’ respectively, at pages 185-217 inclusive, and 251 of Exhibit ‘ 0,’ and pages 222, 336, 337, 446, and 461 of Exhibit ‘ D.’ The plans, maps, and surveys referred to at page 217 of Exhibit ‘ 0,’ are made a part hereof by reference, the same being in the possession of the defendant, and of such a character that the plaintiffs are unable to file the same. The report of the committee, with the resolution therein submitted, a copy of which appears at pages 336 and 337 in said Exhibit ‘ D,’ is still pending in said court of common council. (2) At the end of paragraph 20 add the following: The action of said street board referred to in this paragraph, was pursuant to a vote of said court of common council, a copy of which, with the subject-matter and the correct date thereof, appears in said Exhibit ‘ C,’ at pages 479-481 inclusive. A copy of the publication of the resolution therein mentioned, so far as there was any publication thereof, is the plaintiffs’ Exhibit ‘ B.’ A copy of the publication of the notice given by said street board and referred
Exhibit “ G ” shows, in substance, that the city, in July, 1893, resolved to construct the intercepting sewer complained of, in order to remove, what is called in said Exhibit “ 0,” “ the Park river sewage nuisance,” and also as “ an improvement to the city’s sewerage system in general.”
Exhibit “ D ” shows, in substance, that in July, 1893, the common council appointed a committee to ascertain and report the probable cost of extinguishing the flowage rights of the plaintiffs, and of acquiring their entire mill property; that in November of that year said committee made a report and asked for further power in the premises. This report was eventually tabled by the board of aldermen, in March, 1894, and so remains.
Exhibit “ E ” is as follows: “ Board of Sheet Commissioners, Hartford, Conn., March 19th, 1896. This Board will meet Monday evening, March 19th, 1896, at 7 :30 o’clock, to hear all parties interested in the matter of damages for the right of way for the proposed system of intercepting sewers and branches thereof. ' Parties interested are invited to be present. Charles H. Northam, President.”
So far as it is deemed necessary to set out the demurrers, they are as follows. To the first count: “ The defendants demur to the first count of the plaintiffs’ complaint, for the following reasons: None of the votes or resolutions passed by the court of common council of the city of Hartford, referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19, or any paragraph of the first count, as amended or in plaintiffs’ specific statement, have the effect, or as matter of law contain any vote or determination of the common council, to divert any part of the Park river, or to take the waters of said river out from its stream, or any part thereof, or cause it to flow through a sewer, or other aqueduct built in or upon the bed of such stream, or laid in the earth in or near the banks thereof. It does not appear from the first count nor any amendments thereof, that by virtue of any of said votes or resolutions, the city of Hartford took any action under the act of March
“ The defendant also demurs to the second count of the amended complaint, for the following reasons: It appears from the second count, and from various paragraphs thereof, and especially from paragraph 10, that the defendant is not proposing to divert Park river, nor any streams of water which flow into the same, but is proposing merely to keep sewage out of Park river, to turn sewage or sewage water from certain sewers into an intercepting sewer and take said sewage into the Connecticut river. It appears from the second count, and especially from paragraph 10 of the original complaint, now made part of the second count, that the acts of the defendant complained of are done in the course of the construction of a certain intercepting sewer by the city of Hartford, and the proposed use of the same in order to turn sewage into the Connecticut river. And there are no averments in the second count which tend to show that such construction of a sewer or diversion of sewage on the part of the defendant is unlawful. The defendant demurs to the relief demanded in the second count of the complaint, because upon the allegations of the second count the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief by way of injunction as therein sought.
Although the record in this case is somewhat voluminous, the facts decisive of it lie in narrow compass, and may be briefly stated as follows:—•
The plaintiffs are the owners of a valuable water privilege and mill property on Park river. Prior to the acts complained of the city of Hartford had constructed a system of reservoirs at great expense, to supply itself and its inhabitants with water for domestic and other purposes'. This water supply is all taken above the plaintiffs’ dam, from brooks, streams and springs which are tributary to Park river, to the entire current and flow of which river, including the water so taken by the city, the plaintiffs are exclusively entitled at their mills. The water so taken by the city is from one third to one half the volume of said river. This water is carried to a distributing reservoir’, and thence by leading pipes to the city, where it is sold and distributed to the citizens through service pipes for use; and after such use is returned in great part to Park river through the sewage system of the city. This has been done ever since the city began to use such water supply, and by reason of such return the plaintiffs thus far have suffered no substantial damage from the use of said water by the city.
The city now proposes to divert all the water thus flowing through its sewerage system as aforesaid into Park river
These are the main controlling facts in the case, and the question is whether upon them the plaintiffs are entitled to the precise relief which they now seek.
If the complaint could be regarded as one brought simply to enjoin the city from taking its water supply or any part of it from the tributaries of Park river, the case thus presented would be a very different one from the present case ; but it cannot be so regarded. The complaint is not brought to have the city enjoined from diverting the water of Park river or its tributaries into the reservoirs and distributing pipes of the city, or from using the water so diverted; but it is brought to restrain the city from diverting its sewage into the intercepting sewer; and this is the very gist of the complaint.
The allegations of the complaint are, in effect, that this sewage has heretofore been permitted to flow into Park river, that it is available for use at the plaintiffs’ mills, that the
It is true the complaint may be fairly said to allege, in effect, that the city gets its water supply from waters which belong to the plaintiffs, and that it has no right as against the plaintiffs to take and use such water as it does ; but the complaint does not ask to have such taking and use enjoined against; it only asks to have the city enjoined from disposing of that water after it has become sewage.
How it is quite clear that the city either has, or it has not, the right as against the plaintiffs, to take and use the water which constitutes its supply as set forth in the complaint; and in either case we think it is equally clear that the city has the right, as against the plaintiffs, to dispose of that water after it enters the sewerage system as sewage, under its charter, as it sees fit. In other words, the plaintiffs may or may not have the right to have the whole or a part of the water supply of the city returned as water to Park river, but in either case they have no right to have it so returned after it has become sewage, or to have it returned through the sewerage system of the city, which are in effect the rights claimed in the present case.
If the city has the right, as against the plaintiffs, to take and use the water in its reservoirs, then clearly it has the further right, as against them, either before or after it is used, to dispose of it under its charter as it sees fit. If, on the other hand, it has no right as against the plaintiffs to take or use the waters in its reservoirs—which is we think the ease stated in the complaint—this fact of itself does not give the plaintiffs a right to control the disposition of such water after it has entered the sewerage system and become sewage. That control still remains with the city, and ought to remain with it.
As the court is bound to take .judicial notice of the city
The complaint clearly shows that it is the sewage of the city, and not the waters of Park river or its tributaries in any proper sense, which the city is about to turn into the intercepting sewer; and it is this precise diversion and nothing else which the plaintiffs seek to have enjoined. For the reasons given we are of opinion that they are not entitled to the injunction.
In this view of the case the question whether the city, in what it has done or intends to do as alleged in the complaint, is or is not acting under the Act of 1882—a question much discussed upon the argument-—becomes of secondary importance. We think however that the record clearly shows that the city is not acting in this matter under the authority conferred by the Act of 1882, but under the provisions of its charter, without regard to that Act. Furthermore, we think
The Superior Court is advised that the complaint is insufficient.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.