109 Ark. 456 | Ark. | 1913
(after stating the facts). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the indictment, claiming it does not allege that death resulted from the wound inflicted by bim upon the deceased. The indictment charges that he did “unlawfully * * * kill and murder one Jack Chandler * * * by then and there stabbing and cutting him, the said Jack Chandler, with a certain knife * # * held in his hand with # * * intent then and there to kill and murder bim, the said Jack Chandler.”
It is true, it does not say that he died and that his death was caused from the wound inflicted by the stroke with the knife, but it does say he did kill and murder him with a knife held in his hand, by cutting and stabbing him with the intent to kill and murder him, and although the word “murder” has a technical meaning, which may be ascribed to it in the indictment, the word “kill” is by no means technical, it is used in its ordinary acceptation and means unmistakably to slay, to put to death, to deprive of life, and when the indictment charges that the defendant “did kill and murder Jack Chandler * * *” it gave him clear and specific notice that Jack Chandler died from the effects of the stabbing, and of the offense with which he was charged. Neither was it defective in failing to specifically alleged that the deceased died within a year and a day after the infliction of the wound. It is¡ true our statute (Kirby’s Digest, § 1774) provides that in order to make the killing murder or manslaughter, it is requisite that the person injured die within a year and a day after the wound was given, but under other statutes, requiring what indictments shall contain and providing that none is insufficient for “any defect which does not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits,” it is immaterial that no specific allegation is made of the death resulting within such time after the mortal wound, since murder has a technical meaning, and when it is sufficiently alleged in the indictment the defendant is put upon notice that death resulted within the time specified by law to make the offense of that grade. Kirby’s Digest, § § 2228-9 and 2243; State v. Sly, 80 Pac. (Idaho) 1125; Cordell v. State, 22 Ind. 1; Caldwell v. State, 14 S. W. 123-4; State v. Kirby, 63 Pac. 752; Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44; People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; State v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 371.
Instructions numbered 9 and 10 correctly state the law, and were applicable to the case made. The evidence shows that after appellant and deceased were arrested, and while they were being taken to the office of the justice, the officer discovered open in appellant’s hand a new dirk knife, which he had purchased and exhibited to witnesses, declaring that he bought it to kill deceased with, and there was much testimony tending to show that deceased was standing where the officer left him when he tried to wrest the knife from appellant or prevent him using it, with his hands by his side, making no attempt whatever to assault appellant when the fatal blow was struck. It also tends to show that appellant broke away from the officer, and made two or three steps toward deceased, and struck him with the knife, cutting his throat from ear to ear. That he did this, notwithstanding the officers and others were trying to prevent him and take the knife from him. He claims he thought the other man was advancing upon him, and believed that he had a knife and that he struck the fatal blow in order to protect himself; but no witness said for him that he attempted in any way to avoid the difficulty or get away from the officer or to get out of the way of deceased, and he himself does not contend that he did.
Neither was error committed in refusing to give instruction No. 21, as requested. The evidence shows that appellant had voluntarily entered into the difficulty; that he was about to assault the deceased and the officer to prevent him doing so pushed him aside and tried to wrest the knife from him, and that he made no effort whatever to go around the officer or attempted to get away from the difficulty, but broke loose and went by the officer, or pushed him back and struck over his shoulder and killed the deceased, who was unarmed, so far as the testimony shows, and was not at the.time, according to the great preponderance of it, making any hostile demonstration toward appellant. Instruction numbered 9 correctly covered the phase of the case upon which this instruction was asked. Neither was there error committed in refusing to allow the witness, Z. E. Fisher, to state what the deceased said to him after the cutting relative to who was to blame for the trouble. The conversation was not a part of the res gestae, was not shown to have been made under such circumstances as to render it admissible as a dying declaration, and was but a mere expression of an opinion and inadmissible on that account.
We find no prejudicial error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
