89 Wis. 42 | Wis. | 1894
The evidence tends to support the finding of the jury as to the defective and insufficient condition of the highway and bridge. Upon the question whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury of which the plaintiff complains, we think that the finding of the jury is against the uncontradicted evidence, and that for this reason the recovery cannot be sustained. It appears from the testimony of the plaintiff and one Liscomb, the only other person present, who was helping her to haul hay, that they had passed over the bridge in the morning in going for the hay; that after it was loaded it tipped over in driving out of the field, and when it was righted up they took two levers along with which to steady the load when necessary. There were from 1,000 to 1,500 pounds of hay in the load, and the. plaintiff was driving the team,— a safe and quiet One, which the plaintiff was accustomed to drive and use in work on the farm, and had been for years. There was considerable snow on the ground, in the highway, and on the bridge and approaches, and it had accumulated on the south side, so that the travel was crowded to the extreme north side. It was thawing, and rained some, and
The methbd which the plaintiff and Liscomb adopted to extricate the sleigh and load, situated as they were on the brink of a very deep ravine or gully, with the load tipped or inclined somewhat towards it, obviously was an imprudent and dangerous one, particularly to the plaintiff, in sitting upon the load and attempting to drive the team when it was apprehended that the load might tip over into the ravine. The evidence is clear that the plaintiff knew and understood the situation, and she must have appreciated the risk which she assumed in remaining on the load and attempting to drive off the bridge and out of the difficult situation. She is clearly chargeable with negligence in the course she pursued, and must be held to have taken upon herself the risk of what must be regarded ■ as a dangerous experiment. The dictates of .common prudence required that she should have resorted to other and less hazardous means of extricating the sleigh and load from the predicament in which it had been placed.
Ordinarily, the question of contributory negligence is for the jury; but where negligence is clearly and conclusively established, and there is no fair inference arising upon the undisputed facts that the plaintiff is free from fault, it is then the duty of the court to deal with the question as a matter of law, and direct a verdict accordingly, or set it aside if found for the plaintiff. It is only necessary in this case to repeat what was held in Goldstein v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 46 Wis. 406: “ If a person places himself in a position of known danger, when he might avoid it, he is guilty
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.